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Abstract
This thesis examines how economic shocks, specifically exogenous shocks from im-
migration and developments in the housing market, affect the price people pay for
housing, whether or not they move, and whether who they vote for in an election is
affected. I make use of two sources of shocks, one from a rapid increase in immigra-
tion to the UK since the mid-1990s, and the other from a rapid increase in average
house prices, also from the mid-1990s.
In the first chapter I consider whether there is any evidence of a causal relationship
between the increase in immigrants and the increase in housing rents and prices in
the UK since the mid-1990s. The analysis uses the spatial correlation approach
and a properly specified housing demand equation to estimate the causal impact of
immigration on house prices and rents. Because the majority of immigrants rent
housing rather than own on arrival it is important to study the first order effects
on the rental market. I find evidence of a positive effect of immigration on housing
rents, and significant negative effects of immigration on house prices.
In the second chapter, I examine whether natives and earlier cohorts of immi-
grants are displaced from particular local labour markets in response to immigrant
inflows. Whether or not immigrants displace natives has important implications for
understanding the operation of labour markets. I find strong evidence of native
displacement in aggregate, however I also find evidence of sorting by natives and
immigrants into different areas by skill time; for example high-skilled natives and
high-skilled immigrants appear to be attracted to each over, suggesting that at least
some immigrants and natives can be thought of as complements in the labour market.
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The third chapter examines the consequences of rapidly increasing house prices
on the political preferences of voters. I show that positive unanticipated housing
wealth shocks for homeowners causes a significant increase in the likelihood of voting
for the Conservative Party. I also present evidence that suggests that housing wealth
shocks lead homeowners to hold more conservative economic and social views.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis examines how economic shocks, specifically exogenous shocks from
immigration and developments in the housing market, affect the price people pay for
housing, whether or not they move, and whether who they vote for in an election is
affected.
Exogenous shocks are shocks that are unpredictable or unanticipated that can
affect individuals, as well as firms, communities, cities, or regions, for example, and
that come from ‘outside’ the individual, community or area, rather than from within
(i.e. endogenous). The response of individuals or areas to shocks plays a central role
in our understanding of the spatial organisation of households and firms, which in
turn has been shown to have important implications for economic outcomes, such
as productivity, or inequality. Blanchard and Katz (1992) is a seminal paper in
economic geography that studies how regions evolve in response to economic shocks
such as economic downturns.
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Exogenous, unanticipated shocks are rarely observed, and this therefore makes
efforts to identify their effects difficult. In this thesis I make use of two sources of
exogenous shocks, one from a rapid increase in immigration to the UK since the
mid-1990s, and the other from a rapid increase in average house prices, also from
the mid-1990s. In chapter two I consider whether there is any evidence of a causal
relationship between the increase in immigrants and the increase in house prices in
the UK since the mid-1990s. Rising immigration has led to concern that this may
put pressure on the housing market, leading to higher house prices and housing rents.
In chapter three I consider whether the inflow of immigrants into local authorities
across the UK has caused natives to be displaced, or conversely attracted to areas
that immigrants locate in. Finally, in chapter four, I examine whether unanticipated
housing wealth shocks have any affect on the voting behaviour of individuals’ in
terms of a greater preference for left or right parties, and on whether it affects the
decision to vote or not.
A significant literature in the economics of migration has explored the effect that
immigrants have on local labour markets, often exploiting exogenous shocks such as
the Mariel boat lift in the case of Card (1990). Generally, economists have found
relatively small, if any, effects of immigration on native wages or employment (see
for example, Card (2001, 2007, 2005), Dustmann et al. (2005), Dustmann et al.
(2012), Manacorda et al. (2012)). Chapter two argues that the housing market is an
important arena in which to examine the effects of immigration, as an upward-sloping
supply curve and new immigrant demand could be expected to push up house prices
and rents in areas where immigrants settle. A key feature of the housing market that
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makes it different from the labour market is the durable nature of the housing stock
- it can neither be built or removed quickly (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005), therefore,
the price response could be expected to be much greater in the housing market than
in the labour market.
The analysis in Chapter two uses a properly specified housing demand equation,
embedded in the spatial correlation approach, to examine how immigration affects
the sales prices and rents of houses across 170 local authorities in England and Wales
between 1996 and 2010. The major contribution of this Chapter to the literature
is to be the first to consider the affect of immigrant inflows on the rental sector.
Because the majority of immigrants rent rather than own on arrival it is important
to study the first order effects on the rental market. I control for a range of labour
market and housing market conditions, including native mobility. Although the rapid
increase in immigrants to the UK can be seen as a shock to the UK, where precisely
immigrants choose to live may be endogenous to local economic conditions, and
I therefore construct an instrumental variable making use of the historical location
patterns of earlier waves of migrants, to overcome this problem. I that that an inflow
of immigrants equal to 1% of the initial population of a local area over a three-year
period is associated with a 0.14% - 0.18% increase in average housing rent in the same
three-year period. This is a very small increase and is somewhat puzzling given that
most immigrants are likely to rent on first arrival in the UK. Consistent with earlier
work by Sa´ (2014), I also find statistically significant evidence of a reduction in
average house prices by immigrants. An inflow of immigrants equal to 1% of the
population of a local area over a three-year period reduces house prices by about
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1.3 to 1.6% in the period 2003-2010, however there is no evidence of any significant
affect on house prices for the period 1996-2002.
An important assumption underlying the results in chapter two, and many other
studies of the labour market consequences of migration, is that the native population
does not respond to immigrant inflows by moving out of an area that has experienced
a high immigrant inflow. In chapter three I analyse this question in the context
of local labour markets in the UK. Whether or not natives move in response to
immigrant inflows also has important welfare consequences (negative if they did not
otherwise plan to move), and has implications for the growth and decline of cities
and regions, particularly if immigrants of particular skill types locate in similar areas,
for example high skilled immigrants and high skilled natives in large cities such as
London.
A standard model of labour market displacement suggests that an immigrant
shock to a local labour market may set in motion a process of spatial arbitrage,
whereby immigrants increase the local labour supply, lowering wages relative to other
markets, and creating an incentive for natives to move to higher wage areas. Alter-
natively, an immigrant inflow may attract natives if the economic return to locating
near immigrants is higher because of externalities or skill complementarities, for ex-
ample. Using the spatial correlation approach, and instrumenting for immigrant
inflows, I examine the empirical evidence for displacement or attraction. In aggre-
gate my results suggest that natives move out of a local area when immigrants move
in, at a rate of 20-30 for every 100 immigrants. However these results mask a degree
of sorting of immigrants and natives of different skill types. For example disaggre-
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gating by skill (based on position in the distribution of wages, or age of leaving
full-time education), I find a degree of attraction between high-skilled immigrants
and high-skilled natives, while also finding a negative association between low-skilled
immigrants and high-skilled natives.
In chapter four I consider a possible consequence of the rapid increase in house
prices that has occurred across large parts of the UK since the mid-1990s. This is the
first work to consider how housing wealth might affect peoples’ voting behaviour and
economic and social attitudes, and unlike income which can fluctuate from year-to-
year, wealth (of which housing is usually a major component) gives a more complete
picture of an individuals’ power over resources in society. The increase in house
prices over this period represents a large increase in housing wealth, which to the
extent that it is realisable through for example, equity withdrawal, moving house,
or use as collateral, represents a significant increase in wealth for many individuals
and households. The role of wealth in economic relations and society generally is
coming under increasing scrutiny, particularly wealth inequality. Piketty and Saez
(2003) and Atkinson et al. (2011), for example, show that the share of income ac-
cruing to the top one percent has grown over time. Rajan (2010) has argued that
this growing inequality in the US put pressure on politicians to ease the supply of
credit prior to the Great Recession. In a democracy, voting for a particular political
party is one of the most important decisions people can make, and while there is a
significant literature on the effects of campaign financing for example, on electoral
outcomes, relatively little attention has been paid to the role of economic factors in
affecting people’s choices in the ballot box. Among others, both Bartels (2008) and
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Stiglitz (2012), have emphasised the links between economic inequality and political
inequality.
Until recently the UK has lacked any household surveys of wealth, making it
difficult to study the influence of wealth on a wide of range of social and economic
phenomena. In this chapter I make use of variation in wealth determined by the
housing market to identity how household wealth shocks affect political preferences
and voter turnout. Homeownership rates in the UK are high, and housing wealth
represents the largest share of total household wealth for most people, so it therefore
makes sense to consider how changing fortunes in the housing market might affect
electoral choices. The rapid increase in house prices occurred differentially across
space, and the boom was not confined to solely high income people, as many relatively
low-income people who happened to live in high-growth areas also experienced a
significant increase in housing wealth.
Using data from the British Household Panel Survey and Understanding Society
for the period 1995-2012, I show that an increase in the housing wealth of home
owners causes a significant increase in the likelihood of voting for the Conservative
Party. I find no evidence of an effect of housing price growth on the voting intentions
of renters. In an attempt to explore why increased housing wealth might alter the
voting patterns of homeowners I also present evidence suggesting that growth in
housing wealth leads homeowners to hold more conservative views on a variety of
economic and social issues.
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Chapter 2
The effects of Immigration on
House Prices and Rents: Evidence
from England and Wales
2.1 Introduction
The relationship between rising house prices and immigration1 2 has been the
subject of recent debate in the United Kingdom, as the proportion of foreign born
1Access to the special license version of the Labour Force Survey data used in this study was
provided by the UK Data Archive. Access to housing rent data by Daniel Banks at Dataspring
is gratefully acknowledged. Comments and advice on this chapter from Jonathan Wadsworth and
Arnaud Chevalier are also gratefully acknowledged, as is help with funding from CReAM.
2In this chapter the terms foreign-born and immigrant are used interchangeably. The Labour
Force Survey collects information on the country of birth, and therefore although some immigrants
may in time become British citizens, they are still counted in the LFS as foreign born based on
their country of birth. Foreign born refers to anyone not born in the UK (England, Wales, Scotland
and Northern Ireland).
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in the population has risen from 7 percent in 1996 to approximately 13 percent
in 2010, at the same time that real house prices have appreciated by 146 percent
across England and Wales. Between 1996 and 2008 private sector average real rents
increased by 29 percent. The purpose of this chapter is to examine whether there is
a causal relationship between the increase in immigration and the increase in house
prices and rents illustrated in 2.1. A recent report of the UK House of Lords has
drawn attention to the impact of immigration on housing prices, rents, homelessness,
and affordability, however this did not attempt a causal analysis of the data (House
of Lords, 2008a,b).
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Figure 2.1: Average Real House Prices, House Rents and Proportion of the
Population that is Foreign Born
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Several previous studies have looked at the effect of immigration on wages in
the UK, and have generally found the effect to be small. For example, Dustmann
et al. (2003), using the spatial correlation approach, also used in this study, find a
small positive effect of international migration on wages across British regions. This
is only the second study to examine the effect of immigration on house prices, and
the first to examine the effect of immigration on housing rents, which is potentially
an important channel through which immigrants affect the housing market, as over
90% of immigrants rent rather than own during the first year of arrival. Concurrently
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with this study, Sa´ (2014) has also studied the effect of immigration on house prices
in the UK. She finds that immigration has a negative effect on house prices; her
instrumental variable estimates suggest that an immigrant inflow equal to 1% of a
local authority’s initial population leads to a reduction in house prices of about 1.7%.
In this chapter I use the spatial correlation approach to examine how the propor-
tion of the population that is foreign born affects house prices and rents in the UK.3 I
have an annual panel dataset covering the period 1996-2010 for 170 local authorities
in England and Wales, consisting principally of immigration and population data
from the Labour Force Survey, house price data from the Land Registry, and house
rent data from the Valuation Office Agency (VOA) and Dataspring, in addition to
a variety of other local level covariates. I embed the analysis in a standard housing
demand model such as that used by Muellbauer and Murphy (1997), and Cameron
and Muellbauer (1998). The private housing rental market in the UK has tradition-
ally been relatively small but has grown rapidly in recent years, with the number of
households renting privately standing at 3.4 million in 2009-10, a 68 percent increase
since 1999. In contrast the number of owner-occupied households has increased by
3 percent from 1999 to 14.5 million in 2009-10.4
I examine the relationship between changes in population and changes in house
prices and rents in local authorities, as this allows me to control for time-invariant
unobservable characteristics of local authorities that may either attract or deter im-
3See Dustmann et al. (2008) for an overview of the spatial correlation approach.
4Data are from the English Housing Survey. Proportionately, 67 percent of households were
owner-occupiers in 2009-10, down from 70 percent in 1999; 16 percent of households were renting
privately in 2009-10, up from 10 percent in 1999; 17 percent of households were renting socially in
2009-10, down from 20 percent in 1999.
27
migrants individuals leading to different house prices and rents. Unobserved charac-
teristics of local areas (such as transport, amenities, education and health facilities,
employment opportunities) and unobserved characteristics of the housing stock (such
as age, quality, and size of dwellings) will both influence the characteristics of the
local population and the housing stock.
2.2 Theory and methodology
The effect of migration on house prices and rents will depend on both the size
relative to the native population, and composition of immigrant inflows. Different
groups of migrants may demand different types of housing, and may rent or own.
Theoretically, an increase in the immigrant population could push up house prices
and rents in a local area, particularly if the supply of housing is relatively inelastic,
and in the short run at least, housing supply is relatively fixed. However, there is
every reason to expect that an influx into a particular area of the native-born popu-
lation to also push up house prices and rents in that area, therefore it is questionable
as to why there should be any distinction between the effect of the native born and
foreign born population on house prices and rents.
One possible reason for there to be a differential effect is that immigrants may
be more likely to concentrate in particular parts of the country, particularly London
and other urban areas, in comparison to the native-born population. This might be
because of a desire to live near earlier immigrants from the same country of birth,
and therefore immigrants may exhibit a preference for living in immigrant cities as in
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the model of Saiz (2007). Immigrants may also demand housing services in particular
submarkets. If for example immigrants are on average wealthier than native-born
they may demand more expensive housing in already growing areas. In contrast
poorer or relatively unskilled immigrants may be more likely to locate in relatively
cheaper or declining areas. Immigration may also influence the housing market
indirectly by leading to the out-migration of some of the native-born population from
particular areas, depressing house prices if the outflow is greater than the immigrant
inflow. If immigration has a negative effect on native-born wages (or even just some
part of the population, such as the lower-skilled) this could also affect house prices
indirectly, given that real income is a major determinant of house prices. However,
if as Saiz (2007) points out, the displacement of natives by immigrants is one-for-one
then there should be no or little effect on house prices, and therefore a positive effect
of immigration on house prices would suggest that any displacement of natives is
less than one-for-one. However, even if displacement of natives (to another local
authority) is one-for-one, it is still possible that immigrant inflows could have either
a negative or positive effect on house prices if their tastes are systematically different
from the native born on average.
As mentioned above, an increase in the share of immigrants in an area could
lead to the displacement of natives, as found by Saiz and Wachter (2011) in the US,
due to a preference of the native born to live near other native born. This negative
effect on house prices and rents is more likely to be apparent at neighbourhood level
rather than local authority level, unless the native born cross local authority level
boundaries. In other words, the effects of this sorting are likely to largely cancel out
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at local authority level, as the movement of native born is going to put pressure on
house prices in other parts of a local authority. Therefore to find a negative effect
on house prices of a greater share of immigrants at local authority level because of
the displacement of native born seems less likely.5 Saiz and Wachter (2011) present
a framework based on racial segregation models in which immigration pushes up
average metropolitan (local authority) prices, but prices may not increase as fast in
immigrant neighbourhoods. In their model house prices will increase equally in all
neighbourhoods if the native born are indifferent to the presence of immigrants, even
if immigrants tend to cluster in particular areas. This implies that there should not
be any correlation between immigration and house prices. If the native born have
a preference to live with other native born, house price growth should be weaker in
immigrant areas, and native flight (and the subsequent fall in prices/rents) is likely
to be at least partly offset by lower income natives taking advantage of lower prices.
However, as Saiz and Wachter (2011) point out, if natives value diversity then prices
and population will also go up in immigrant areas.
Expectations have an important role in influencing house price behaviour par-
ticularly during booms when people often expect rapid house price appreciation to
continue indefinitely into the future. If people believe that immigration levels are
high, then this, in conjunction with an often-held view that there is a shortage of
land, could help raise expectations that house prices are going to continue to rise
further, than in the absence of immigration, helping to promote a house price bub-
5House prices also tend to be downwardly sticky (see for example Glaeser et al. (2005) and
Genesove and Mayer (2001)) which is likely to mitigate any rapid decline in house prices; although
native born owners might like to move, it does not necessarily mean that they will if moving means
that they will realize a capital loss.
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ble.6
The degree to which an increase in immigration affects house prices should also
depend partly on the elasticity of housing supply, as shown by Saiz (2007).7 In
areas with more elastic housing supply, the effect of immigration (and population
increases generally) on prices and rents should be lower. Saiz (2007) also shows
that the impact of immigration should be higher in areas with low price elasticity of
demand or in which the responsiveness of the UK born to an increase in the foreign
born population is low. Immigrants are also likely to find it more difficult to access
credit in comparison with the native population because of a lack of UK work history
and a UK bank account.8
There are three major difficulties in assessing the effect of immigration on house
prices and rents that could lead to biased results. First, immigration may be en-
dogenous, migrants might be attracted to areas that have successful economies, and
therefore there may be a spurious correlation between migration and house prices.
Conversely migrants may be attracted to declining areas with lower housing costs,
leading to an underestimate of the effect of immigration on prices and rents. Second,
estimation could be biased by omitted variables that drive both house prices and im-
6See for example Case and Shiller (2003), Shiller (2007). Case and Shiller (2003) suggest that
although changes in “fundamentals” such as income growth or interest rate changes can lead to
changes in house prices, expectation can become self-reinforcing leading to a bubble, which they
describe as “a situation in which excessive public expectations for future price increases cause prices
to be temporarily elevated” (p. 299).
7See for example Glaeser et al. (2008) for the more general result with respect to the total
population.
8There are also differences between EU and non-EU immigrants. Immigrants from the EU are
free to work in the UK and therefore are more likely to buy a house if they settle permanently. For
non-EU immigrants, visa requirements have changed over time, under current rules it is primarily
only the highly skilled and/or wealthy that are able to settle permanently.
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migrant inflows, such as expectations of future economic growth, or improvements to
the environment or amenities such as parks, schools and other facilities. Estimation
in first differences helps to overcome some of the problem associated with unobserved
local authority characteristics, however it does not resolve the problem of differing
trends in unobserved local authority characteristics (for which I try to control for
using local authority-specific time trends). Third, error in the measurement of the
foreign born population could result in attenuation bias, biasing the estimated coef-
ficient on the foreign-born share toward zero (Aydemir and Borjas, 2011). And this
error will be exacerbated in first differences. Error could also arise due to the timing
of immigrant arrival in the country and their inclusion in the LFS, or as a result of
migrants moving after spending some time in their initial arrival location, both of
which would lead to an underestimate of the effect of immigration on house prices
and rents.
The extensive literature on modelling housing markets also provides insights that
need to be taken into account. Equilibrium house prices are, as in other markets, a
function of demand and supply factors, however the long-lived and durable nature
of housing means housing stock is a slow moving variable in comparison with house
prices (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005). It is possible to motivate the derivation of an
inverse demand equation for house prices using a utility maximising framework (See
for example Pain and Westaway (1997) or Grimes and Aitken (2010)). I estimate the
following inverse long-run equation for prices in first differences to remove the effect of
unobserved local authority specific characteristics that may determine local authority
32
house prices and may also be correlated with immigrant location choices:9 Table A2
in Appendix A shows that regressing the level of the foreign born share of the lagged
total population with fixed effects is equivalent to estimating the equation in first
differences without fixed effects. A test of the residuals indicates evidence of AR(1)
serial correlation,10 suggesting that the first difference model is more appropriate
than the fixed effects specification. I therefore present all of the results in first
differences. Given that prices and rents in the housing market are not likely to
adjust instantaneously to population inflows, I also estimate a variant of equation
3.1 taking the change over a three year period.
∆ln
(
PHit
PCit
)
= β1(∆FBit/Popi,t−1) + β2(∆UKit/Popi,t−1) + γ∆Xit + ϕt + λi + it
(2.1)
With the exception of Sa´ (2014), Stillman and Mare´ (2008), and Ottaviano and
Peri (2007), most previous studies have only included the change in foreign-born
population, and not the change in the native-born population, in their econometric
estimation. Without controlling for the change in the native born population, the
estimate of the effect of the foreign-born share on prices, β1, is likely to be biased
upwards, as it will capture the effect of the omitted variable, and I therefore include
the change in the native born population relative to the lagged total population, to
control for the potential outflow of the native population. The dependent variable
is the change in the log of average house prices (or log change in average house
9See Appendix A.2 for the derivation.
10Wooldridge (2002).
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rent) in local authority i between years t-1 and t. I also estimate models using
median and lower quartile house prices. The vector of time-varying control variables
represented by Xit consists of the user cost of capital, average weekly gross pay in
the local authority, the area unemployment rate, the lagged dwelling stock, and the
proportion of the population with no qualifications. Ideally I would like to have a
measure of household permanent income, but in the absence of consumption data at
local authority level I rely on average real weekly pay, and the unemployment rate,
as proxies. I expect real income to have a positive effect on house prices, and the
unemployment rate to have a negative effect on house prices. I include the proportion
of the population with no qualifications as a proxy for the socio-economic status of a
local authority, to control for the likely propensity of immigrants to locate in either
strongly growing areas, or slower growing/declining areas. There is growing evidence
that people (at least the native born population) are attracted to cities and urban
areas where the average skill and qualification level of the population is much higher
(Glaeser and Saiz, 2004), in contrast, some segments of the immigrant population
will be attracted to cities for the same reasons, while others may prefer to locate in
slower growing areas with lower housing costs. Year fixed effects, ϕt capture national
trends in inflation, mortgage rates and over economic variables such as movements in
the economic cycle. Although time invariant factors specific to each local authority
have been differenced out, I also estimate models with local authority fixed effects,
λi, to control for different trends in local authority characteristics over time such as
amenities that are associated with house price/rent growth.
The user cost of capital, the opportunity cost of capital, in this case representing
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the lost income that could have been received had the capital been invested elsewhere
(Himmelberg et al., 2005). Following Himmelberg et al. (2005) the annual cost of
ownership is calculated according to the following formula:
Annual Cost of Ownership = Pit
(
rit + τit + υit + κt − EitPi,t+1
Pit
)
(2.2)
where the expression in brackets is the user cost of capital. The first term (Pit · rit),
the price of housing multiplied by the risk-free interest rate, represents the foregone
interest that could have been earned elsewhere.11 The second term is the price of
housing multiplied by the stamp duty rate τ. The third term is the price of housing
multiplied by υ, the council tax rate. The fourth term represents depreciation of the
housing stock multiplied by house prices, where κ is the depreciation rate. The final
term is the expected capital gain (or loss). I assume that expectations of house price
changes are based on past realisations of house prices, and therefore model the capital
gains using the average return in the previous two years. I attempt to mitigate some
of the endogeneity problem this introduces by using regional capital gains, rather
than local authority capital gains.12 While such extrapolative expectations may
appear naive there is significant evidence that people do form expectations based on
past asset price behaviour (Case and Shiller, 1989, 2003). Case and Shiller (1989)
find that the house price change in one year helps predict the price change in the
11Often the tax adjusted interest rate is used in the construction of the user cost, however as
mortgage interest payments have not been tax deductible since April 2000, I ignore this issue here.
12The ten regions are the East, North East, North West, Yorkshire and the Humber, East Mid-
lands, West Midlands, Wales, London, the South West and the South East.
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following year. The survey results of Case and Shiller (2003) suggest that in markets
experiencing rapid house price inflation, house buyers build in high-expected capital
gains for the following decade.
On the supply side, new investment in housing is negatively influenced by con-
struction costs, including labour and building material costs, land availability, plan-
ning restrictions, and positively influenced by current house prices.
Before turning to the effect of increased immigration on house prices and rents, I
first estimate Equation 2.3 with the change in the total population on the right hand
side; as to the best of my knowledge house price equations at local authority level
have not previously been estimated for the UK. Previous models of the UK housing
market have all been estimated using regional data, see for example, Muellbauer
and Murphy (1997), Cameron et al. (2006) and Meen (1996). This gives me a base
reference to compare to previous regional estimates of house price models, and to
check that the covariates have the expected sign before decomposing the population
change into the change in foreign born and change in UK born population.
∆ln
(
PHit
PCit
)
= β(∆Popi,t−1) + γ∆Xit + ϕt + λi + it (2.3)
The market for rental property is a broad segment of the overall market for hous-
ing services, and because immigrants are more likely to rent rather than own when
first arriving in the country, it is interesting to analyse the effect of immigration on
average house rents.13 Table 2.1 shows that immigrants are more likely to rent than
13The markets for rental accommodation and the markets for home ownership are interrelated,
and this means that I do not necessarily expect to find a stronger effect on rents than house prices;
holding everything else constant, increased pressure in the rental market increases asset values and
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own in the first few years after arrival in the UK, with only 5% of immigrants owning
after 1 year in the UK, rising to 38% owning after 10 years.14 In the same way that
home ownership is affected by the cost of capital, the supply and demand of rental
housing is also affected by the cost of capital. Theoretically, house prices and rents
should be strongly correlated, but in practice there are institutional characteristics
of the rental market such as contractual arrangements, regulations, transaction costs
and search, that cause the evolution of rents to be sluggish relative to house prices
(DiPasquale and Wheaton, 1992). For example, the longer the average contractual
length of rental contracts the greater will be the degree of stickiness in the rent-price
relationship, and there are likely to be substantial differences in quality between
rental units and owner-occupied dwellings. My specification for estimating the effect
of immigration on rents is the same as that used for house prices, except I replace
the user cost of capital with the change in average house prices. As the cost of
ownership increases, I expect the demand for rental housing to increase; I therefore
expect the effect of a change in house prices to be positive. I expect the coefficient
on housing stock to be negative. The expected effect of real income on rents is am-
biguous, as an increase in income may result in a move out of the rental market into
home ownership, or there could be a positive income effect, particularly if barriers
such as credit constraints make home ownership relatively difficult (DiPasquale and
Wheaton, 1992).
should lead to greater investment in residential construction, with some lag.
14All tables in this thesis are produced using ‘estout’ and associated Stata commands written by
Jann (2005, 2007).
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Table 2.1: Tenure of foreign born by year of arrival
Tenure
Years since arrival in the UK % Own % Rent % Other
0 3 95 2
1 5 94 1
2 10 89 1
3 14 85 1
4 19 80 1
5 24 75 1
6 28 71 1
7 32 67 1
8 35 64 1
9 37 62 1
10 38 60 2
2010 average for:
Foreign Born 45 55 1
UK Born 69 31 1
Note: This table shows the percent of immigrant household
heads by tenure. Ownership includes being owned outright,
and being bought with mortgage or loan. Rent includes both
rented and rent free. Other includes squatting, and ‘part rent,
part mortgage’. Source: LFS, 2010
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2.2.1 Endogeneity and instruments
Endogeneity is a potential problem as immigrants may choose to locate in areas
with strong economic growth and therefore likely strong house price growth, resulting
in an upward bias in the elasticity, or they might choose areas that are relatively less
expensive resulting in a downward bias in the estimated elasticity. Following Bartel
(1979), Altonji and Card (1991), Saiz (2007), and others, I construct a supply-push
instrument for migration. This instrument is constructed weighting the historical
spatial distribution of immigrants by the contemporaneous national growth in im-
migrants, based on the idea that immigrants are more likely to locate where earlier
immigrants have settled (Munshi, 2003). I therefore take the foreign born population
in each local authority in 1981 and attribute to each local authority the net immi-
grant growth rate for the whole of the UK each year from the LFS. This approach
allows me to construct an “imputed” foreign born population for each local authority
i at time t according to the following formula:
SPIVi,t =
R∑
r=1
(
FBi,r,1981
FB1981
)
× [(FBr,t − FBr,t−1)− (FBi,r,t − FBi,r,t−1)] (2.4)
To construct the instrument I sum over region of birth, r, as shown in Equation
2.4. From the 1981 census I can identify the number of immigrants in each local au-
thority by twelve broad regions of birth (Africa (New Commonwealth), Bangladesh,
39
India, Pakistan, China, Ireland, Old Commonwealth, EC (1992) members, Other
Europe, South East Asia (NC), Caribbean (NC), and the rest of the World). I then
use the historical pattern of immigrant location by region of birth as the base off of
which to predict local authority level immigration growth based on national growth
in immigrants by country of birth. I follow Smith (2012) and Wozniak and Murray
(2012), and make an adjustment to the usual Card (2001) instrument by excluding
the contribution of each local authority to the national growth in immigrants (the
right-hand side of Equation 2.4). This removes changes in an area’s immigrant pop-
ulation that are driven by local characteristics. The supply-shock (SPIV) is then
assumed to be driven by factors that are exogenous to area i. The left-hand side of
Equation 2.4 is the share of immigrants in each local authority in the base period.
SPIV can therefore be interpreted as the net change in the immigrant population of
area i that would arise if the area received its 1981 share of the net change in the
UK immigrant population by region of birth, minus the contribution to that change
from area i.
2.3 Literature review
Several studies have examined the local impact of immigration on house prices,
with several finding a significant positive relationship. Saiz (2003) utilizes the exper-
iment provided by the Mariel boatlift when Cuban refugees led to 9 percent more
people requiring housing in Miami. He found a small decline in house prices, and
an increase in housing rent of eight percent. Because this was a specific event in
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one place at one time, Saiz (2007) uses the spatial correlation approach to study
the local impact of immigrants at MSA level using both annual and decennial data
between 1983 and 1997, and finds that an immigrant inflow equal to one percent of
a city’s population is associated with an increase in average house prices and rents
of about one percent. Also using US data, Ottaviano and Peri (2007) adopt a spa-
tial correlation approach in a general equilibrium framework and estimate jointly
the effect of immigrants on wages and rents for the average individual as well as for
individuals in each skill group. They find a positive correlation between immigra-
tion and wages/housing prices on average, but find that low skilled native workers
experience a small negative wage effect from immigration and a small positive rent
effect. For skilled workers, immigration is associated with a positive wage effect and
a large positive effect on house prices. Greulich et al. (2004) focus on the effect of
immigration on the rents of lower income U.S. natives who are more likely to be in
competition with lower income immigrants for housing services. They do not find
much of an effect of immigration on this group, suggesting that either natives move
out or elastic housing supply mitigate the migrant inflow.
In the UK, Sa´ (2014) has also used the spatial correlation approach to examine the
effect of immigration on average house prices at local authority level in England and
Wales for the period 2003-2010. She finds a significant negative association between
immigrant inflow and average real house prices using both OLS and IV (instrument-
ing using predicted immigrant inflows based on historical location patterns by region
of birth), controlling for the change in employment relative to the population, and
year and local authority fixed effects. She finds that an increase in immigrants equal
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to 1% of a local authority’s initial population leads to a reduction in house prices of
between 1.6 - 1.7%, and she attributes this to a negative income effect on housing
demand due to higher income natives leaving areas where immigrants cluster, thus
pushing down prices Sa´ (2014). In contrast to Sa´ (2014) I examine the effect of
immigrant inflows on housing rents as well as prices, as over 90% of immigrants rent
on arrival, and it is reasonable to expect a first order effect on rents. I also include
a range of other controls in my house price equation, such as the user cost of capital
and the lagged housing stock which are known to be important in modelling house
prices (see for example Meen (1996) and Cameron et al. (2006)).
Studies using data for Switzerland, Spain, New Zealand, and Canada also use the
spatial correlation approach to examine the effect of immigration on house prices,
and they all use a form of the supply-push instrument used here. Degen and Fis-
cher (2009) use data for 85 Swiss districts between 2001 and 2006 and find that an
immigrant inflow equal to 1 percent of an area’s population increases the prices of
single-family homes by approximately 2.7 percent, conditioning on local variables.
They do however, lack income data, giving rise to possible omitted variable bias
due to the important role that income has on determining house prices. In contrast
to other countries that have been studied, the housing market and levels of immi-
gration in Switzerland are quite different. Switzerland has a system of nationwide
rent control, a low level of homeownership, a low house price inflation environment,
and moderate immigration; therefore the finding of a significant positive effect is not
something that is restricted only to boom environments such as Spain and the UK.
Similarly to the UK, Spain has also recently experienced a housing boom in conjunc-
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tion with a rapid expansion in immigration during 1998-2008, a period examined
by Gonzalez and Ortega (2009) who estimate a house price elasticity of 3.2 percent
at provincial level. They control for GDP growth and the ratio of employment to
population at the provincial level in their regressions.
In contrast to the previous studies, Stillman and Mare´ (2008) and Akbari and
Aydede (2009) use census data and generally find less significant effects on house
prices. Because the supply of housing is more able to respond to population change
over longer time periods this could account for why the estimated effects are smaller
than in those studies using higher frequency data.15 Stillman and Mare´ (2008) exam-
ine how international migration affects house prices and rents in New Zealand using
census data available at five-yearly intervals from 1991-2006. They find that an in-
crease in the total population leads to an increase in house prices, but no evidence
that the inflow of foreign-born immigrants into a local area has a positive effect on
house prices, conditioning on the change in the native born population. They are
able to distinguish between foreign-born and returning New Zealanders, and find
a positive relationship between house prices and returning New Zealanders. They
also find differences in the relationship over time. Using Canadian five-yearly census
data for 1996-2006 Akbari and Aydede (2009) find no effect of immigration on house
prices, controlling for per capita income before taxes, the unemployment rate, the
labour force participation rate, and the housing stock.
Saiz and Wachter (2011) also use the spatial correlation approach at the neigh-
bourhood level, within US metropolitan areas, and find that growth in immigrant
15Although Saiz (2007) also uses Census data in addition to annual data, and the results are
similar for each specification.
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share is associated with lower house price appreciation, in contrast to the results
of Saiz (2007) at MSA level. They attribute this negative effect to native flight
from areas that have a relatively higher immigrant population. Because immigrants
choosing areas that are relatively cheaper could also drive this result, they create
an instrument using a spatial diffusion model to generate predictions of immigrant
location.
Internal migration between British regions has been the subject of several stud-
ies, and house prices have often been seen as playing an important role in mediating
inter-regional migration flows. Cameron and Muellbauer (1998) estimate an equation
for net commuting, and separately, for net migration between British regions between
1978 and 1995. They find that migration responds strongly to relative earnings and
relative employment prospects, but also that high relative house prices discourage
net migration to a region. Although they do not consider foreign immigration, they
do find that an exogenous inflow from another region has a negative effect on house
prices. Cameron et al. (2005) build on Cameron and Muellbauer (1998) and model
regional migration between regions in England and Wales as a system of eight equa-
tions, using data from the National Health Service Central Register for 1975 to 2003.
Again, they do not specifically consider the role of international migration in inter-
regional flows. They find that higher relative house prices reduce net in-migration
and gross in-migration, and increase gross out-migration, additionally; the expecta-
tion of relative capital gains increases net and gross in-migration, and reduces gross
out-migration.
Hatton and Tani (2005) analyse the effect of international migration on inter-
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regional migration between 1982 to 2000 using National Health Service registrations,
and International Passenger Survey data. The focus of their paper is the extent
to which inter-regional mobility acts as an adjustment mechanism in response to
international migration, which might explain the apparent lack of a wage effect as
found by Dustmann et al. (2005) and others. Hatton and Tani (2005) model net
inter-regional in-migration rates as a function of house prices, unemployment rate
and earnings, and similarly to Cameron et al. (1998, 2005) find that the level effect
of house prices is strongly negative, with the change in house prices having a pos-
itive influence reflecting expected capital gains. Hatton and Tani (2005) also find
evidence of displacement effects, their estimates suggesting that a net increase of 100
immigrants to a region produces net out-migration to other regions of 35 people.
2.4 Data
This chapter uses immigration data from the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS),
a household survey containing a variety of labour market statistics. The standard
version of the LFS is available for Government Office Regions, however I was given
access to a special license version of data that is available at local authority level
from 1996 to 2010. This provides data on the foreign-born and UK-born popula-
tion at local authority level. I have data for 170 local authorities in England and
Wales. The LFS counts foreign-born residents irrespective of their formal immigrant
status. LFS data excludes those who live in communal accommodation such as hos-
tels, shelters, and caravan parks. I also do not have data on the number of illegal
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immigrants, or indeed even the scale of illegal immigration in the UK. In 2001, the
Home Office estimated that 430,000 people were illegally resident in the UK House
of Lords (2008b), but some of these may be included in the LFS.
2.4.1 House prices
The house price data used in this analysis comes from the Land Registry, that
has a dataset of over 15 million transactions in England and Wales from 1995 to the
present. The data covers all private residential transactions with the exception of
sales at less than market price (such as Right to Buy), sales below £1,000, and sales
above £20m. The Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG)
makes the Land Registry data available and produces figures for mean, median and
lower quartile prices at local authority level. The Land Registry also produces a
mean house price series using repeat sales regression (RSR) techniques on the repeat
sales of about 5 million properties over the period 1995-2010, and this enables me
to control to a large extent for the size and quality of the dwelling stock as it is
comparing the sale prices of the same properties over time. This assumes that the
characteristics of a particular property, observed on at least two occasions, are largely
unchanged, which is not true to the extent of depreciation and home improvement.
The index is also subject to transaction bias as the sample of properties included in
the measure are a non-random sample of the value of the entire housing stock, as a
property has to be sold at least twice for there to be a matching pair. Houses that
sell more frequently may be systematically different in location, size and quality from
those that sell less frequently, in spite of this, there would have to be a differential
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attraction between immigrants and the native born to the more frequently sold and
less frequently sold properties for this to bias the regression results. The main house
price series I use in the analysis is therefore based on the repeat sales mean from the
Land Registry.
2.4.2 Rent data
House rent data are available at local authority level from two sources, from 1996
until 2001 data is available from the now defunct Rent Service (now incorporated
in the Valuation Office Agency, part of the DCLG), while from 2002 until 2008 I
have data from Dataspring.16 For both data series the coverage is for private rental
accommodation, and I am able to use data based on the average bedroom size, as
well as data for different bedroom sizes. I therefore use three main rental series in
my analysis, the first is the average local authority rent across all bedroom sizes, the
second is the average rent for rental units with one or two bedrooms, and finally the
average rent for rental units with three or four bedrooms.
The rental data is based on what is termed the “local reference rent”, which is the
rent that is determined by a rent officer when housing benefit claimants in the private
sector make a claim that the rent that they are paying is unfair. The local reference
rent is the mid-point between what the rent officer believes to be the highest and
lowest non-exceptional rents in a particular area, and the reference rent is determined
for different bedroom sizes.17 It is important to therefore note that this rent data
16A research unit at the Cambridge Centre for Housing and Planning Research (CCHPR), De-
partment of Land Economy, University of Cambridge. Unfortunately data after 2008 is unavailable.
17See Valuation Office Agency (2008) for a description of how a neighbourhood is defined. The
housing benefit allowance is determined by local authorities and is available to those in both public
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is not the result of arms-length market transactions, and because a determination is
only made because of a claim by someone receiving the housing benefit, the data may
not be fully representative of market prices if there is a geographic concentration of
housing benefit recipients in particular neighbourhoods. These data suggest that real
average rents have increased by 19 percent between 1996 and 2008. In comparison,
the national level ONS Retail Price Index data for rent shows that rental costs
have increased by 42 percent over the same period. Clearly, these data sources are
different, and the ONS series is likely to be more representative of a variety of rental
stock quality, but neither the VOA/Dataspring data I use, or the ONS data make
any adjustment for changes in size and quality. Both data sources indicate that rents
have not increased by the same order of magnitude as house prices.
2.4.3 Control variables
Data on the stock of dwellings in each local authority are obtained from the
Department for Communities and Local Government. I have data on all owner-
occupied housing, privately rented housing, local authority owned housing and the
stock of housing in the (non-local authority owned) social sector. From the Annual
Survey of Household Earnings (ASHE) I have data for the gross weekly wage of full-
time permanently employed adults at local authority level. Data on unemployment
and the proportion of the population with no qualifications at local authority level
are available from the Labour Force Survey.
and private sector housing. Generally those with total income of less than £16,000 a year can claim,
with the level of benefit determined by income, family size, and age. It can only be used for the
payment of rent, and not for buying a house or mortgage payments.
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To construct my measure of the user cost of capital I use data on stamp duty rates
from HMRC.18 These national level rates specify a series of tax rates and thresholds
based on the price of a house, I therefore estimate an average stamp duty rate for
each local authority based on the average house price in each local authority. From
the VOA I have data on average council tax in each local authority from 1996, which
allows me to calculate, as a fraction of the average house sales price in each local
authority, the average council tax rate for each local authority.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Descriptive evidence
This section summarizes the association between house prices and house rents and
population changes over time and across space. Between 1996 and 2010 average real
house prices grew by 109 percent across England and Wales, an average increase of
8 percent per year.19 There is wide spatial variation in the change in house prices as
shown in the map in Figure 2.2, with the largest increases concentrated in Greater
London, (with the highest increases in house prices of over 200 percent over the
period) parts of the South East and South West, and coastal Wales. The North East
had the smallest increase of 117 percent. At local authority level the highest growth
occurred in the London authorities of Hackney (250%), Newham (238%), Southwark
18For example, current stamp duty rates on residential property are: Zero for up to £125,000, 1
percent for over £125,000 to £250,000, 3 percent for over £250,000 to £500,000, 4 percent for over
£500,000 to £1 million, and 5 percent for over £1 million.
19In England, average real house prices grew by 112% between 1996 and 2010, in Wales they
grew by 95%.
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(231%), Westminster (228%), and Lewisham (223%). Outside of London, the areas
with the highest average real house price growth included Brighton and Hove (239%),
Southend-on-Sea (195%), the Isle of Wight (176%), Pembrokeshire (173%), and Bath
and North East Somerset (173%). The five local authorities that had the smallest
increase between 1996 and 2010 were Wolverhampton (92%), Neath Port Talbot
(89%), Blaenau Gwent (88%), Middlesbrough (87%), and Knowsley (81%).
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Figure 2.2: Percentage change in Real Mean House Prices (1996-2010)
Legend
% Change in real mean house prices
31 - 72
73 - 100
101 - 126
127 - 171
172 - 263
London inset
Notes: Figure shows the percentage change in real mean house prices (repeat sales) between 1996
and 2010. Source: Land Registry.
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Figure 2.3: Percentage change in Real Mean House Rent (1996-2008)
Legend
% Change in real mean rent
-26 - 1
2 - 19
20 - 32
33 - 58
59 - 132
London inset
Notes: Figure shows the percentage change in real mean rents (average of all bedroom sizes) between
1996 and 2008 for 148 English local authorities. Source: VOA/Dataspring.
Across England (Welsh rental data are unavailable), average real rents for all
bedroom sizes rose by 19 percent between 1996 and 2008, as shown in Table 2.2.
Prices for one and two bedroom dwellings rose by 14%, while rents for three and
four bedroom dwellings increased by 21%. Regionally, average real rents for all bed-
room sizes rose the highest in London, by 37%, and grew the least in the North
West by 16%. There is significant variation across local authorities, as shown in
Figure 2.3, with the largest increases as high as 131 percent in St. Helens, Leeds
(103%), Kensington and Chelsea (89%), Camden (67%), Salford (66%), East Riding
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of Yorkshire (65%), Westminster (58%), and Islington (58%). At the bottom end,
real rents declined by 26% in North East Lincolnshire, and also fell in Wandsworth
(-13%), Stockport (-9%), Trafford (-7%), Brighton and Hove (-7%), Blackburn with
Darwen (-2%), and rose by 0.7% in Kingston upon Hull, and by 3% in Bolton.
Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics
1996 2010 % Change (1996-2010)
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Mean house price (repeat sales) 81,925 28,759 180,279 104,752 109 44
Mean house price 88,676 39,769 222,392 135,498 142 35
Median house price 74,315 27,208 183,949 89,881 141 35
Lower quartile house price 54,842 18,393 137,801 63,826 144 41
Mean weekly rent (all bedrooms) 111 37 143 61 27 19
Mean weekly rent (1+2 bedrooms) 102 33 113 46 8.7 14
Mean weekly rent (3+4 bedrooms) 129 53 159 95 20 21
UK born population 275,929 225,093 280,531 237,092 .65 7.1
Foreign born population 21,659 23,016 39,780 38,682 102 69
Total population 297,588 234,975 320,311 254,390 7.5 8
Percent UK born .92 .088 .87 .12 -6.1 6.6
Percent foreign born .08 .088 .13 .12 89 65
∆ UKit / Popi,t-1 .00051 .014 .0027 .021 -147 284
∆ FBit / Popi,t-1 .0013 .014 .0049 .021 -70 271
Instrument (Foreign born) .044 .071 .0086 .055 -142 427
Number of dwellings 125,754 97,756 141,790 112,042 12 7
Unemployment rate 8.5 3.3 8.2 2.2 2.2 21
Proportion with no qualification .17 .14 .12 .038 14 522
Real gross weekly pay 460 66 595 130 29 17
User cost of capital .14 .021 .13 .0095 -.43 17
Note: Percentage changes are for the period 1996-2010, except for the change in rents which is between 1996-
2008, and for immig rob which is between 2003-2010. Rental data for Welsh local authorities is unavailable,
and therefore rental data covers 148 English local authorities. All other data covers 170 English and Welsh
local authorities. All monetary amounts are in £2010.
The population of England and Wales grew by 7.4 percent between 1996 and
2010, with significant growth and decline in some local authorities. The total popu-
lation declined in 22 out of the 170 local authorities, predominantly in the formerly
industrialised areas of the North West, North East, West Midlands, Wales and York-
shire and the Humber.20 Disaggregating the population change between UK born
20The total population declined by 5% in Blaenau Gwent, and also fell in Blackpool (-5%),
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and foreign-born finds some very large growth in the foreign born population in some
local authorities, and generally, relatively modest growth in the UK born popula-
tion of most local authorities. The absolute number, and also the proportion, of the
population who were born in the UK declined in the majority of local authorities.
In contrast, the number of foreign born fell in only three local authorities, North
East Lincolnshire, Rutland, and Gwynedd, and the share of the population that was
foreign born fell only in Rutland (-31%), North East Lincolnshire (-24%), Gwynedd
(-4%), Hackney (-2%), Bury (-1%), and Monmouthshire (0.1%). On average, the
proportion of the population that is foreign born increased by 89% across all local
authorities, with the foreign born share of ten local authorities increasing by over 200
percent.21 The largest increases were in Barking and Dagenham (258%), Middles-
brough (279%), Gateshead (292%), Shropshire (311%), Kingston upon Hull (338%)
as shown in Figure 2.4.
Sefton (-5%), Wirral (-4%), and Merthyr Tydfil (-4%). The five local authorities with the largest
population growth were Kingston upon Thames (21%), Milton Keynes (23%), Camden (26%),
Tower Hamlets (32%), and Westminster (42%)
21For example, the proportion of foreign born increased from 1.9% to 8.5% in Kingston upon
Hull, In Shropshire the proportion increased from 1.1% to 4.6%, In Gateshead from 1.5% to 6.0%.
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Figure 2.4: Percentage change in Foreign Born Population (1996-2010)
Legend
% Change in Foreign Born Population
-25 - 45
46 - 93
94 - 144
145 - 215
216 - 344
London inset
Notes: Figure shows the percentage change in the foreign born population between 1996 and 2010.
Source: LFS.
55
Figure 2.5: Foreign Born Share of the Population (2010)
Legend
Immigrant share
2 - 6
7 - 10
11 - 18
19 - 31
32 - 55
London inset
Notes: Figure shows the foreign born population as a proportion of the total population for 2010.
Source: LFS.
As Figure 2.5 and Table 2.3 illustrate there is a distinct spatial pattern in the
distribution of the foreign born population, with the share of the population of local
authorities varying from 2% of the population of Knowsley, to 54.7% of Brent. In
2010, 77% of the foreign born population in the UK were living in predominantly
urban areas, while the remaining 23% were living in predominantly rural areas.22 In
22Urban and rural are defined by Defra (2005). Defra classifies local authorities into one of six
groups; ‘Major Urban’, ‘Large Urban’, ‘Other Urban’, ‘Significant Rural’, ‘Rural 50’, and ‘Rural
80’. ‘Major Urban’ for example, consists of districts with either 100,000 people or 50 percent of
their population in an urban area with a population of more than 750,000. I aggregate these further
into two groups, ‘Urban’ consisting of the first three urban groups, and the remainder I define as
‘Rural’. The 41 local authorities classified as rural are Bath and North East, Bedfordshire, Bucking-
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Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics for the Local Authorities with the 10
largest and 10 smallest Immigrant-to-Population ratios
FB/Pop. Pop. House Price Rent % ∆ FB/Pop. % ∆ HP % ∆ Rent
(2010) (2010) (2010) (2010) (1996-2010) (1996-2010) (1996-2008)
Largest immigrant share:
Brent 54.7 256,600 305,606 224 42 194 35
Westminster 54.6 253,100 617,882 363 134 207 58
Newham 48.9 240,100 224,217 179 77 170 17
Kensington and Chelsea 46.1 169,500 861,539 443 50 221 89
Harrow 44.4 230,100 288,192 219 90 150 31
Tower Hamlets 43.9 237,900 341,948 247 101 173 44
Ealing 43.0 318,500 315,791 249 31 171 39
Haringey 42.3 225,000 337,649 219 28 202 21
Hounslow 41.4 236,800 280,971 217 110 144 35
Merton 41.3 208,800 326,444 219 164 178 30
Average 46.1 237,640 390,024 258 83 181 40
Smallest immigrant share:
Torfaen 2.8 90,500 110,028 . 149 89 .
Cumbria 2.7 494,300 131,620 91 87 100 16
St. Helens 2.7 177,400 106,546 208 57 66 131
Caerphilly 2.5 173,100 101,742 . 43 71 .
Wigan 2.4 307,600 98,881 93 48 56 15
Hartlepool 2.4 91,300 95,551 88 118 43 12
Rhondda, Cynon, Taff 2.2 234,300 79,805 . 30 65 .
Redcar and Cleveland 2.2 137,400 113,081 93 48 58 20
Blaenau Gwent 2.2 68,400 76,910 . 48 66 .
Knowsley 2.0 149,100 108,450 109 45 53 17
Average 2.4 192,340 102,261 114 67 67 35
Average over all 170 LA’s 13.3 324,878 180,279 143 102 109 27
Note: This table shows the local authorities with the 10 largest and 10 smallest immigrant-to-population ratios in 2010, the 2010
population, house prices, and rents. The percentage change in immigrant share (FB/Pop.) and real average house prices (HP) is
between 1996 and 2010. The percentage change in real average rents is between 1996 and 2008. Rental data is for 148 English
local authorities only as Welsh data is unavailable. All monetary amounts are in £2010.
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contrast, 55% of the UK born population were living in urban areas, and 45% in rural
areas. Of the total foreign born population, 39.9 percent lived in London in 2010,
13.6% lived in the South East, 8.3% in the East, 8.1% in the West Midlands, 7.8%
in the North West, 6.5% in the East Midlands, 6.2% in Yorkshire and the Humber,
5.3% in the South West, 2.3% in Wales, and 2.0% percent lived in the North East.
Table 2.3 shows that the ten local authorities with the largest immigrant share in
2010 had an increase in immigrant share averaging 24% between 1996 and 2010.
This coincided with an average increase in real average house prices of 181% in these
local authorities, compared to an average house price increase of 67% in the ten local
authorities with the smallest immigrant share. The average increase in the foreign
born share of the population in the ten smallest immigrant-share areas was just under
1%. Real rents increased by an average of 40% in the ten local authorities with the
highest immigrant share between 1996 and 2008, and increased by an average of 35%
in the smallest immigrant-share local authorities.
hamshire, Calderdale, Cambridgeshire, Cheshire, Cumbria, Derbyshire, Devon, Dorset, Durham,
East Riding of Yorkshire, East Sussex, Essex, Gloucestershire, Hampshire, Herefordshire, Kent,
Lancashire, Leicestershire, Lincolnshire, Norfolk, North Lincolnshire, North Somerset, North York-
shire, Northamptonshire, Northumberland, Nottinghamshire, Oxfordshire, Redcar and Cleveland,
Rutland, Shropshire, Somerset, Staffordshire, Suffolk, Wakefield, Warwickshire, West Berkshire,
West Sussex, Wiltshire, and Worcestershire.
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Figure 2.6: Foreign Born Population vs. House Prices and Rents
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Figure 2.6 illustrates the correlation between the proportion of the population
that is foreign born and house prices and rents, and shows the regression line. This
confirms that the positive association shown in Figure 2.1 for the UK is also apparent
across local authorities between 1996 and 2010 (1996 and 2008 for rents), suggesting
that higher house prices and rents are associated with local authorities with a larger
share of immigrants in the population. Clearly, this does not necessarily imply a
causal relationship between increasing immigration and increasing house prices, if,
for example, migrants choose to locate in faster growing areas because of better job
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prospects or amenities.
The first row of Figure 2.7 shows the correlation between the change in real av-
erage house prices (repeat sales) and, respectively, the normalised (by lagged total
population) change in total population, normalised change in the foreign born pop-
ulation (regression variable), and the normalised change in the UK born population,
between 1996 and 2010 for all 170 local authorities. There is a positive correlation
between the change in the total population and the change in average real house
price across LA-year observations, with a correlation coefficient of 0.12, this positive
association is also apparent in the second and third columns showing the change in
the foreign born population and the UK born population, but the correlation be-
tween the change in real house prices and the UK population is very weak, with a
correlation coefficient of 0.016. The bottom row of Figure 2.7 also shows the cor-
relation between the change in real average weekly rent (for all bedroom sizes) and
normalised population changes. These indicate a slight negative correlation between
the change in rent and total population, and a slight positive correlation between
the change in the foreign born population and the change in real average rent.
60
Figure 2.7: Change in Population, Real House Prices, and Rents (1996-2010)
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Notes: Figure shows annual changes in total population, foreign born population (normalised), and
UK born population (normalised) against annual changes in average real house prices (top row),
and annual changes in average real weekly rents (bottom row). Source: LFS and the Land Registry.
Naturally these graphs do not take into account the heterogeneity of the different
population groups and local authority characteristics, nor the possibility that people
who migrate may self-select into areas experiencing either rapid house price growth or
stagnation/decline. The more sophisticated regression analysis that follows explores
these relationships further.
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2.5.2 Regression estimates
2.5.3 Effect of total population on house prices and rents
This section presents my estimates for the effects of immigration on housing
markets. I first present the results for the effect of a change in the total population
on house prices and rents, before presenting the immigration OLS and IV results.
Panel unit roots tests (Table A1 in Appendix A) on the data for house prices, rents,
immigration and other covariates suggest that they are stationary in first differences,
alleviating concerns of spurious regression.
Table 2.4 presents the correlation between the change in average house rents for
different bedroom sizes and the change in total population. All specifications include
year and local authority fixed effects. Columns (1) - (3) present the results using
data for the average rent across all bedroom sizes, columns (4) - (6) present the
results when I consider only the rent for rental units with three or four bedrooms,
and the last three columns present the results for the average rent across one and
two bedroom units. I test the effect of a one year change in population and rent, and
given that changes in rent are not likely to be felt immediately following an increase
in population, I also test the effect of a three change in population and rent (columns
(3), (6) and (9)). Irrespective of the length of the lag there is no evidence that an
increase in population has any effect on average housing rent.
In Table 2.5 I estimate the effect of population change on average house prices.
The local authority controls I include are the unemployment rate, an estimate of the
user cost of capital, the dwelling stock (lagged by one year), and the proportion of
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the population with no qualifications. I find that over the whole period 1996-2010,
a one percent increase in the population is correlated with about a 0.2 percent in-
crease in average house prices. For the earlier period, 1996-2002 there is no evidence
of any significant effect of population change on house prices. These estimates are
significantly lower than those of approximately unity found in the existing house
price literature during the 1980s/1990s estimated at a regional level (for example
Muellbauer and Murphy (1997), and Cameron et al. (2006)). The coefficient on the
user cost is similar to earlier estimates using regional data (see for example Meen
(1996)). In addition to the population measures, the controls are arguably endoge-
nous and therefore perhaps should not be included, on the other hand as Stillman
and Mare´ (2008) argue, to the extent that changes to these local characteristics are a
consequence of migration, they should be included as part of the effect of migration.
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2.5.4 Effect of immigration on housing rents
Because I expect immigration to have a first order effect on the rental market, I
turn first to estimating the effect of immigration on housing rents. Table 2.6 reports
the OLS estimates of equation 3.1 for respectively, average rents across all bedroom
sizes, average rents for three and four bedrooms, and average rents for one and two
bedrooms. I show the results using both the first difference in population and house
prices, and also in columns (4), (7), and (9) the results using a longer difference of the
preceding three years. Table 2.6 show that there is no evidence of any statistically
significant effect of an increase in the foreign born population on average house rent.
In Table 2.7 I present the corresponding IV estimates, showing only the estimates
using the three-year change. I find a significant positive effect of immigrant inflows on
housing rents when averaging across all bedroom sizes, with estimated coefficients of
between 0.14 - 0.18 (significant at 5%). This implies that an increase in the stock of
immigrants equal to 1% of the local population during a three-year period generates
an increase in house rents of about 0.14% to 0.18% in the same three-year period.
Examining the effects of immigration on the average rent of small and large rental
units fails to find any significant effect. In Tables 2.8-2.9 I show estimates for two
sub-period; 1996-2002, and 2003-2008, the positive effect of immigration on rents
appears only in the second period from 2003-2008, with estimated coefficients of
between 0.14 to 0.15.
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2.5.5 Effect of immigration on house prices
In Tables 2.10-2.11, I turn to looking at the effect of a change in the foreign born
population on real average house prices. As before, all specifications include year
and local authority fixed effects. The results in Table 2.10 are for annual changes in
population and prices, and in Table 2.11 I show the equivalent estimates for change
over a longer period of three years. An increase in the foreign born population is
associated with lower house prices. The first specification in Table 2.10 excludes the
change in the native population, and it suggests that there is an upward bias on the
foreign born coefficient in column 1. In column 2, I control for the change in the UK
born population, as the native population could also be changing, partly in response
to immigrant inflows. Column 2 indicates that native inflows to an area actually
have a positive effect on average house prices.
The estimates for the whole period 1996-2010 in column (3) suggest that an
immigrant inflow equal to one percent of a local authority’s population is associated
with a decrease in average house prices of about 0.25 percent. For the period 2003-
2010, the estimated coefficient is 0.13. Turning to the longer period changes in Table
2.11, here the dependent variable is the change in the log of the average house price
between years t and t − 3 and the change in both the foreign-born, and UK born
population is between years t and t− 3 relative to the total population in year t− 3
The coefficients are much larger and suggest that it does take time for house prices
to adjust to an inflow of immigrants. The estimate in column (3) suggest that an
increase in the stock of immigrants equal to 1% of the local population over a three
year period reduces house prices by about 0.6%.
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Due to endogeneity and possible unobserved omitted variables I estimate Equa-
tion 3.1 using instrumental variables. I first make use of the fact that immigrants
tend to locate in areas where previous immigrants have located to create instruments
for the foreign born. I use the change in the UK born population lagged two years
as my instrument for the UK born population in all of the following IV estimates.
Tables 2.12 - 2.13 present the IV results for both the first difference estimates and
the longer three-year change, respectively. The coefficients on the change in the
foreign born population in specifications (1) - (3) range are between -0.8 to -0.9,
thus being significantly lower than the corresponding OLS estimates in Table 2.10.
The coefficients on the change in the UK born population are generally insignificant,
except for in the later period only (2003-2010) where they are approximately -0.8.
In the period 2003-2010, the estimates range from -1.3 to -1.6 which are similar in
magnitude to the estimates of Sa´ (2014). The estimates in Table 2.13 are for the
change in population and house prices over a three-year period, and as with the OLS
estimates are considerably larger in absolute terms. The estimates for the 2003-2010
suggest that an increase in the foreign-born population equal to 1% of the local pop-
ulation reduces house prices by between 2.2-2.3%. The bottom panel of the tables
gives the first stage coefficients and a test of weak identification - the Angrist-Pischke
F statistic that partials out the influence of the other endogenous variable (Angrist
and Pischke, 2009).23 The size of the IV estimates in contrast to the OLS estimates
suggests that the OLS results are biased upwards due to endogeneity or measurement
problems or both. This suggests that immigrants are choosing areas with relatively
23See also Baum et al. (2007, 2010).
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large increases in house prices, and the OLS estimates are therefore overstating the
positive effect of new immigrants on house prices. However, it is arguable as to
whether this instrument is truly exogenous, and these results should therefore be
treated with caution. If there are unobservable factors that led immigrants to settle
in particular places in 1981 these factors may still be relevant and correlated with
the decisions of contemporaneous migrants.
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2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I analyse how population change, and international migration
in particular, affects house prices and rents in local authorities across England and
Wales between 1996 and 2010. Over this period both immigration and house prices
have risen rapidly, and the purpose of this chapter is to explore whether there is
any causal link between increased immigration and increases in housing rents and
prices. To mitigate problems of measurement error and endogeneity I use a common
instrument used in the migration literature to predict the inflow of the foreign born
population using historical patterns of immigrant settlement from the 1981 Census.
Using instrumental variables I find that an immigrant inflow equal to one percent
of the initial population increases average housing rents by about 0.14 to 0.18 percent.
The instrumental variable estimates also suggest that an immigrant inflow equal to
one percent of the population reduces average house prices by about 1.6 percent,
conditioning on the change in the UK born population and other covariates. If
immigrants are particularly sensitive to housing costs, this may bias the results
downwards, conversely if immigrants respond to factors that I am unable to directly
control for such as better amenities, expectations of economic growth or changes in
preferences for particular locations, I may overestimate the affect of immigration on
house prices and rents.
Much attention in the UK has recently been focused on the relative lack of re-
sponse from the construction sector to what has been significant increases in house
prices in the last 20 years. The 2004 Barker Review of Housing Supply concluded
that a higher rate of house building was necessary, and supply needed to be more
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responsive to prices particularly to allow for building in places where people actually
want to live Barker (2004). More recently, Nickell (2011) argues that house build-
ing in England has fallen behind household growth, and for this reason house prices
have risen dramatically since the late 1990s, and immigrants are getting the blame,
although their contribution to the housing shortage is relatively small. Increases in
house prices as a result of population growth from any source should help to generate
new construction in the long run, but this depends on land availability and planning
rules. To the extent that London can be considered a “Superstar City” in the termi-
nology of Gyourko et al. (2013), it is possible that high prices reflect a premium for
living in such places, and even a sustained expansion of the housing stock may not
ameliorate high prices. One possible way in which the housing market in the UK has
adjusted to increased levels of immigration in recent years, beyond any price effect,
is the development of the rental sector itself, demand for which has been met by
the supply of houses/flats for rental accommodation by investors looking for capital
gains, which may have contributed to price increases.
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Chapter 3
Changing Places? Spatial Mobility
of Immigrants and Natives in
Great Britain
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3.1 Introduction
An unresolved question regarding immigration to the UK is whether natives and
earlier cohorts of immigrants are displaced from particular local labour markets in
response to immigrant inflows.1 And despite previous evidence to the contrary, there
is still widespread belief that immigrants have a deleterious effect on the wages and
employment opportunities of natives. In this paper I exploit variation in skills and
variation in the location patterns of immigrants to analyse the extent to which immi-
grant inflows cause the UK born population to change location. The analysis starts
by estimating the relationship between changes in the immigrant and native popula-
tion in a local area. The OLS and IV results show that aggregate immigrant inflows
are associated with increases in the local native population. Because of heterogene-
ity amongst immigrants and natives, the overall proportion of immigrants in a local
market is an insufficient measure of the degree of competition between natives and
immigrants, and I therefore divide the population into skill groups, to examine the
degree of differential response to an immigrant shock. The scatter plots in Figure 3.1
indicate that overall there is a positive correlation between the change in immigrants
and the change in natives across 200 local authorities in the UK. The analysis that
follows seeks to examine whether or not this is a causal relationship. These rela-
tionships are explored in more detail and I show that there is no evidence of native
outflows from local authorities in response to immigrant inflows. To overcome the
1In this paper the terms foreign-born and immigrant are used interchangeably. The Labour
Force Survey/Annual Population Survey collects information on the country of birth, and therefore
although some immigrants may in time become British citizens, they are still counted in the LFS
as foreign born based on their country of birth. Foreign born refers to anyone not born in the UK
(England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland).
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problem of endogeneity - immigrants are likely to be drawn to areas that are experi-
encing growth in labour demand - I make use of the concentration of immigrants in
particular areas where earlier waves of migrants settled to create an instrument.
Figure 3.1: Change in Immigrants vs change in UK born
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Note: This figure graphs the standardized change in the UK born population (total and working
age), against the standardized change in the foreign born population. Authors’ calculations from
the APS.
Whether or not immigrants displace natives has important implications for un-
derstanding the operation of labour markets. If natives, or earlier cohorts of immi-
grants, move in response to immigrant supply shocks, then the effect of immigration
on wages and employment is spread across the national labour market, and estimates
of the effect of immigration using a spatial correlation approach on native mobility,
will be biased downwards. The effect of immigration on the wages of the native
population has generally found to be small in both the US and UK (see for exam-
ple Card (2005); Altonji and Card (1991); LaLonde and Topel (1991); Dustmann
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et al. (2005)). Unless the distribution of skills amongst immigrants is identical to
the distribution among natives, immigrant inflows will also alter the composition of
skills among the population which could conceivably affect wages.2 As Dustmann et
al. (2005) highlights, an essential difference between the US and British experiences
of immigration is that the skill distribution of immigrants to the UK has generally
been similar to the native skill distribution (or immigrants are on average higher
skilled than natives), in contrast to the US, where immigrants have tended to be
predominantly low-skilled. A distinction between US work and the current paper, is
that US studies typically rely on census data, and therefore these are estimates of
long-run relationships, which may differ from short-run relationships.3 In the UK,
Sa´ (2014) has perviously estimated the relationship between immigrant inflows and
net native outflows at local authority levels, but this was not the main focus of her
work, and the present study provides a more comprehensive analysis, primarily by
considering heterogeneity in skill.
Two approaches have generally been used to estimate the effect of immigration on
native workers, the area approach pioneered by Grossman (1982), where the effect
of immigration supply shocks are estimated by comparing variation in the shock
amongst local labour markets, and a time-series approach. The main disadvantage of
the area approach is that local labour markets are not isolated, and this approach has
been criticised by Borjas et al. (1996, 1997). However, unlike this chapter, early area
based studies ignored the significant heterogeneity in skills and other characteristics
2It is also conceivable that there could be native outflows due to discrimination/prejudice, but
that is beyond the scope of this work.
3See for example Card (2001); Borjas (2006, 2003); Altonji and Card (1991).
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amongst natives and immigrants.4
3.2 Analytical framework
The primary question addressed in this paper is whether net changes in immigrant
inflows result in the departure of natives from a local area. That is, do natives and
immigrants change places? Displacement may occur if the immigrant inflow lowers
wages in one area relative to other areas, creating an incentive for natives, or older
cohorts of immigrants, to move. As natives leave, wage levels return to the previous
equilibrium and the outflows reduce, how much time is required for this process to end
is an open empirical question, and one that I attempt to address below, making use of
data on year of arrival in the UK. Displacement, if it occurs, need not necessarily be
one-for-one, it may be that only some natives, or those from older immigrant cohorts
decide to move. Borjas et al. (1996, 1997) argue that out-migration of natives is an
important factor in the failure of most area-analyses in the US to find evidence of
an effect of immigrant inflows on natives wages. Therefore evidence for or against
displacement is of critical importance in understanding how labour markets work in
response to a labour supply shock. An alternative to the displacement hypothesis is
one of attraction, high skill natives may be attracted to areas with clusters of high
skill immigrants (or at least both groups may be attracted to similar areas due to city
size, economic growth, or amenities, for example). It is also possible that low-skilled
natives might be attracted to areas where high-skill immigrants locate because of
jobs in complementary areas, such as low-wage service sector jobs.
4Grossman (1982); Borjas (1987); Altonji and Card (1991); LaLonde and Topel (1991).
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There is substantial methodological debate in the literature as to how to define
the estimating equation, and various papers have used alternative equations. Peri
and Sparber (2011) review a number of these and conclude, based on simulations
that the best approach to avoid any built in bias towards displacement is to specify
the dependent variable as the first difference in the native population and the inde-
pendent variable as the first difference of the foreign born population, normalising
both by the first lag in the total population in the previous period, so that the es-
timates are not affected by cell size. I follow their approach and estimate the same
specification. Normalising population changes helps to mitigate spurious correlation
between ∆UK and ∆FB as area size will drive changes in both (Peri and Sparber,
2011). A possible concern with either the normalised or unnormalised specification is
attenuation bias, a concern emphasised by Aydemir and Borjas (2011), arising from
measurement error, which would drive the estimates toward zero. As a robustness
check I also estimate results excluding large cities. I estimate the following model of
immigrant inflows on net native outflows:
∆UKit/Popt−1 = β1∆FBit/Popt−1 + γ∆Xit + ϕt + λi + it (3.1)
The dependent variable is the change in the native population ∆UK in area i between
year t and t − 1, divided by the lagged total population, Popt−1 and the main
explanatory variable of interest is the change in the foreign born population ∆FB
between year t and t − 1, divided by the lagged total population, Popt−1. it is
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an i.i.d. error term. Unobserved determinants of population growth are likely to
drive both immigrant and native population flows, resulting in a biased estimate of
β. Time invariant factors specific to each local authority, such as the initial size
of the local population, are differenced out, but I also estimate models with local
authority fixed effects, λi, to control for unobserved linearly time-varying trends in
local authority characteristics, such as amenities, changing industrial structure or
changing demographics, factors that are likely to drive both immigrant and native
population growth. The coefficient β represents the causal effect of immigration on
native population growth. A value of β = 1 implies that each additional immigrant
adds one native born to the local population. A value of β < 1, means that for an
additional immigrant moving into area i, 1β native would be displaced. The case of
β = 0 would imply that immigrant inflows are completely offset by natives leaving
the area.
Earlier studies such as Card (2001, 2007) have employed a specification similar
to that in Equation 3.5 in regression analysis. Using metropolitan level census data
from 1980-2000, Card (2007) finds evidence that growth in immigrants is met with
growth in the native population at the rate of almost one-for-one. Card and DiNardo
(2000) and Card (2001, 2005, 2007), use similar specifications, but using the change
in the total population on the left hand side, rather than just the change in the
native population. They find that native mobility has very little offsetting effect in
response to immigrant supply shocks. Card and DiNardo (2000) examine the extent
to which immigrant inflows between 1980 and 1990 change the distribution of skills
across US cities. Their results suggest that there is a small increase in the population
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of natives of the same skill group. Using the presence of Mexican immigrants in an
MSA in 1970 as an instrument, they find slightly larger point estimates than the
corresponding OLS estimates.5
Using a single cross section of 175 cities from the 1990 Census, Card (2001) defines
skill groups based on occupations and fails to find any significant offsetting effect of
native movement in response to inflows of new immigrants. However, he also finds
that a 10% increase in the relative population share of an occupation group is asso-
ciated with a 0.5 percentage point reduction in the employment rate of the group,
and a slightly larger effect using instrumental variables. Card (2005) finds similar
results, while focusing particular attention on the effect of more recent US immigra-
tion on low-skilled natives, he finds no significant effect on relative wages as a result
of low-skilled immigration, but a small negative impact on relative employment.
Card (2007) distinguishes between an overall composition effect resulting from
increased immigration into a city, and separate selectivity effects for natives and
immigrants. He finds a strong positive relationship between the proportion of immi-
grants in a city and and the proportion of low-skill natives, and find that on average
immigration raises the proportion of natives in the lower skill groups, and lowers the
proportion of higher skilled natives.6
5Pooling all there skill groups the point estimates are between 0.24 and 0.28, depending on
the controls. (Their specification includes the lagged relative growth of the native population (the
dependent variable) as an explanatory variable, and also immigrant share in each skill group in
1980).
6The OLS estimates suggest that a 10 percentage point increase in the proportion of immigrants
in a city is associated with a 1.73 percentage point increase in the proportion of the adult population
in the lowest skill quartile. Most of this is due to the composition effect of more immigrants
(1.31pp), while 0.26pp is due to the native population being less skilled in high immigrant cities,
and the remaining 0.16pp is due to the immigrant population being less skilled in high immigrant
cities. He also finds a positive association with the highest skill quartile and immigrant share. The
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In contrast to the studies by Card and co-authors, which all utilise a similar
methodology and regression specification, Borjas (2006) uses a different specification
and finds quite large offsetting behaviour by natives. In a 2006 paper he finds that 10
new immigrants entering a city results in 6.1 natives leaving the city. However Peri
and Sparber (2011) argue that the way Borjas specifies his regression equation creates
a mechanical bias in the estimates in favour of finding displacement.7 Borjas (2003)
using national level education and experience cells, finds relatively large negative
effects on wages (an increase equivalent to 10% of the labour force leads to a 3%
decline in wages of the native born).
Mobility in the Britain has been shown by at least one study to be relatively
low, with regional mobility rates averaging 2-3% over the period 1977-1999 (Gregg
et al., 2004). Several other studies have examined migration within Britain without a
particular focus on the effects of immigration. For example, Cameron and Muellbauer
(1998) study regional migration between 1983-1995 and find that migration responds
strongly to relative earnings and relative employment prospects.8 High relative house
prices also discourage net migration.9 A possible threat to identification comes from
the presence of local productivity shocks, as migrants might be more likely to locate in
corresponding IV estimates are very similar to the OLS estimates.
7The first specification used by Borjas (2006) is the following, where N represents natives, and
F immigrants:
ln(Nijt) = α+ β1 ·
(
Fijt
Nijt+Fijt
)
+ γ ·Xijt + si + rj + τt + (si × rj) + (si × τt) + (tj × τt) + ijt
where j represents 32 skill groups, i 51 states, and t five census years. The appearance of Niji
in the dependent variable and in the denominator of the main explanatory variable may create a
spurious negative correlation (Peri and Sparber (2011). The second specification in Borjas (2006)
also has a similar problem, and Peri and Sparber (2011) show that the bias is increasing in the
standard deviation of ∆Nijt.
8See also Pissarides and Wadsworth (1989); Jackman and Savouri (1992); Hughes and Mc-
Cormick (1994), and McCormick (1997).
9A point also mentioned by Gregg et al. (2004).
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areas that have higher long term growth prospects. To test for the relative importance
of these factors, I therefore include average real house prices in the vector Xit, in
addition to the size of the local housing stock as migrants moving into an area require
somewhere to live.
Existing work using UK data suggests that there is some evidence of a displace-
ment effect of immigration. Estimating the effect of immigration on net migration
between 11 regions for the period 1981-2000, Hatton and Tani (2005) find consistent
negative displacement effects (using OLS), although the effect is only significant for
the six southern-most regions, where a net increase of 100 immigrants to these re-
gions results in out-migration of about 44 people to other areas in the UK. Hatton
and Tani use National Health Service (NHS) registration data to measure the flow
of people between regions (irrespective of country of birth), and International Pas-
senger Survey data (IPS) to measure the flow of immigrants to UK regions. They
regress the net inter-regional migration rate from region j to region i on the inflow
rate of foreign born to region i minus the inflow rate to region j. They also include
the unemployment rate, vacancy rate, wages, and house prices as determinants of
migration. The data used by Hatton and Tani does not allow them to desegregate by
skill groups, and as with Borjas (2006), the data are for very broad regions (Borjas
uses state level data) that will undoubtedly mask movement between smaller labour
market areas within these regions. More recently, Sa´ (2014), in studying the effect
of immigration on house prices, also estimates the effect of total immigrant inflows
on total native outflows at local authority level, finding an OLS estimate of 0.27
(significant at 5%), and an IV estimate of -0.87 (significant at 1%). She uses the
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LFS for 170 local authorities in England and Wales for the period 2003-2010.
Several papers have examined the effects of migration on the labour market in
the UK. Dustmann et al. (2005) use data from the LFS covering 17 regions of Britain
for the period 1983-2000, to examine the labour market consequences of migration
in the UK. Unlike this paper they are focused on wages and employment, rather
than changes in total or working age population. They find that an immigrant in-
flow equal to one percent of the native population would result in a 0.07 percentage
point reduction in the native employment rate, but this is not statistically signifi-
cant. They also find no significant effect of immigration on native unemployment
or participation. Analysing the effect of immigration separately for three education
groups they find that there is only a significant effect on employment, unemploy-
ment and participation for the medium education group (those with O-levels but no
higher).10 Manacorda et al. (2012) focus on the effect of immigration on the structure
of wages in the UK from the mid-1970s to the mid-2000s, and argue that natives
and immigrants are imperfect substitutes which helps to explain the relative lack of
any significant effects of the increase in the supply of immigrants on native wages.
Manacorda et al. (2012) show that immigration has mainly reduced the wages of
previous immigrants relative to the native born.
Immigrants do not randomly choose where to locate, and unobserved factors that
attract immigrants to particular local authorities are also likely to attract the native
population (and earlier cohorts of immigrants), thereby confounding causal inference,
10For employment they find that an immigrant inflow (those with ‘medium’ education) equal to
one percent of the native population would result in a 0.18 percentage point reduction in the native
employment rate for those with O-levels. The corresponding point estimates for unemployment are
0.10, and for participation, -0.11.
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and biasing the estimation. There is a threat to identification from both the demand
side and the supply side, although most previous studies focus possible endogeneity
of the supply of immigrants. Local productivity shocks are unobserved and migrants
might be more likely to locate in areas that have higher growth prospects.
Because immigrants are likely to be attracted to areas for specific reasons such
as amenities or stronger economics growth/employment, I use the commonly used
approach in the literature inspired by Bartel (1989), and used by many others since
such as Altonji and Card (1991). This instrument is constructed weighting the his-
torical spatial distribution of immigrants by the contemporaneous national growth
in immigrants, based on the idea that immigrants are more likely to locate where
earlier immigrants have settled (Munshi, 2003). I therefore take the foreign born
population in each local authority in 1992/1993 and attribute to each local authority
the net immigrant growth rate for the whole of the UK each year from the APS. As
a base I use data from the secure access version of the LFS which unlike the APS
is based on a smaller sample, and therefore I pool over eight quarters of the LFS
in 1992 and 1993 when creating instruments for individual skill groups to overcome
the problem of missing data in some local authority-skill group cells. This approach
allows me to construct an “imputed” foreign born population for each local authority
i at time t according to the following formula:
SPIVi,t =
R∑
r=1
(
FBi,r,1992/93
FB1992/93
)
× [(FBr,t − FBr,t−1)− (FBi,r,t − FBi,r,t−1)] (3.2)
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where I sum over the 11 regions of birth, r shown in Table 3.4. Following Smith (2012)
and Wozniak and Murray (2012), I make an adjustment to the usual Card (2001)
instrument by excluding the contribution of each local authority to the national
growth in immigrants (the right-hand side of Equation 3.2). This removes changes
in an area’s immigrant population that are driven by local characteristics. The
supply-shock (SPIV) is then assumed to be driven by factors that are exogenous to
area i. The left-hand side of Equation 3.2 is the share of immigrants in each local
authority in the base period. SPIV can therefore be interpreted as the net change in
the immigrant population of area i that would arise if the area received its 1992/1993
share of the net change in the UK immigrant population by region of birth, minus
the contribution to that change from area i. The predictive power of this instrument
is shown in Figure 3.2, which plots the instrumented immigrant inflow against the
actual immigrant inflow.
This IV strategy could fail if local immigrant inflows are positively correlated
with unobserved local demand conditions, as mentioned above. The IV estimates
would then be biased upwards, making it less likely to find evidence of displacement.
I address the problem of local productivity shocks by controlling for an imputed
productivity shock based on the initial industrial production in each area, follow-
ing the approach of Bartik (1991). I start with the initial two-digit industry shares
in each local authority and weight these by the national growth in employment in
each two-digit industry to create the predicted local growth in employment demand,
assuming that there are no changes in industrial composition. The predicted em-
ployment growth is calculated by the following:
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Figure 3.2: Actual vs. Predicted Growth of Immigrants
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Note: This graph plots the standardized actual growth in immigrants as defined in Equation 3.1,
against the predicted growth immigrants (standardized) as explained in the text and Equation 3.2.
The solid line is the best linear fit.
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γit =
K∑
k=1
ψi,k,t−1
(
ν−i,k,t − ν−i,k,t−1
ν−i,k,t−1
)
(3.3)
where ψi,k,t−1 is the employment share of industry k in area i, and ν−i,k,t−1 is the na-
tional employment share in industry k, excluding that in area i. The total predicted
employment is thus Eˆi,t = (1+γi,t)Ei,t−1. The identifying assumption is that changes
in industry shares at the national level are uncorrelated with local authority level
supply shocks and can therefore be taken to represent exogenous demand-induced
variation in area employment.
Estimating the effect of aggregate immigrant inflows on the total native popula-
tion may mask the effect of immigrants in different skill groups on natives in similar
skill groups, particularly given the heterogeneity in skills amongst immigrants. If na-
tives and immigrants in similar skill groups are substitutes there may be more likely
to be a negative (displacement) effect on natives in a similar skill group. On the other
hand, if particular skill groups are complements, attraction may result. I therefore
pool by skill group, where the skill groups are defined three ways as described above,
the first being based on three observed occupations (professional, intermediate, and
routine), the second based on three observed education groups, and the third based
on allocating individuals probabilistically to four quartiles based on predicting their
wages from observable characteristics. I estimate Equation 3.4 which is similar to
Equation 3.1, except that now ∆UKijt and ∆FBijt, are respectively, the change in
the UK born and foreign born population in each skill group j, in each area i. In
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addition to the year and local authority fixed effects, I also include skill group fixed
effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity across skill groups:
∆UKijt/Popt−1 = β1∆FBijt/Popt−1 + γ∆Xijt + ϕt + λi + ζj + it (3.4)
Because I focus on skill-specific migration flows I also create skill-specific instruments
to be able to identify the causal effect of immigrant inflows. I therefore construct
instruments as in Equation 3.2, separately for each skill group for each of my three
definitions of skill.
3.3 Local population data from the Annual
Population Survey
This paper uses immigration data from the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS), a
household survey containing a variety of labour market statistics, that has been
running since the mid-1970s. A version of the data with a boosted sample size is
available and is called the Annual Population Survey (APS), making this data more
robust for small area estimates, however the data is only available at local authority
level from 2003 onwards. The standard version of the APS is available for Govern-
ment Office Regions, however I was given access to a secure access version of data
that is available at local authority level from 2003 to 2012. There are approximately
27,000 foreign born observations, and 263,000 UK born observations in each year in
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the APS, compared to an average of 10,600 foreign born and 102,500 UK born in the
local authority level LFS. This provides data on the foreign-born and UK-born pop-
ulation at local authority level. The main advantage of using the APS for this study
is that data is available annually, and in addition to counts of the foreign and native
population, a rich array of labour market and other characteristics are available,
allowing for the construction of a variety of skill groups. APS data excludes those
who live in communal accommodation such as hostels, shelters, and caravan parks.
Sample weights are provided in the APS which should normally be used, although
some papers in the literature have not used them (see for example Dustmann et al.
(2005, 2012)). The Office for National Statistics advises that the sample weights
should be used and the details are discussed in Appendix B.5. For comparison I also
present the main regression estimates using unweighted data in Appendix B.6. Table
3.1 shows summary statistics for all of the variables used in the regression analysis,
showing the mean of the first difference of the UK born and foreign born in aggre-
gate, and for each skill cell, in both the weighted and unweighted data. The figures
are averages across local authorities for the period 2003-2012. Examining the size of
these cells by local authority for each skill definition shows that the ranking changes
between the weighted and unweighted data, which could account for the differences
in results between the weighted and unweighted data.
As a robustness check I also use an alternative source of data. Legal employment
in the UK requires a National Insurance Number (NINo), and this data is adminis-
tered by the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP). National Insurance data
has been used in several recent studies (such as Paolo et al. (2012)). A National In-
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surance number is a requirement for anyone starting work or claiming benefits or tax
credits in the UK, and therefore immigrants who are working require a NINo. The
data covers all migrants entering the UK, although migrants who leave and re-enter
at a later date are not required to register for a new NINo. The downside to this
data compared to LFS/APS data is that no other information on the characteristics
of the individuals is available, and there could be lags in people arriving and actually
finding work and getting a NINo.
The Office for National Statistics (ONS) also produces estimates of internal migra-
tion based primarily on NHS (National Health Service) data. These annual estimates
are derived from combining three administrative data sources, the Patient Register
Data Service (PRDS), the National Health Service Central Register (NHSCR) and
Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) data. The primary source of this is
data is due to people changing their GP registration, and the main limitation is that
there may be a delay when someone moves in re-registering with a new doctor, and
some moves may not result in a change in GP. From 2012 onwards, ONS has also
adjusted the data for students using HESA data as it is known that students have
relatively low rates of GP registration. This data is available for 345 local authority
districts in England and Wales. A separate data series is available, so-called ‘Flag
4’ which records GP registrations of those whose previous address was overseas, this
can include the UK born if they have been living overseas.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Total Population Working Age
Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Aggregate population
(∆ UK)/Popt−1 0.046 0.132 0.044 0.133
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 0.009 0.027 0.012 0.033
∆ Local demand shock -0.003 0.036 -0.003 0.036
∆ Log real house price 0.011 0.071 0.011 0.071
∆ Log housing stock 0.037 1.442 0.037 1.442
Occupation groups
(∆ UK)/Popt−1 (professional) 0.012 0.06 0.009 0.066
(∆ UK)/Popt−1 (intermediate) 0.003 0.09 0.001 0.094
(∆ UK)/Popt−1 (routine) -0.004 0.08 -0.007 0.079
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 (professional) 0.006 0.019 0.021 0.057
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 (intermediate) 0.007 0.019 0.041 0.128
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 (routine) 0.006 0.019 0.036 0.113
Education groups
(∆ UK)/Popt−1 (highest) 0.039 0.228 0.036 0.229
(∆ UK)/Popt−1 0.107 0.257 0.104 0.259
(∆ UK)/Popt−1 (lowest) 0.040 0.149 0.030 0.149
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 (highest) 0.014 0.042 0.014 0.042
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 0.014 0.041 0.014 0.041
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 (lowest) 0.015 0.045 0.015 0.045
Skill (wage) groups
(∆ UK)/Popt−1 (4th quartile) 0.032 0.109 0.032 0.109
(∆ UK)/Popt−1 (3rd quartile) 0.032 0.120 0.032 0.120
(∆ UK)/Popt−1 (2nd quartile) 0.032 0.109 0.032 0.108
(∆ UK)/Popt−1 (1st quartile) 0.049 0.134 0.049 0.135
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 (4th quartile) 0.037 0.166 0.037 0.167
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 (3rd quartile) 0.032 0.157 0.032 0.156
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 (2nd quartile) 0.038 0.180 0.038 0.179
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 (1st quartile) 0.072 0.252 0.073 0.254
Note: Cells for skill groups (occupation, education-experience, and
wage) all refer to working age population only (aged 16-65).
Source: Authors’ calculations from the Annual Population Survey.
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3.3.1 Defining skill groups
Skill groups have frequently been defined differently by different authors, with the
main divide being between a deterministic allocation versus a probabilistic allocation.
I take both approaches and define skill groups in three different ways. One approach
is to use occupation groups that individuals actually work in, and I use this as my
first definition. Eckstein and Weiss (2004) in the case of Israel has drawn attention
to the fact that immigrants will often down-grade in the destination country by
not making full-use of their potential, perhaps because of a lack of language skills.
This phenomena is also apparent in the UK as shown in Table 3.2 which shows
the distribution of occupations for immigrants and natives, averaging over 2011 and
2012, using the National Statistics Socio-economic Classification (NS-SEC), which
appears in the APS datasets. I exclude employers and the self-employed as these
have no information on wages. The last column shows the average wage in each
occupation. I split the immigrant sample into those who arrived within the last
two years (recent arrivals), and those that arrived prior to two years ago. It is
noticeable that the distribution of occupations for earlier immigrants is quite similar
to the distribution for natives, in contrast to the distribution of occupations among
more recent immigrants, where for example there is a much larger share in routine
occupations, 24%, compared to 12% for natives, and 15% for earlier immigrants.
Table 3.3 breaks down the occupational distribution by education, and shows
that within each education grouping more recent immigrants are distributed more
heavily towards the bottom of the occupational distribution. For example among the
highly skilled, approximately 2% of natives are in routine occupations, compared to
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11% of recent immigrants (and 6% of earlier immigrants). This suggests that there
is signifiant occupational downgrading among recent immigrants within education
groups. For the purposes of the regression analysis I define three broad occupation
groups; professional (Higher managerial and professional, Lower managerial and pro-
fessional), intermediate (Intermediate occupations, Small employers and own account
workers, Lower supervisory and technical), and routine (Semi-routine occupations,
Routine occupations, Never worked, unemployed).
The second definition I use is defined by the age that individuals leave full-time
education. This is less subject to measurement error since since it is possible that
the reported qualifications of immigrants in the APS do not accurately correspond to
the native equivalent, or are simply missing.11 I define three broad groups; the low
skill group refers to those who left full-time education aged 16 or below; medium, to
those who left full-time education between 17 and 20, and high refers to those who
left full-time education aged between 21 and 40. These groups are summarised in
the second panel of Table 3.4.
The third skill definition I use is based on a probabilistic strategy similar to that
used previously by Card (2007) for example. I first estimate a set of ordered probit
models, separately for immigrants and natives, for the probability that an individual
would earn an hourly wage in one of four quartiles. I use the coefficients to assign the
probabilities that a particular individual is classified in quartile 1, 2, 3, or 4 (highest
wage). This procedure also allows me to assign non-workers, or those with missing
11Full-time education refers to education without a break, therefore holiday jobs do not count as
a break provided that the person intended to complete a course, nor does a gap of up to a year
between going to school and going to college or university, or National Service between school or
college.
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wage data to a skill group. The results of the ordered probit model are shown in
Table B1.
Table 3.2: Occupational Distribution of Natives and Foreign Born
in 2011 and 2012
Foreign Born
Occupation Natives Earlier Recent Average
hourly wage
Higher managerial and professional 15.9 18.4 17.2 22.5
Lower managerial and professional 30.3 27.7 21.7 15.3
Intermediate occupations 16.8 12.7 9.6 10.4
Lower supervisory and technical 8.9 8.9 7.7 10.5
Semi-routine occupations 16.4 17.4 20.1 7.9
Routine occupations 11.7 14.9 23.8 7.9
Source: Authors’ calculations from the Annual Population Survey 2011, 2012.
Table 3.3: Occupational Distribution of Natives and Foreign Born by
Education in 2011 and 2012
High education Intermediate education Low education
Foreign Born Foreign Born Foreign Born
Occupation Natives Earlier Recent Natives Earlier Recent Natives Earlier Recent
Higher managerial and professional 37.8 33.5 28.8 17.8 13.1 8.4 7.4 4.1 2.7
Lower managerial and professional 44.8 33.4 30.3 35.8 28.6 15.7 20.8 15.5 6.0
Intermediate occupations 9.8 11.6 10.1 19.8 14.2 10.0 16.3 11.1 5.3
Lower supervisory and technical 2.0 5.3 4.4 6.9 9.2 9.9 13.0 14.7 12.9
Semi-routine occupations 4.0 10.3 15.6 13.2 18.3 22.9 23.1 27.8 29.0
Routine occupations 1.6 5.9 10.8 6.6 16.7 33.1 19.5 26.9 44.2
Source: Authors’ calculations from the Annual Population Survey 2011, 2012.
3.3.2 The characteristics of immigrants
Immigration to the UK has increased substantially in recent years as shown in
Figure 3.3. Table 3.4 presents some characteristics of the native-born and foreign-
born population in the UK for 2003 and 2012.
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Figure 3.3: Proportion of Immigrants in the UK over time
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Note: Authors’ calculations from the weighted APS.
The first panel in Table 3.4 shows the distribution of education levels using actual
qualifications achieved, whether GCSE grades A-C or equivalent, GCE A levels or
equivalent, or those with a degree or equivalent. In 2003 a slightly higher proportion
of immigrants (17.0 percent) had a degree compared to 14.0 percent of the UK born.
By 2012 these proportions had increased to 37.5 and 23.2 percent respectively. The
second panel shows the education cells based on years of full-time education. This
indicates that immigrants were overwhelmingly more highly educated than natives,
In 2003, 34.6 percent of immigrants left full-time education between the age of 21
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Table 3.4: Characteristics of Foreign born and UK born in 2003 and 2012
2003 2012
% With given characteristics Foreign Born UK Born Foreign Born UK Born
Qualifications
Degree or equivalent 17.0 14.0 37.5 23.2
Higher education 5.4 7.1 8.2 9.0
GCE, A-level or equivalent 10.3 19.8 13.6 24.8
GCSE grades A*-C or equivalent 7.4 19.5 9.4 24.6
Other qualifications 25.8 8.3 18.8 7.8
No qualifications 15.8 11.9 11.8 9.2
Missing 18.4 19.5 0.8 1.4
Occupation
Professional 31.3 32.7 29.7 34.0
Intermediate 20.6 26.9 22.4 26.2
Routine 48.1 40.4 47.9 39.8
Education groups (age left FT education)
High 34.6 15.9 42.3 20.8
Medium 33.8 27.4 35.1 32.8
Low 25.9 53.3 19.0 45.8
Missing 5.7 3.4 3.6 0.6
Skill groups (wage)
1st quartile 16.2 15.9 36.7 31.0
2nd quartle 23.8 25.1 21.1 25.4
3rd quartile 25.9 27.6 21.6 24.5
4th quartile 34.2 31.4 20.6 19.2
Labour force status
Employed 63.7 73.5 66.3 71.4
Unemployed 5.1 3.5 6.8 6.1
Inactive 31.2 23.0 26.8 22.6
Age
16-20 5.7 10.5 5.4 10.2
21-25 10.7 9.5 10.7 10.8
26-30 15.3 8.8 16.1 9.9
31-35 14.2 11.1 16.4 8.8
36-40 12.6 12.4 13.4 9.4
41-45 12.0 11.2 11.0 11.3
46-50 10.3 10.1 9.1 11.9
51-55 8.3 9.9 7.7 10.5
56-60 6.4 10.4 6.1 9.4
61-65 4.6 6.3 4.2 7.8
Sex
Male 48.4 49.8 48.4 50.1
Female 51.6 50.2 51.6 49.9
Region of Birth
Africa (New Commonwealth) 13.0 10.2
Bangladesh 4.9 3.4
Caribbean (NC) 3.4 2.3
China 1.5 1.5
India 9.4 8.9
Old Commonwealth 8.4 5.5
Other Europe 10.4 21.3
Pakistan 5.9 6.5
Republic of Ireland 6.2 3.3
Rest of World 18.5 21.3
Sth East Asia (NC) 5.2 4.5
Note: Source: Authors’ calculations from the APS. Working age population (16-65 years).
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and 40 (high)12, in contrast to 15.9 percent of the native population. In 2012 the
overall picture is similar, with a small decline to 19.0 percent in the proportion of
immigrants with a low education, and corresponding increases in the proportion with
medium or high education levels. The increase in immigrants from countries that
have joined the EU more recently (as opposed to the 1992 members) has increased
markedly between 2003 and 2012. In 2003, 9.7 percent of immigrants came from
‘Other Europe’, in contrast to 18.2 percent in 2012.
There are also differences in the educational attainment of natives and immigrants
depending on the length of time that they have been in the UK, as shown in Table
3.3. Immigrants that have been in the UK for less than five years are more highly
educated compared to those who have been living in the UK for more than five years.
In 2012, 46.8 percent of immigrants who had been in the UK for less than five years
had left full-time eduction aged 21-40 years, in contrast to 35.5 percent of those
who had been resident for more than five years. For those who had left full-time
education aged less than five years, the fractions are 13.6 percent and 28.6 percent
respectively. Of course, some of these differences and those in Table 1 will be due
to differences between age cohorts, a dimension that I can not examine here in the
absence of longitudinal data.
3.3.3 Decomposing immigrant and native population growth
The growth of the population has not been spread evenly across the country, and
it can be decomposed into two parts - the growth of the immigrant population, and
12This category also includes those still in full-time education, and may therefore be below the
age of 21.
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the growth of the native born population. At time t the total population in local
authority i, is Popt, the sum of the native born population, UKt, and the foreign
born population, FBt. The growth of the total population can then be shown by the
following equation:
(Popt − Popt−1)/Popt−1 = (UKt − UKt−1)/Popt−1 + (FBt − FBt−1)/Popt−1 (3.5)
Table 3.5 presents the decomposition in Equation 3.5 for the working age popula-
tion (aged 16-64) for selected local authorities between 2003 and 2012. There is
significant heterogeneity in the relative growth of the two components across cities.
In London for example, Merton, Westminster, and Barking and Dagenham, all had
large increases in the size of their immigrant populations (between 16 - 20 percent).
Brent and Newham both had net declines in their native born populations of 10 and
9 percent. Several other London local authorities also had declines in their native
born populations, such as Greenwich (8 percent decline) and Merton (6 percent de-
cline) These areas also had increases in their immigrant populations of between 3
and 15 percent.
Population growth can further be decomposed by skill groups, and Table 3.6
presents the growth in each of the three education groups used previously for natives
and immigrants between 2003 and 2012 (summing across each row should therefore
add to the percentage change for the total population in Table 3.5 however I do not
exclude those with no education information in Table 3.5 hence the discrepancy).
A striking feature of Table 3.6 is the marked decline in the native population with
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Table 3.5: Components of Population Growth for selected Local
Authorities (2003-2012)
2012 population Percentage change (2003-2012)
Foreign Foreign Born UK Born (∆ Foreign (∆ UK (% Change
Local Authority Born/Pop. Born)/Pop. Born)/Pop. Total
Brent 64.7 110,558 60,195 8.9 -12.1 -3.2
Westminster 60.5 123,408 80,513 17.1 3.9 21.0
Newham 64.4 102,290 56,522 6.7 -11.6 -4.9
Tower Hamlets 56.5 102,045 78,507 18.1 3.2 21.4
Camden 50.5 89,883 88,166 14.3 3.8 18.1
Merton 51.3 76,655 72,826 21.5 -9.0 12.5
Haringey 45.0 71,176 86,929 0.4 -0.2 0.2
Hackney 45.9 72,679 85,675 8.5 6.2 14.7
Waltham Forest 45.3 70,909 85,491 13.8 -6.7 7.2
Greenwich 42.9 66,128 88,098 17.3 -11.4 5.9
Islington 37.1 56,419 95,608 6.6 7.0 13.6
Leicester 39.7 83,001 126,269 15.0 -1.8 13.2
Enfield 38.9 74,912 117,560 9.0 1.7 10.7
Barking and Dagenham 38.5 46,280 73,893 18.2 -4.7 13.5
Manchester 28.8 108,438 267,690 16.8 9.9 26.8
Birmingham 28.5 194,277 486,977 13.1 -3.1 10.0
Coventry 26.1 55,832 158,051 11.2 -0.2 11.0
Nottingham 24.3 55,214 172,124 15.8 3.6 19.4
Bradford 20.0 67,456 270,382 5.4 7.2 12.6
Bristol 15.9 51,886 274,869 10.9 11.2 22.1
Sheffield 15.2 59,214 330,146 9.2 6.5 15.6
Leeds 15.0 84,703 481,773 6.6 9.5 16.1
Liverpool 11.1 34,216 274,803 6.5 0.4 6.9
Kingston upon Hull 10.4 19,111 165,441 6.8 5.3 12.1
Stoke-on-Trent 9.3 14,576 141,541 4.8 -3.3 1.4
Average (2012) 29.5 90,391 262,303 9.3 1.1 10.4
Note: Authors’ calculations from weighted data using the Annual Population Survey.
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Table 3.6: Components of Population Growth by Education Group
for selected Local Authorities (2003-2012)
Low education Medium education High education
% Change (∆ Foreign (∆ UK (∆ Foreign (∆ UK (∆ Foreign (∆ UK
Local Authority Total Born)/Pop. Born)/Pop. Born)/Pop. Born)/Pop. Born)/Pop. Born)/Pop.
Brent 1 3 -7 7 -3 3 -2
Westminster 23 -1 0 5 2 15 3
Newham -10 -8 -14 2 -2 10 2
Tower Hamlets 17 -4 -5 4 2 15 5
Camden 21 0 -1 5 2 11 4
Merton 12 3 -10 7 -0 12 1
Haringey 3 -3 -6 1 3 5 3
Hackney 18 3 -5 0 9 7 2
Waltham Forest 5 1 -12 2 2 8 3
Greenwich 8 0 -11 9 0 9 1
Islington 15 -1 -5 0 6 9 5
Leicester 18 1 -11 10 9 5 2
Enfield 14 1 -10 6 7 4 5
Barking and Dagenham 17 3 -14 9 9 7 3
Manchester 28 1 -8 7 13 8 7
Birmingham 13 4 -6 6 6 5 -1
Coventry 14 3 -2 7 4 2 -0
Nottingham 22 1 -9 10 11 6 4
Bradford 14 -0 1 3 6 2 2
Bristol 25 3 -6 2 12 6 7
Sheffield 19 0 -6 4 14 4 2
Leeds 19 2 -4 3 11 2 5
Liverpool 11 1 -8 3 8 3 4
Kingston upon Hull 17 -0 -7 5 15 2 2
Stoke-on-Trent 6 1 -8 3 8 1 2
Average (2012) 11.1 0.3 -5.1 2.9 7.6 2.7 2.6
Note: Authors’ calculations from weighted data using the Annual Population Survey.
107
low education in all of these local authorities, and this decline has been the primary
driver of the decline in the native (and total) population in cities such as Manchester,
Nottingham and Sheffield, the average decline across all 200 local authorities is 10.8
percent, although this will be partly driven by cohort effects from an ageing popu-
lation. The foreign born population with low education has also generally declined
across all local authorities, averaging -0.2 percent. In contrast, the population of im-
migrants who left full-time education between the ages of 21 and 40 (high education)
grew by an average of 1.4 percent across all local authorities, and the average growth
of the UK born population is 0.4 percent. As Table 3.6 shows, there is significant
variation across local authorities, with the London boroughs of Newham, Merton,
Greenwich, and Barking and Dagenham experiencing large increases in the high and
medium skill cells (average of 9.8 percent and 8 percent respectively).
The nature of the correlation between changes in the foreign born population
and native population in different skill groups is explored further in Figures 3.4 -
3.6. Figure 3.4 shows the annual change in the UK born against the change in the
foreign born for 200 local authorities. There is a negative correlation between high
skilled (professionals) immigrants and the UK born, and also between low skilled
(routine occupations) immigrants and the UK born, while there is a positive corre-
lation between medium skilled immigrants and medium skilled natives. Each graph
also shows the linear line of best fit. Figure 3.5 presents similar graphs for the three
broad education groups, high skill (those who left full-time education between the
ages of 21 and 40), medium skill (those who left full-time education between the
ages of 16 and 20), and low skilled (those who left before the age of 16). There is
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a positive correlation between the change in immigrants and the change in natives,
with no correlation between the change in high skilled immigrants and natives in
the highest education group. Figure 3.6 shows that there is a positive correlation
between the first difference in immigrants and natives in all four of the skill groups
defined by the probabilistic allocation to wage quartiles.
Figure 3.4: Change in Immigrants vs change in UK born by Occupation Group
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Note: This figure graphs the change in the UK born population (working age), against the change
in the foreign born population in three occupation groups. Authors’ calculations from the APS.
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Figure 3.5: Change in Immigrants vs change in UK born by Education Group
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Note: This figure graphs the change in the UK born population (working age), against the change
in the foreign born population in three education groups. Authors’ calculations from the APS.
Figure 3.6: Change in Immigrants vs change in UK born by Skill Cell
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Note: This figure graphs the change in the UK born population (working age), against the change
in the foreign born population in four skill groups. Authors’ calculations from the APS.
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Table 3.7: Estimates of the Effect of Immigrant Inflows on Net
Native Outflows (Local Authority)
Total Population Working Age Population
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. OLS
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 -0.262∗∗ -0.196∗∗ -0.408∗∗ -0.318∗
(0.101) (0.072) (0.127) (0.145)
∆ Local demand shock -0.003 -0.028
(0.137) (0.142)
∆ Log real house price 0.110∗ 0.152∗∗
(0.052) (0.053)
∆ Log housing stock 0.013 0.078
(0.062) (0.065)
adj. R2 0.86 0.88 0.83 0.86
B. IV
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 -0.781∗∗∗ -0.706∗∗∗ -0.866∗∗∗ -0.910∗∗∗
(0.132) (0.194) (0.156) (0.227)
∆ Local demand shock -0.038 -0.041
(0.066) (0.083)
∆ Log real house price 0.001 -0.007
(0.015) (0.019)
∆ Log housing stock 0.029 0.034
(0.022) (0.023)
First stage coeff. 0.636 0.519 0.682 0.511
(0.179) (0.163) (0.218) (0.209)
F-stat 12.67 10.11 9.82 8.96
N 1800 1800 1800 1800
Local Authorities 200 200 200 200
Note: Authors’ estimation of Equation 3.1. All estimates includes year and local
authority fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the local authority district
level are in parentheses. *p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001.
Source: Annual Population Survey.
3.4 Effect of immigrant inflows on native popula-
tion growth
The key question I wish to examine in this paper is whether net changes in the
UK born offset changes in Immigrants. That is, do natives move out of an area as
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immigrants arrive? An immigrant entering a particular local authority adds one to
the population unless natives or those from earlier cohorts of immigrants move out
of that local authority.13
Table 3.7 presents OLS and IV estimates of Equation 3.1.14 The table presents
the results for both the total population in columns (1) - (4) and the working age
population (16-65 years) in columns (5) - (8). Various specifications are reported, in-
cluding with and without local authority specific time trends, and with and without
controls (house prices, housing stock, and the labour demand shock). All specifica-
tions include year fixed effects and local authority fixed effects. The local authority
specific time trend controls for unobserved, non-linear fluctuations in population that
could be caused by birth rate shocks for example.
Both the OLS and IV estimates of the effect of immigrant inflows on net native
outflows are negative and statistically significant. The OLS estimates range from -
0.20 to -0.33 for the total population, and between -0.32 to -0.45 for the working age
population. The IV estimates presented in panel B are approximately three times the
size of the IV estimates and range from -0.71 to -0.78 for the total population. These
results indicate a substantial effect that is close to one-to-one native displacement.15
It is possible that the relationship between changes in the the native and immi-
grant population could be different depending on the geographic scale, clearly larger
areas such as regions will mask many movements between smaller spatial units such
13The Annual Population Survey data used in this study is not available at other geographic
definitions such as travel-to-work areas, which arguably represent more economically meaningful
areas.
14Tables produced using ‘estout’ and associated Stata commands written by Jann (2005, 2007).
15Table B5 in Appendix B presents the equivalent results using the unweighted data, and shows a
much smaller degree of displacement, with IV estimates of approximately -0.2 (significant at 0.1%).
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as local authorities. I therefore re-estimate Equation 3.1 using three different geo-
graphic definitions; districts (407 areas), counties (140), and regions (11). Table 3.8
presents the OLS and IV estimates for both the total population and the working
age population. For both the total and working age populations there is a consistent
negative correlation between the the change in immigrants and change in the native
population across the different areas, and this is robust to the use of an instrument,
with the exception of the district are results.
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Table 3.8: Estimates of the Effect of Immigrant Inflows
on Net Native Outflows
Total Population Working Age
(1) (2)
A. District
OLS
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 -0.643∗∗ -0.697∗∗∗
(0.216) (0.150)
adj. R2 -0.01 -0.07
IV
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 -0.371 -0.435
(0.307) (0.505)
F-stat 28.58 23.21
N 3663 3663
Districts 407 407
B. County
OLS
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 -0.874∗∗∗ -0.859∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.036)
adj. R2 0.67 0.61
IV
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 -0.764∗∗∗ -0.828∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.129)
F-stat 16.82 11.56
N 1120 1120
Counties 140 140
C. Region
OLS
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 -0.839∗∗∗ -0.901∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.049)
adj. R2 0.96 0.94
IV
(∆ FB)/Popt−1) -0.548∗∗∗ -0.715∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.099)
F-stat 58.89 35.86
N 99 99
Regions 11 11
Note: Authors’ estimation of Equation 3.1. All estimates
includes year and area fixed effects. Standard errors clus-
tered at the local authority district level are in parenthe-
ses. *p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001.
Source: Annual Population Survey.
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3.5 Effect of immigration on local skill
composition
This section focuses on the effect of immigrant inflows on the skill composition
of local areas. Rather than treating immigrants and the UK born as two separate
factors I define skill groups within which immigrants and natives are more obviously
substitutes. As discussed above I define skill groups in three different ways; two de-
terministically - occupation, and education groups, and one probabilistically, based
on wage data. I start by estimating Equation 3.4 by pooling the three occupation
groups and these results are shown in Table 3.9. I do not present results including
the other controls as these do not vary by skill group, and the instrument is too weak
when these controls are included. The OLS estimates suggest a large negative corre-
lation between the change in immigrants and change in natives, with estimates of -1.0
to -1.2. The corresponding IV estimates also show a significant negative relationship
between the inflow of immigrants and native outflows, of a similar magnitude.
An alternate deterministic skill classification is to use the year that each person
left full-time education; before the age of 16 years, between 17 and 21, and after 21
years. Table 3.10 shows the results of pooling these three education groups, and in
contrast to the occupation cell results, they show a positive correlation between the
change in immigrants and the change in the UK born population. The estimates
using OLS range from 0.65 - 0.67, a strong degree of attraction. The corresponding
IV estimates range from 1.6 - 18, suggesting attraction of almost two natives for
every immigrant arrival in a local authority.
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Table 3.9: Estimates of the Effect of Immigrant Inflows on
Net Native Outflows (Pooled Occupation Groups)
Total Population Working Age
(1) (2)
A. OLS
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 -1.030∗∗∗ -0.670∗∗
(0.066) (0.238)
adj. R2 0.26 0.25
B. IV
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 -1.050∗ -0.644∗∗
(0.454) (0.221)
First stage coeff. 0.669 0.603
(0.166) (0.108)
F-stat 16.08 31.16
Occupation fixed effects Yes Yes
N 5400 5400
Local Authorities 200 200
Note: Authors’ estimation of Equation 3.4. All estimates in-
cludes year and local authority fixed effects. Standard errors
clustered at the local authority district level are in parentheses.
*p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001.
Source: Annual Population Survey.
In terms of the sign of the relationship between the change in immigrants and
the change in natives, the results using my third skill definition - four skill groups
based on a probabilistic assignment on wages - are most similar to the results using
the education groups. As shown in Table 3.11, the OLS estimates range from 1.1 -
1.2, suggesting a strong degree of attraction between similar natives and immigrants,
defined by skill. However, the IV estimates are negative and insignificant.
3.6 Mechanisms
In aggregate the estimates of the relationship between natives and immigrants
appears to be negative (Table 3.7) - consistent with a model of labour market dis-
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Table 3.10: Estimates of the Effect of Immigrant Inflows on
Net Native Outflows (Pooled Education Groups)
Total Population Working Age
(1) (2)
A. OLS
(∆ FB) / pop. (t-1) 0.668∗∗∗ 0.662∗∗∗
(0.090) (0.097)
adj. R2 0.15 0.15
B. IV
(∆ FB) / pop. (t-1) 1.599∗∗ 1.704∗∗
(0.570) (0.634)
First stage coeff. 0.414 0.382
(0.067) (0.064)
F-stat 14.85 12.64
Education fixed effects Yes Yes
N 5400 5400
Local Authorities 200 200
Note: Authors’ estimation of Equation 3.4. All estimates in-
cludes year and local authority fixed effects. Standard errors
clustered at the local authority district level are in parentheses.
*p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001.
Source: Annual Population Survey.
Table 3.11: Estimates of the Effect of Immigrant Inflows on
Net Native Outflows (Pooled Skill Groups)
Total Population Working Age
(1) (2)
A. OLS
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 1.117∗∗∗ 1.088∗∗∗
(0.227) (0.222)
adj. R2 0.54 0.53
B. IV
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 -0.397 -0.405
(1.253) (1.260)
First stage coeff. 0.348 0.352
(0.070) (0.067)
F-stat 14.52 14.72
Skill fixed effects Yes Yes
N 7200 7200
Local Authorities 200 200
Note: Authors’ estimation of Equation 3.4. All estimates
includes year and local authority fixed effects. Standard
errors clustered at the local authority district level are in
parentheses.
*p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001.
Source: Annual Population Survey.
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placement - however disaggregating by various definitions of skill groups suggests
that the relationship is more complicated. The pooled occupation group results also
indicate a high degree of displacement (Table 3.9), yet this contrasts with the evi-
dence in favour of attraction shown in Tables 3.10 - 3.11, when using education, or
a probabilistic allocation of individuals to skill groups based on observable charac-
teristics. In this section I explore further the mechanisms that may lie behind the
results presented so far. First, I examine whether the total immigrant inflow has a
differential effect on particular native skill groups. Second, I examine whether the
composition of the immigrant inflow has a differential effect on natives in different
skill groups.
3.6.1 Effect of immigrant inflow on native skill composition
I first examine whether the total immigrant inflow has a differential effect on
natives in different skill groups, focusing on the lowest and highest native skill groups
using each of my three skill definitions. I estimate the following equation:
∆UKijt/Popt−1 = β1∆FBit/Popt−1 + ϕt + λi + it (3.6)
where the dependent variable is either the lowest or highest native skill group, and
the main explanatory variable is the total immigrant inflow. Table 3.12 presents the
results of regressing the total change in the immigrant population on the lowest and
and highest occupation groups. Each cell in Table 3.12 represents the results of a
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Table 3.12: Estimates of the Effect of Total Immigrant Inflows
on Net Native Outflows by Occupation
Total Population Working Age
(1) (2)
A. OLS
Low skill natives
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 -0.749∗∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗
(0.120) (0.025)
High skill natives
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 -1.085∗∗∗ -0.364∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.038)
B. IV
Low skill natives
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 -0.425 -0.121
(0.607) (0.125)
High skill natives
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 -0.864 -0.334
(0.504) (0.184)
Local Authorities 200 200
Note: Authors’ estimation of Equation 3.6. All estimates
includes year and local authority fixed effects. Standard
errors clustered at the local authority district level are in
parentheses.
*p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001.
Source: Annual Population Survey.
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separate regression, and the first stage instrumental variables results are the same
as those reported in Table 3.7. The OLS estimates suggest that the total immigrant
inflow has a negative effect on both the lowest and highest occupation groups. How-
ever, there is no evidence of a causal relationship between the total immigrant inflow
and natives in either the lowest or highest occupation groups, as indicated by the
insignificant IV estimates in panel B of Table 3.12.
Table 3.13: Estimates of the Effect of total Immigrant Inflows
on Net Native Outflows by Education
Total Population Working Age
(1) (2)
A. OLS
Low skill natives
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 -0.197 -0.190
(0.150) (0.142)
High skill natives
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 -0.261 -0.261
(0.224) (0.226)
B. IV
Low skill natives
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 -0.654∗∗ -0.668∗
(0.253) (0.288)
High skill natives
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 -0.378 -0.417
(0.536) (0.561)
Local Authorities 200 200
Note: Authors’ estimation of Equation 3.6. All estimates
includes year and local authority fixed effects. Standard
errors clustered at the local authority district level are in
parentheses.
*p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001.
Source: Annual Population Survey.
In Table 3.13 I present the equivalent results where I estimate the effect of total
immigrant inflows on the top and bottom education skill groups. The OLS results
are significant, but the IV estimates indicate a displacement of approximately seven
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low-educated (less than 16 years full time education) natives for every ten immi-
grants. For high-skilled natives the sign on the coefficient is also negative but there
estimates are not statistically significant.
Table 3.14: Estimates of the Effect of total Immigrant Inflows
on Net Native Outflows by Skill
Total Population Working Age
(1) (2)
A. OLS
Low skill natives
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 0.929∗∗ 0.880∗∗
(0.325) (0.316)
High skill natives
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 1.507∗∗∗ 1.493∗∗∗
(0.331) (0.320)
B. IV
Low skill natives
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 0.409 0.439
(0.508) (0.550)
High skill natives
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 0.728 0.703
(0.570) (0.526)
Local Authorities 200 200
Note: Authors’ estimation of Equation 3.6. All estimates
includes year and local authority fixed effects. Standard
errors clustered at the local authority district level are in
parentheses.
*p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001.
Source: Annual Population Survey.
Finally, in Table 3.14, I present the results using the probabilistically determined
skill cells. In contrast with the results using occupation or education cells, the OLS
estimates are consistently significant and positive, ranging from 0.93 - 0.99 for low
skilled natives, and 1.51 - 1.59 for high skilled natives. However, none of these
estimates are significant when using instrumental variables.
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3.6.2 Effect of Immigrant composition on natives
In this section I disaggregate the immigrant supply shock by the three skill groups
(occupation, education, and wage group) used previously, and I examine the effect
of immigrant inflow in the lowest and highest cell on the corresponding native cells.
I also estimate the effect of immigrant inflows in each of the lowest skill cells on each
of the highest native skills cells, and vice versa, while controlling for the combined
remaining immigrant groups. I thus estimate the following equation:
∆UKi,j,t/Popt−1 = β1∆FBi,k,t/Popt−1 + β2∆FBi,−k,t/Popt−1 + ϕt + λi + i,t (3.7)
where j and k are either the highest or lowest cell in each of the three definitions, and
I estimate every pairwise combination. I focus on β1 in the following tables and do not
report β2, but I report the Angrist-Pischke F-statistics for each instrument. This is of
particular interest given that immigrants who are highly skilled for various reasons,
such as language issues, or lack of work experience in the UK, end up working in areas
for which they are overqualified. Therefore it is perhaps not competition between
natives and immigrants with similar skills that is of most concern, but between
low-skilled natives and high-skilled immigrants, or conversely, between high-skilled
natives and low-skilled immigrants.
I report the results using the occupation group definition first, restricting at-
tention to the ‘high’ occupation group (professional) and the ‘low’ occupation group
(routine workers). Table 3.15 presents the OLS and IV results for both the total pop-
ulation and the working age population. Focusing on the IV estimates, there is no
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statistically significant evidence of any affect of either low or high skilled immigrants
on either low or high-skilled natives. In columns (5) to (8) there is weak evidence
of a negative effect of low-skilled immigrants on high-skilled natives (significant at
5%, and not robust to the inclusion of a local authority time trend), and slightly
stronger evidence of a positive effect of high-skilled immigrants on high-skilled, the
coefficients suggesting an attraction of close to one native for every immigrant.
Table 3.15: Estimates of the Effect Immigrant Inflows on Native
Occupation groups
∆ Low UK ∆ High UK
Total Population Working Age Total Population Working Age
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. OLS
(∆ High FB)/Popt−1 -0.207∗ -0.173 -0.212∗ 0.501∗∗∗
(0.096) (0.093) (0.092) (0.070)
(∆ Low FB)/Popt−1 -0.129 -0.129 -0.145∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.070) (0.043) (0.039)
B. IV
(∆ High FB)/Popt−1 -0.729 -0.754 0.892∗ 1.002∗
(0.535) (0.626) (0.433) (0.467)
(∆ Low FB)/Popt−1 0.586 0.504 -1.027∗ -1.028∗
(0.492) (0.432) (0.457) (0.412)
F-stat 9.37 9.37 9.37 9.37
F-stat 10.55 10.55 10.55 10.55
N 1600 1600 1600 1600
Local Authorities 200 200 200 200
Note: Authors’ estimation of Equation 3.1. All estimates includes year and local authority fixed effects. Standard
errors clustered at the local authority district level are in parentheses. *p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001.
Source: Annual Population Survey.
In Table 3.16 I present the results using the highest and lowest categories of the
education cells. These results suggest there is little significant relationship between
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change in immigrants and change in the native population for either the low or high-
skilled. Finally, Table 3.17 presents the equivalent results using the 1st and 4th
quartiles of the skill measure, and the IV estimates indicate a positive relationship
between high-skilled immigrants and natives, similar to that found using the occu-
pation groups.
Table 3.16: Estimates of the Effect Immigrant Inflows on
Native Education groups
∆ Low UK ∆ High UK
Total Population Working Age Total Population Working Age
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. OLS
(∆ High FB)/Popt−1 -0.078∗ -0.081∗ 0.093 0.108
(0.038) (0.037) (0.158) (0.154)
(∆ Low FB)/Popt−1 -0.080 -0.023 -0.261 -0.243
(0.076) (0.075) (0.151) (0.140)
B. IV
(∆ High FB)/Popt−1 -0.663 -0.593 -0.663 -0.676
(0.545) (0.643) (0.610) (0.626)
(∆ Low FB)/Popt−1 -1.752 -1.855 -3.646 -3.950
(0.955) (1.031) (2.149) (2.361)
F-stat 15.68 22.88 15.68 22.88
F-stat 6.81 32.17 6.81 32.17
N 1800 1800 1800 1800
Local Authorities 200 200 200 200
Note: Authors’ estimation of Equation 3.1. All estimates includes year and local authority fixed effects. Standard
errors clustered at the local authority district level are in parentheses. *p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001.
Source: Annual Population Survey.
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Table 3.17: Estimates of the Effect Immigrant Inflows on Native
Skill groups
∆ Low UK ∆ High UK
Total Population Working Age Total Population Working Age
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. OLS
(∆ High FB)/Popt−1 1.008 0.948 1.507∗∗∗ 1.493∗∗∗
(0.564) (0.608) (0.331) (0.320)
(∆ Low FB)/Popt−1 0.929∗∗ 0.880∗∗ 0.050 0.047
(0.325) (0.316) (0.164) (0.152)
B. IV
(∆ High FB)/Popt−1 -0.154 -0.159 0.779∗ 0.766∗
(0.117) (0.123) (0.343) (0.342)
(∆ Low FB)/Popt−1 0.953 0.956 -1.396 -1.404
(0.981) (0.969) (1.194) (0.378)
F-stat 12.23 12.51 12.25 12.29
F-stat 11.06 10.07 11.42 10.20
N 1800 1800 1800 1800
Local Authorities 200 200 200 200
Note: Authors’ estimation of Equation 3.1. All estimates includes year and local authority fixed effects. Standard
errors clustered at the local authority district level are in parentheses. *p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001.
Source: Annual Population Survey.
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Table 3.18: Estimates of the Effect of Immigrant Cohorts on Natives
Total Population Working Age
(1) (2)
A. OLS
2 year cutoff
< 2 years -0.928∗∗∗ -0.881∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.036)
> 2 years -0.855∗∗∗ -0.907∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.033)
5 year cutoff
< 5 years -0.916∗∗∗ -0.912∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.034)
> 5 years -0.833∗∗∗ -0.888∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.036)
B. IV
2 year cutoff
< 2 years -1.039∗∗∗ -0.819∗∗∗
(0.301) (0.247)
> 2 years -0.771∗∗∗ -0.920∗∗∗
(0.180) (0.181)
F-stat 3.68 5.52
F-stat 10.57 10.14
5 year cutoff
< 5 years -1.091∗∗ -0.808∗∗
(0.410) (0.271)
> 5 years -0.732∗∗ -0.942∗∗∗
(0.232) (0.238)
AP F-stat 5.10 5.01
AP F-stat 9.04 9.20
Local Authorities 200 200
N 1800 1800
Note: Authors’ estimation of Equation 3.8. All estimates
includes year and local authority fixed effects. Standard
errors clustered at the local authority district level are in
parentheses. *p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001.
Source: Annual Population Survey.
3.6.3 Cohort effects
Immigrants have been defined up until this point as all those who were born out-
side of the UK, however it is well known that immigrants tend to to become more
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like natives over time and therefore one might expect more recent migrants to have a
more pronounced effect on the local labour market than earlier waves of immigrants
who have become relatively more assimilated. There is also evidence (Manacorda
et al. (2012)), that more recent immigrants put more competitive pressure on older
immigrant cohorts than natives. For these reasons I estimate the following equation,
splitting the total immigrant population into two groups recent and earlier arrivals:
∆UKit/Popt−1 = β1∆FB/Popt−1 (≤ 2yrs)it+β2∆FB/Popt−1 (> 2yrs)it+ϕt+λi+it
(3.8)
I use two cutoffs to define recent arrivals, those who arrived within the last two years,
and those that arrived within the last five years.16 The results are presented in Table
3.18. Similarly to the main results presented in Table 3.7, the OLS estimates suggest
a strong negative association between change in the UK population and both older
and more recent immigrants. These results also hold when using the instrument
as shown in panel B. However, the Angrist-Pischke first stage F -statistics are often
quite low, particularly for the instrumented recent arrivals, so these results should
be treated with caution. It should also be noted that although I see an arrival year,
I do not know in which local authority an immigrant first lived in, only where they
live when observed in the current survey year.
The next question I address is whether there is any evidence of a displacement
effect of recent immigrant arrivals on earlier cohorts of immigrants. To do this I
16Using a cutoff of three years gives almost identical results to that using two years, and using
four years gives very similar results to the five year cutoff.
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estimate the following equation:
∆FB/Popt−1 (> 2yrs)it = β1∆FB/Popt−1 (≤ 2yrs)it+β2∆UKit/Popt−1+ϕt+λi+it
(3.9)
where again, the cutoff is either two or five years, and I also control for the change
in the native population on the right-hand side. These results are presented in
Table 3.19. The OLS estimates suggest a degree of displacement between recent
immigrant arrivals and earlier immigrant cohorts, with estimates of β1 in Equation
3.9 of around -0.5 for the total population and -0.22 to -0.55 for the working age
population. However the IV estimates (panel B) indicate that there is no significant
relationship between new and older arrivals.
Given that recent immigrants are more dissimilar to older cohorts of immigrants
and natives in their labour market characteristics it is also of interest to examine the
effect of recent immigrants on the sum of natives and earlier immigrants, as this is
where most of the variation is coming from. I therefore estimate one further variation
of Equation 3.1 by estimating the following equation:
∆(UK + FB (> 2yrs))/Popt−1 = β1∆FB/Popt−1 (≤ 2yrs)it + ϕt + λi + it (3.10)
As before the cutoff for recent immigrants is those that arrived within either the
last two or five years, and the results are presented in Table 3.20. The OLS results
show a consistent negative correlation between recent arrivals and the change in
the combined stock of natives and older immigrants, with estimates, with estimates
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of displacement close to 1. These results also hold using an instrument for recent
immigrant arrivals with estimates of β1 ranging from -1.04 to -1.23 for the total pop-
ulation, and between -0.84 to -1.15 for the working age population.
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Table 3.19: Estimates of the Effect of Recent Immigrants
on Earlier Immigrant Arrivals
Total Population Working Age
(1) (2)
A. OLS
2 year cutoff
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 -0.548∗∗∗ -0.224∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.029)
(∆ UK)/Popt−1 -0.505∗∗∗ -0.518∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.028)
5 year cutoff
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 -0.501∗∗∗ -0.210∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.027)
(∆ UK)/Popt−1 -0.427∗∗∗ -0.422∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.033)
B. IV
2 year cutoff
∆ FB)/Popt−1 -0.074 -0.290
(0.288) (0.305)
(∆ UK)/Popt−1 -0.082 -0.051
(0.113) (0.132)
F-stat 13.03 13.03
F-stat 4.93 7.52
5 year cutoff
∆ FB)/Popt−1 0.083 -0.163
(0.308) (0.262)
(∆ UK)/Popt−1 -0.080 -0.019
(0.116) (0.124)
F-stat 13.03 13.03
F-stat 4.05 4.90
Local Authorities 200 200
N 1800 1800
Note: Authors’ estimation of Equation 3.9. All estimates
includes year and local authority fixed effects. Standard
errors clustered at the local authority district level are in
parentheses. *p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001.
Source: Annual Population Survey.
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Table 3.20: OLS Estimates of the Effect of recent Immigrants
on Natives and Earlier Immigrants
Total Population Working Age
(1) (2)
A. OLS
2 year cutoff
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 -0.948∗∗∗ -0.896∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.036)
5 year cutoff
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 -0.944∗∗∗ -0.935∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.031)
B. IV
2 year cutoff
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 -1.036∗∗∗ -0.839∗∗
(0.295) (0.262)
F-stat 7.25 11.06
5 year cutoff
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 -1.137∗∗∗ 1.027∗∗∗
(0.231) (0.203)
F-stat 6.59 9.56
Local Authorities 200 200
N 1800 1800
Note: Authors’ estimation of Equation 3.10. All estimates
includes year and local authority fixed effects. Standard
errors clustered at the local authority district level are in
parentheses. *p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001.
Source: Annual Population Survey.
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3.7 Further robustness checks
This section presents some additional robustness checks. I first present some
results using data from an alternative source, and second I report some results ex-
cluding London and other large urban areas. Some previous work in this area have
used data collected from National Insurance Number (NINo) registrations, for ex-
ample Paolo et al. (2012). In this section I use NINo and NHS data (as used by
Hatton and Tani (2005) for example) as a comparison. The major disadvantage of
this data is that it is not possible to disaggregate by any kind of skill group. Ta-
ble 3.21 presents the OLS and IV estimates of Equation 3.1, where the dependent
variable is now the normalised change in the total population from the NHS data,
and the main independent variable is the normalised change in the foreign born as
defined by NINo registration data. I find a significant negative coefficient in both the
OLS and IV estimates, the IV estimates suggest an immigrant inflow of 100, leads
to a reduction in natives of between 17 to 38.
To further understand the results I re-estimate Equation 3.1, with the addition
of interacting immigrant inflow with area characteristics - specifically the size and
growth of local authorities. I first interact the immigrant inflow with a dummy vari-
able for the most populous local authorities including all of the London boroughs,17
and the results are presented in Table 3.22. As in Table 3.7, the sign on the immi-
grant inflow is always negative, but only significant when the data is restricted to
the working age population (columns (5)-(8)). The sign on the interaction between
17Large local authorities are listed in Table B3.
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Table 3.21: Estimates of the Effect of Immigrant Inflows
on the Native Population
OLS IV
Native inflow (NHS) Native inflow (NHS)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Foreign born (NINo) / total pop. (t-1) -0.227∗∗ -0.264∗∗∗ -0.098 -0.168∗∗
(0.069) (0.074) (0.050) (0.055)
F-stat 250.54 228.96
LA fixed effects no yes no yes
N 2415 2415 2415 2415
Local Authorities 345 345 345 345
Note: Authors’ estimation of Equation 3.1. All estimates includes year and local authority
fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the local authority district level are in parentheses.
*p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001.
Source: Annual Population Survey.
the large area dummy and the immigrant inflow is negative, but never significant
(which would indicate a greater displacement effect in more populous areas). None
of the coefficients are significant when using an instrument.
A similar pattern emerges when I interact immigrant growth with the fastest
growing local authorities.18 I define fastest growing in terms of population growth, as
I lack data on economic growth at the local authority level. I use the 90th percentile
as the cutoff for determining the fastest growing local authorities, although using
the 75th percentile gives similar results. Table 3.23 presents the results and the OLS
estimates indicate that there is a stronger displacement effect in faster growing areas.
18The local authorities are listed in Table B4.
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Table 3.22: Effect of Immigrant inflows on Native Population
- Area size effects
Total population Working age
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. OLS
∆ FB/Popt−1 -0.104 -0.256 -1.002∗∗ -1.597∗∗
(0.228) (0.312) (0.374) (0.540)
Large area * ∆ FB/Popt−1 -0.489 -0.501 -0.468 -0.441
(0.322) (0.373) (0.259) (0.294)
Large area 0.024∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.006
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
∆ Local demand shock -0.031 -0.048
(0.158) (0.162)
∆ Log real house price 0.092 0.132∗
(0.059) (0.059)
∆ Log housing stock 0.015 0.075
(0.066) (0.071)
R2 0.88 0.90 0.86 0.89
B. IV
∆ FB/Popt−1 -1.246 3.284 0.265 0.244
(2.427) (43.933) (0.154) (0.154)
Large area * ∆ FB/Popt−1 0.369 -4.131 0.949 4.601
(2.413) (43.376) (2.098) (16.748)
Large area -0.002 0.025 -0.000 0.007
(0.006) (0.125) (0.008) (0.056)
∆ Local demand shock -0.336 0.351
(3.928) (1.610)
∆ Log real house price -0.076 0.057
(0.834) (0.241)
∆ Log housing stock -0.010 0.097
(0.341) (0.243)
AP F-stat 12.67 10.11 9.82 5.96
AP F-stat (interaction) 13.32 11.48 10.76 6.19
N 1800 1800 1800 1800
Local Authorities 200 200 200 200
Note: Authors’ estimation of a variant of Equation 3.1. All estimates includes
year and local authority fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the local
authority district level are in parentheses.
*p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001.
Source: Annual Population Survey.
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Table 3.23: Effect of Immigrant inflows on Native Population
- Area growth interaction
Total Population Prime Age Population
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. OLS
∆ FB/Popt−1 -0.177 -0.088 -0.326∗ -0.252
(0.226) (0.262) (0.154) (0.178)
Fast growing area * ∆ FB/Popt−1 -0.689∗∗ -0.652∗ -0.321 -0.940∗
(0.235) (0.266) (0.199) (0.226)
Fast growing area 0.034∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.005
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
∆ Local demand shock 0.006 -0.030
(0.138) (0.152)
∆ Log real house price 0.097 0.147∗
(0.057) (0.057)
∆ Log housing stock 0.004 0.072
(0.065) (0.069)
R2 0.58 0.60 0.57 0.59
B. IV
∆ FB/Popt−1 -0.923∗∗∗ -0.872∗∗∗ -1.019∗∗∗ -1.121∗∗∗
(0.140) (0.169) (0.155) (0.198)
Fast growing area * ∆ FB/Popt−1 0.145 0.151 0.150 0.302
(0.146) (0.177) (0.159) (0.205)
Fast growing area 0.005∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
∆ Local demand shock -0.007 -0.009
(0.050) (0.069)
∆ Log real house price 0.003 -0.007
(0.015) (0.020)
∆ Log housing stock 0.024 0.031
(0.021) (0.023)
AP F-stat 12.67 10.11 9.82 5.96
AP F-stat (interaction) 12.32 11.96 11.56 7.73
N 1800 1800 1800 1800
Local Authorities 200 200 200 200
Note: Authors’ estimation of Equation 3.1. All estimates includes year and local au-
thority fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the local authority district level are in
parentheses.
*p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001.
Source: Annual Population Survey.
135
3.7.1 Native mobility
The analysis so far has been an analysis of net flows, in this section I analyse gross
flows using data from the labour force survey, which records the information on the
local authority of residence one year ago, enabling an analysis of the in-migration,
out-migration, and net-migration rates for the native population.19 If a native lived
in local authority i in year t − 1, and lives in a different local authority in year t,
then s/he is defined as having moved out, and the out-migration rate is defined as
the number of natives who moved out of local authority i between years t − 1 and
t, divided by the native population of local authority i in year t − 1. Similarly, a
native moves into a local authority if s/he lived there in year t and lived in a different
local authority in t− 1, and the in-migration rate is therefore the number of natives
who moved into local authority i divided by the population of i in t − 1. The net
migration rate is the difference between the in-migration rate and the out-migration
rate. Summary statistics for native mobility rates are shown in Table 3.24.
I use the following model to estimate the effect of immigrant inflows on native
in-migration, out-migration, and net-migration rates:
native mobility it = βit
FBit
Popit−1
+ ϕi + ρt + it (3.11)
The dependent variable is now either in the in-migration, out-migration, or net-
migration rates, and the coefficient of interest, β is the response in these mobility
rates from the normalised inflow of immigrants. Table 3.25 presents the OLS and
19Data are not available at the smaller district level, and these data are not available in the
Annual Population Survey, and therefore the following results are based on a smaller sample than
the boosted APS data.
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IV estimates of Equation 3.11. The IV estimates suggest that an immigrant inflow
equal to 1% of the local initial population increases the native out-migration rate by
approximately 0.12 percentage points (columns 3 and 4), which is reasonably large
considering the average out-migration rate for the UK is 1.55%. The results also
imply that an immigrant inflow is associated with a smaller inflow of natives, and
that the net result is an increase in the net outflow of natives of between 0.06 to 0.08
percentage points (last row), which is consistent with the results found for the net
flows in the previous sections.
Table 3.24: Average mobility rates for the UK born
Total Population Working Age
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Native in-migration rate 0.069 0.035 0.067 0.040
Native out-migration rate 0.015 0.02 0.018 0.025
Native net migration rate -0.054 0.041 -0.049 0.049
Note: Table shows the average (over the period 2003-2012) in-,
out-, and net-migration rsates between local authorities for the
UK born. Authors’ calculations from the Annual Population Sur-
vey.
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Table 3.25: Effect of Immigrant inflows on Native Movers
OLS IV
Total Population Working Age Total Population Working Age
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Native in-migration rate
∆ FB/Popt−1 0.027∗∗ 0.048∗∗ 0.042∗ 0.064∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.016) (0.017) (0.019)
Native out-migration rate
∆ FB/Popt−1 0.092∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.019) (0.029) (0.034)
Native net out-migration rate
∆ FB/Popt−1 0.065∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.080∗ 0.061∗
(0.016) (0.018) (0.038) (0.031)
N 1800 1800 1800 1800
Local Authorities 200 200 200 200
F-stat 79.74 56.94
Note: Authors’ estimation of Equation 3.1. All estimates includes year and local authority fixed effects.
Standard errors clustered at the local authority district level are in parentheses.
*p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001.
Source: Annual Population Survey.
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3.8 Conclusion
This chapter provides the first comprehensive analysis of the effect of immigration
on local labour markets in the UK using data from the Annual Population Survey
for the period 2003-2012. The results indicate that when considering the aggregate,
total or working age population, there is significant evidence of native displacement
from local areas as a result of immigrant inflows. The IV estimates suggest displace-
ment of between 20-30 people in response to an immigrant inflow of 100 people, an
economically significant decrease.
Immigrants and natives are heterogenous, and it therefore makes sense to split
natives and immigrants into skill groups to allow competition between arguably
more similar subgroups. Although previous studies of labour market adjustment
to immigration also consider heterogeneity in skill, most tend to focus on only one
particular definition of skill, whereas I consider three alternatives. The first two are
based on direct observation of the characteristics of immigrants and natives, while
the first takes a probabilistic approach, following for example Card (2001, 2007),
to allocate natives and immigrants to skill groups based on where their observed
characteristics would place them in the wage distribution.
The overall negative relationship between immigrant inflows and native growth
is also apparent when pooling by occupation groups. Both OLS and IV estimates
suggest displacement of between -0.6 to -1.1, suggesting that within three broadly
defined occupation groups (routine, intermediate, and professional) natives in similar
occupations to immigrant are displaced. However, if skill groups are defined by
either age of leaving full-time education, or a probabilistic assignment into the wage
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structure, there is some evidence of attraction between similarly skilled natives and
immigrants. These results are not driven by differences in the sample, and therefore
this is an important finding. Most previous studies in the migration literature have
used only one definition of skill, but there are different dimensions to skill, and
this may explain the results presented here, although further investigation may be
warranted.
To further understand what might be driving these results I estimate the effect of
total immigration on low skilled and high-skilled natives separately (for each of the
three skill definitions). Using an instrument I don’t find any statistically significant
effect of immigrant inflows on either low-skilled or high-skilled native outflows, for
either the occupation or wage based skill definitions. Defining skill be education
groups there is evidence (using an instrument) that immigrant inflows displace low
skilled natives, with an estimated coefficient of around -0.7.
I show that immigrants often work in occupations that are below what their ed-
ucation might otherwise suggest, and because of this occupational down-grading it
is interesting to examine whether the composition of the immigrant inflow has a
differential effect on low and high-skilled natives. I therefore split the immigrant
inflow into low-skilled and high-skilled groups, and estimate the effect on both low
skilled and high-skilled natives. Using the occupation based skill definition I find
evidence of a positive association between both high skilled immigrants and high-
skilled natives. I also find a negative association between low skilled immigrants
and high-skilled natives. These first effect suggests that there might be a degree
of complementarity between the high-skilled of either type. There is are significant
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effects evident when defining skill groups by education groups, but the positive rela-
tionship between high-skilled immigrants and high-skilled natives is also found using
probabilistic wage groups.
Although immigrants may face significant occupational down-grading on arrival,
it is also the case that they become more similar to the native population over time,
and therefore when looking for any effects of immigration in the labour market it
is important to consider the length of time that immigrants have been in the UK.
The APS allows me to see the year of arrival of an immigrant, and so I first split
immigrants into those that arrived recently (within either the last two or five years),
and those that arrived earlier, and estimate the effect of each group on the total
native population. Here I find that the sign on the coefficients for both recent and
earlier immigrants arrivals is always negative and significant, and the two are not
statistically significantly difference from each other. These results should be treated
with caution due to the relatively weak instruments, but it does suggest that even if
immigrants do become more assimilated over time, they are still ‘different’ in some
sense.
Previous studies such as Manacorda et al. (2012), have shown that the effect of
recent immigrants is most strongly felt by earlier immigrants, I therefore estimate
the effect of recent immigrants (while controlling for the change in the native popula-
tion) on earlier immigrants. The OLS estimates indicate that recent immigrants do
displace older immigrants, but this effect is not robust to the use of an instrument.
Finally, when considering the length of time in the UK, I estimate the effect
of recent immigrant arrivals on the net outflows of the sum of natives and earlier
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immigrants. Given that recent immigrants are the most dissimilar, it is here that
there is maximum variation between immigrants and natives/earlier immigrants,
and therefore if there was any displacement effect I would expect it to be evident
here. The IV estimates show a consistent negative effect of recent immigrants on
natives/earlier immigrants.
The evidence presented in this chapter provides some support for the idea that
an inflow of high-skilled immigrants attracts high-skilled natives, perhaps because
of skill complementarities, which at least for the high-skilled runs counter to the
standard labour market model of displacement.
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Chapter 4
Do housing wealth shocks affect
voting behaviour? Evidence from
the UK
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4.1 Introduction
Whether to vote and for whom, are two of the most important actions taken
in a democracy.1 While there is a large literature studying the effect of a host
of factors on voter turnout, relatively little attention has been paid to economic
factors such as income, wealth, and employment. Further, despite a long literature
on “economic voting” (Downs, 1957), no previous studies have sought to examine
the effect of changing household wealth on partisan choice. The consequences of
increasing income and wealth inequality are of great interest to social scientists, and
the relationship between economic conditions and politics has come under increasing
scrutiny in the wake of the Great Recession. Piketty and Saez (2003) and Atkinson
et al. (2011), for example, show that the share of income accruing to the top one
percent has grown over time. Rajan (2010) has argued that this growing inequality
in the US put pressure on politicians to ease the supply of credit. More recently,
Stiglitz (2012) among others, has emphasised the links between economic inequality
and political inequality.
In this chapter, I use household variation in wealth determined by the housing
market to identify how household wealth shocks affect political preferences and voter
turnout. The analysis makes several contributions to the literature, First, my use of
house price variation allows me to overcome the endogeneity of house price growth
and voting behaviour, and other biases associated with cross sectional data. It could
1British Household Panel Survey and Understanding Society data were made available through
the UK Data Service. Richard Topf of the the British Election Studies Information System
kindly provided data on British election results by Parliamentary constituency. I thank Jonathan
Wadsworth, Daniel Hamermesh, and Andrew Oswald for helpful comments on this chapter.
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be, for example that those who vote for the Conservative Party are more likely to
live in more expensive houses and in areas that experience more rapid house price
growth (a ‘selection’ effect). Alternatively, this chapter argues that exposure to
rapid house price growth causes individuals’ to adopt certain attitudes and vote
in a particular way (a ‘treatment’ effect). Furthermore, this chapter is the first
to examine how voting behaviour responds to the wealth of the household rather
than simply its income. Excluding wealth may be problematic as it results in the
mischaracterisation of the financial resources of the household. Third, while I do not
directly examine the effect of housing wealth on the political economy of housing
supply, the analysis does indicate how housing wealth affects partisan choice which
does have implications for inter alia housing regulations. Fourth, I provide some
evidence suggesting that wealth shocks may lead people to change their attitudes to
a wide variety of economic and social issues, and this provides some evidence for the
underlying mechanisms driving political preferences determined by shocks to housing
wealth. Finally, this chapter contributes to the literature on housing wealth and
household behaviour.2 There is debate over the extent to which housing wealth has
any effect on consumption, savings, labour supply decisions, and education, partly
because it has historically been difficult to realise gains without selling the house.
The period under examination spans five elections (1992, 1997, 2001, 2005, and
2010) for the Westminster Parliament elected by voters in England, Scotland and
2The rapid increase in house prices from the mid-1990s has led to many papers studying the
effect of this on various aspects of welfare, including fertility (Lovenheim and Mumford, 2013),
educational choices (Lovenheim, 2011), divorce (Dettling and Kearney, 2014; Farnham et al., 2011),
health (Gathergood and Fichera, 2012), consumption (Attanasio et al., 2009; Campbell and Cocco,
2007; Disney et al., 2010), and indebtedness (Disney et al., 2009; Hurst and Stafford, 2004).
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Wales.3 Using nationally representative longitudinal data, I show that unanticipated
positive wealth shocks make people more likely to vote for right-wing political parties.
Negative wealth shocks lead people to favour left-wing parties. Using restricted access
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and Understanding Society data from 1991
to 2011 that contain geographic identifiers, I use short-run variation in house prices
within 403 local authority districts over time to examine whether people are more
or less likely to vote for a particular political party, or more broadly, vote for “left”
or the “right”, in areas with high-growth in house prices versus areas of low-growth,
controlling for detailed demographic characteristics and area fixed effects.
There are at least three problems with the existing literature, the first is that
existing studies (discussed below) all rely on aggregate cross-sectional data which
make identifying casual effects difficult.4 This study focuses on the voting decisions of
individuals by making use of representative longitudinal data. Second, the criticism
of George Stigler that all voters want good economic conditions, and nobody wants
a bad economy, therefore voters may vote for the incumbent if they see prosperity,
and otherwise not, is perhaps too simple. For most economic and social issues a
distribution of opinions will exist, within which a voter will hold a particular position.
For example, it’s reasonable to expect that voters will have different positions on
issues such as redistributing income, regulating the economy, funding healthcare,
changing welfare payments, and so on. Where such opinions come from and how
they effect voting behaviour is beyond the scope of this chapter, but some analysis of
3Northern Ireland is not included in the analysis.
4Some, such as Charles and Stephens (2013) do use instrumental variables techniques, but these
papers are focused on turnout which is not the main focus of this study.
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attitudes will be undertaken below. It should be noted that these early cross-sectional
studies all focus on the choice between the incumbent versus the alternative, rather
than on the left/right division.
Finally, to the best of my knowledge no previous studies have considered the
influence that wealth might have in changing individuals’ political preferences, yet it
is quite reasonable to assume that the position a person occupies in the distribution
of wealth (both financial and non-financial) might alter their political preferences.
Powdthavee and Oswald (2014) is the most similar paper to the current chapter,
but they use lottery wins instead of house prices, finding that lottery winners are
more likely to vote right-wing. My measure of wealth is better than theirs given that
over 70% of the population own a house, and is therefore affected by changing house
prices in contrast to the relatively small proportion of people who gamble (and the
relatively small sums involved). Bartels (2008) among others, emphasise the link
between income and voting, finding that on average, the real incomes of middle-class
families grew twice as fast under Democrats as they did under Republicans, while the
real incomes of working poor families grew six times as fast under Democrats as they
did under Republicans. However, measures of income, or more broadly class, do not
fully capture the role of property ownership. Those who have a greater accumulation
of wealth, whether financial or property, are more likely to favour different political
parties, and advocate different policies.
I use housing wealth as a measure of household wealth for several reasons. First,
about 73% of people in the BHPS own a house. Second, for these, and people in Great
Britain as a whole, housing wealth represents the largest share of total household
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wealth.5 Third, I argue that housing market changes are exogenous to households,
which allows me to overcome the inherent endogeneity between wealth accumulation
and voting decisions.6 The housing boom that began in the late 1990s provides the
main identifying variation in the analysis. This period was characterised by a large
boom and two busts in house prices, and the boom was associated with increases in
home equity withdrawal.7 Between 1991 and 1995, average real house prices fell by
9.5%, and then increased by 183.6% between 1995 and 2007, and subsequently fell
in the Great Recession by 6% between 2007 and 2013.8 Home owners who lived in
high-growth areas experienced a large increase in their liquid wealth relative to those
in low-growth areas and renters. Importantly, the house price boom was not confined
to solely high income people, as many relatively low-income people who happened
to live in high-growth areas also experienced an increase in housing wealth.
Figure 4.1 shows that parliamentary constituencies that have higher house prices
have a higher proportion of people voting for the Conservative Party. Of course
those that are more likely to vote for the Conservative Party may self-select into
areas that have higher house price growth, and this chapter seeks to argue that there
is a treatment effect of higher house prices, and not purely a selection effect.
5See for example Banks et al. (2003), who find that the value of home equity accounts for 60%
of household financial wealth in the UK.
6To the extent to which house price movements are determined by local economic conditions,
these could influence voting behaviour through routes other than house prices, and I therefore
include area and time dummies in the econometric models.
7Reinold (2011).
8Authors’ calculations from Land Registry data. In London average prices increased by an
average of 261.8% between 1995 and 2007, and rose the least in the North East by 140.0%.
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Figure 4.1: Cross-Sectional Relationship between Share of Party Vote for
the Conservatives and Real House Prices by Parliamentary Constituency
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Source: The proportion of the party vote for the Conservatives comes from British Election Studies
Information System (BESIS) data which collates the results of each election by parliamentary
constituency. House price data comes from the Land Registry, and I calculate the average house
price for each constituency. Data are for the 1997, 2001, 2005 and 2010 Westminster elections in
650 constituencies.
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4.2 Voting and wealth
Despite the importance of partisan choice in determining which party holds polit-
ical office and therefore holds power over a myriad of decisions relating to economic
growth, social policies, and income distribution to name just a few, there is remark-
ably little attention paid by economists to understanding the differences between
political parties and why voters choose one over the other. The classic model of
voting in economics is due to Downs (1957). However, Downs (1957), and the sub-
sequent literature largely focus on the reasons for voting as a trade-off between costs
and benefits, with most of the literature focused on how various variables affect
voting costs. These variables have included the role of demographic variables such
as household size, the media, information, campaign spending, voter dissatisfaction,
and registration requirements. Very little attention has been paid to the role of
economic factors such as employment and income.
Research on “economic voting” suggests that features of the labour market should
affect voting behaviour.9 These studies typically use state-level data and relate the
votes received by a particular candidate to the state of the labour market, generally
finding a positive association between votes received by the incumbent and economic
conditions. A seminal paper by Kramer (1971) helped spark a debate over the
role of economic events in influencing voting behaviour, finding that behaviour in
Congressional elections in the United States from 1896 to 1964 was influenced by
economic fluctuations. A conclusion Stigler (1973) refuted, finding no relationship
9See Duch and Stevenson (2008), Blais (2006), Hibbs, Douglas A. (2005), and Lewis-Beck and
Stegmaier (2000) for reviews of the economic voting literature.
150
between either the past average income performance, or the unemployment rate and
the share of votes received. He argues that this is not unusual as there is no difference
between the two parties with respect to their pursuit of economic prosperity, and that
in fact the idea that economic activity affects voters’ views about candidate quality is
inconsistent with rational behaviour on the part of voters (Stigler, 1973, 1975). Fair
(1978) points out that many of the disagreements are due to statistical procedures
and interpretation, and attempts to narrow the range of disagreement by providing a
more general model of voting that can incorporate a range of theories.10 Fair (1978)
finds that votes for president are affected by the change in real economic activity
(either the change in the unemployment rate or real per capita GDP), but that
voters do not look very far back, considering only the events within a year of the
election, and not considering the past performance of the non-incumbent party.
Consistent with Stigler (1973), using repeated cross-sectional data, Leigh (2005)
finds no evidence that macroeconomic factors affect partisan choice in his study of
the affect of individual, local, and national characteristics on partisan choice in ten
Australian elections between 1966 and 2001. He does, however, find demographic
differences, and that the partisan gap has widened along three dimensions: young
and old; between rich and poor; and between native-born and foreign-born.
An advance on these aggregate studies is provided by Gelman (2007) and Gelman
et al. (2010), who uses both individual and aggregate data to better understand
the relationship between income and and voting behaviour in the US; in particular
explaining the observed pattern of rich people in poor states being much more likely
10Fair has updated his original 1978 study following subsequent presidential elections. See also
Fair (1996) for an overview.
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to vote for Republicans than rich people in more prosperous US states. Gelman
(2007) finds that in rich states there is almost no correlation between income and
voter preferences. Glaeser and Sacerdote (2007) also study the apparent “aggregation
reversal” of voting behaviour in the US, arguing that it is due to the social formation
of beliefs. For example, although higher incomes might be associated with a belief
for lower taxes, it might also be associated with more liberal social views. The first
effect might lead people to prefer Republicans, but the second may push them away
from Republicans. In their model if beliefs are a reflection of social learning which
exhibits a social multiplier, it is possible for the aggregate relationship between beliefs
and income to be much stronger than the individual relationship between these two
variables.
There is also a literature on the effects of economic factors on voter turnout. For
example Rosenstone (1982) uses individuals data from the 1974 Current Population
survey, and finds that unemployment, poverty, and a reduction in financial wellbeing
all reduce voter turnout. A pattern supported in aggregate data on Presidential
and mid-term elections between 1896 to 1980. More recently, Charles and Stephens
(2013) finds that higher local wages and employment lower turnout in elections for
governor, senator, US Congress and state House of Representatives, but have no effect
on presidential turnout. A large number of aggregate-level studies find no effect at
all (Blais, 2006). More closely related to the present analysis, a few papers have
explored the role of housing tenure on voting, for example DiPasquale and Glaeser
(1999), using data from the United States and Germany, find that homeowners are
more likely to vote and participate politically; while Holian (2011), also using data
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from the United States, does not find a significant effect of homeownership on turnout
when controlling for basic demographics, or using instrumental variables. In the UK,
Huberty (2011) also fails to find evidence of a ‘homeowner’ effect, when analysing
the results of the 1997 and 2001 elections.
4.3 Analytical framework
There are two basic questions to be addressed in this chapter, first, whether or
not you vote, and second, which party (“left” or “right”) do you vote for. Housing
tenure and the cost of housing might affect both decisions. Previous literature, such
as DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999), finds that homeowners are more likely to vote than
renters, while research in the political economy of housing supply (Ortalo-Magne and
Prat, 2007) might suggest that homeowners propensity to vote is increasing in the
value of their house. We might also expect voting participation to be non-linear in
wealth. House price changes could affect the partisan choice of owners and renters
differentially through a mix of wealth effects and changing attitudes. For home
owners, a price increase represents a positive wealth shock, while for renters, to the
extent to which house prices and rents are positively correlated, an increase in house
prices represents a negative financial shock. The following simple analytics build
on Oswald and Powdthavee (2010) and provide a framework for thinking about the
results that follow.
People earn real income y, and also hold wealth, which could be both financial
and non-financial wealth, however I simplify, and assume that individuals’ only hold
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housing wealth, h, a private good. The government provides public services, P, such
as public education, health services, or the police force for example, which are funded
from the collection of income taxes, levied at rate t, and taxes on housing wealth. In
the UK there is no capital gains tax on the sale of the family home11 I assume that
There is a left-right political spectrum, where r represents the degree of “red” of the
government, a higher r, the more “red” a government or society. And I assume that
housing wealth is a function of the degree of “redness” of society, and is decreasing
in r.
There is a monotonic relationship P (t) between the supply of the public good
and the tax rate, and this is increasing and differentiable; greater income taxes lead
to a larger supply of the public good. A left-wing society, with a high r, provides
a relatively large amount of the public good, funded by a relatively high tax rate.
In contrast right-wing societies have relatively low P and low t. Let the income tax
rate be t = t(r), and assume t(r) is increasing, monotonic, and differentiable. The
amount of the public good can be written
P = P (t(r)) = p(r) (4.1)
as a reduced-form function of the political shade of the society.
An individual who rents has the separable utility function
V = (1 + α)v(P ) + y(1− t) (4.2)
11But there are exceptions, for example if it is not your main residence, or you have not lived
in it for all of the time that you have owned it, you have let part of it out, used part of it for a
business, or bought it just to make a gain (HMRC, 2014). There is also stamp duty paid on the
purchase of property, and this is also a tax on housing assets.
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where the function v(P ) captures the utility from the public good, and v(.) is dif-
ferentiable, increasing, and strictly concave. The parameter α captures the degree
of importance that an individual places on the supply of public services, and an
individual chooses the optimal political colour of society, r, by balancing a desire for
low taxes with a desire for the public good. The utility maximisation decision is the
choice of the level of r that maximises
V = (1 + α)v(p(r)) + y(1− t(r)) (4.3)
so that
∂V
∂r
= (1 + α)v′(p(r))p′(r)− yt′(r) = 0 (4.4)
Now consider a homeowner who in addition to receiving utility from the public
good, also receives wealth, h, from owning a house. The utility function takes the
form12
U = (1 + α)v(p(r)) + y(1− t(r)) + h(r) (4.5)
so that
∂U
∂r
= (1 + α)v′(p(r))p′(r)− yt′(r) + h′(r) = 0 (4.6)
where h′(r) < 0 is assumed. which can be rewritten as
∂U
∂r
= (1 + α)v′(p(r))p′(r)− yt′(r) = h′(r) (4.7)
12Treating the existing capital gains taxes and stamp duty as taxes on housing wealth, Equation
(4.5) becomes U = (1 + α)v(p(r)) + y(1− t(r)) + h(1− τ(r)) and (4.6) and (4.7) follow.
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and contrasted with the condition in the renter equation in equation 4.4. This leads
to:
Proposition 1. The voting preferences of homeowners lie strictly to the right of
renters.
The function U is increasing and concave; the right-hand-side term of equation (4.7)
is positive; hence the optimal political shade of red, r*, is lower among homeowners
than renters.
Proposition 2. The greater is their income, y, the less left wing are individuals (of
either tenure).
Consider income, y. The sign of the cross-partial of the maximand with respect to r
and y is given by the term
− t′(r) < 0 (4.8)
which establishes the proposition.
Proposition 3. The greater is the weight on P, the more left wing are voters.
The sign of the cross-partial of the maximand with respect to r and α is given by
the term
v′(p(r))p′(r) > 0 (4.9)
which establishes the proposition.
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Proposition 4. The greater the value of a person’s house, the more he or she votes
to the right. The lower the value of a person’s house, the more he or she votes to the
left.
The sign of the cross-partial of the maximand with respect to r and h is given by
the term
− τ ′(r) < 0 (4.10)
which establishes the proposition.
4.4 Data
To explore these questions further, I use micro-data from Understanding Society
(also known as the UK Household Longitudinal Study, UKHLS), and its forerunner
the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), a nationally representative panel survey
covering the period 1991-2011.13 The BHPS began with a representative sample of
5,500 households and 10,300 individuals in 1991, and since that time has followed
these respondents and their descendants continually. The advantage of the BHPS
over other survey data is that it allows me to track changes in the family’s house
price prior to voting in an election. The data contain a rich set of individual and
family characteristics that are important for controlling for selection of individuals
and families into areas with different housing growth rates. The sample consists of all
13From hereafter, ‘the BHPS.’ The BHPS ended in 2008, when Understanding Society began with
a larger sample of 40,000 households. The original BHPS sample is incorporated in Understanding
Society from Wave 2 onwards, and thus there is a gap of one year (2009) when tracking the BHPS
sample from 1991 through to 2011.
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males and females aged over 18 years, the age of voting in the UK. I use restricted-use
data files containing local authority district codes in which each person lives, allowing
control for cross-area selection that might be correlated with the unobserved political
preferences of individuals.
Table 4.1: Voter Preferences - selected years
Political Party 1991 1993 1998 2002 2006 2011
Conservative 46.3 39.5 31.0 27.6 30.9 34.8
Labour 40.2 41.7 53.9 50.0 44.6 43.4
Liberal Democrats 10.5 16.4 12.0 12.8 13.5 10.6
Scottish National Party 1.3 1.2 1.9 5.1 4.8 6.9
Plaid Cymru 0.1 0.1 0.2 2.4 2.3 2.4
Green Party 1.1 0.8 0.7 1.0 1.8 1.7
Other parties 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.8 1.9 0
Other answer 0.1 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.05 0
Don’t know/no answer 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.2 0.3 0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Note: Tabulation from Question: “Which Party do you regard your-
self as being closer to than others?”
Source: BHPS and Understanding Society.
The primary focus in this chapter is on which political party an individual sup-
ports, and I make use of three survey questions in the BHPS to form the dependent
variables in the regression analysis that follows. The first question asks “Which party
do you regard yourself as being closer to than the others?” Table 4.1 presents the
answers for all individuals aged over the age of 18 for selected years. Clearly the
political preferences of individuals’ are complex, and cannot easily be reduced to a
left-right scale, despite this, there is broad agreement that Labour is to the left (it
has traditionally promoted socialist ideas), and the Conservatives are to the right (it
has traditionally promoted the free market).
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The second question I use to form a dependent variable ask “Which political
party did you vote for in the last general election?” This question has not been
asked every year,14 and I tabulate the results for the most recent available year fol-
lowing a general election in Table 4.2. There were general elections in 1987, 1992,
1997, 2001, 2005, and 2010. I also show in parentheses data from the British Election
Studies Information System showing the national share of the vote for each election.
Comparing the two sources, shows that the proportions are similar in magnitude,
but it does appear that a slightly higher proportion of BHPS respondents claim to
have voted for the Labour Party, and slightly fewer for the Conservative Party, than
that shown by the actual election results.
Table 4.2: Voter Choices in last general election
Political Party 1992 1995 1998 2002 2006 2011
Conservative 43.8 (43.2) 40.4 (42.5) 28.8 (32.1) 24.7 (32.9) 26.1 (32.2) 33.9 (37.3)
Labour 37.4 (29.4) 41.3 (33.2) 52.5 (40.7) 49.4 (37.9) 42.7 (39.4) 35.7 (28.4)
Liberal Democrats 16.2 (22.0) 15.5 (17.9) 14.9 (17.5) 15.9 (18.5) 20.0 (22.0) 24.4 (23.5)
Scottish National Party 1.6 (0.6) 1.6 (0.8) 1.8 (0.8) 5.0 (0.7) 4.6 (1.7) 3.3 (1.7)
Plaid Cymru 0.1 (0.3) 0.2 (0.3) 0.2 (0.5) 3.1 (0.8) 3.0 (0.6) 0.3 (0.6)
Green Party 0.6 (0.3) 0.7 (0.5) 0.5 (0.2) 0.5 (0.6) 1.4 (0.9) 2.5 (0.8)
Other parties 0.2 (4.3) 0.3 (4.8) 1.3 (8.2) 1.3 (8.6) 2.3 (7.5) 0 (7.8)
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Note: Tabulation from Question: “Which political party did you vote for in the last general election?” The
national share of the party vote from BESIS (British Election Studies Information System) data is in parentheses.
Source: BHPS/Understanding Society, and BESIS.
The previous two questions are used to form a dummy variable equal equal to
one if an individual voted for the Conservative Party, and zero otherwise. I also use
question one above, and a question that asks about the strength of support for a par-
ticular party to form a categorical variable. The strength of support variable asks:
“Would you call yourself a very strong supporter of (named party), fairly strong or
14This question was asked in 1992, 1995, and 1997-2011.
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not very strong?” This contains more information than the binary variables, and is
defined as follows: 1 = Labour (very strong support), 2 = Labour (fairly strong), 3
= Labour (not very strong), 4 = Other parties (including Liberal Democrats) 5 =
Conservative (not very strong), 6 = Conservative (fairly strong), 7 = Conservative
(very strong). I tabulate the responses to this question in Table 4.3, and separately
for home owners and renters in Table 4.4.
Table 4.3: Strength of Political support for Conservatives and Labour
Strength of party support (%) 1992 1995 1998 2002 2006 2011
Labour (very strong support) 4.5 5.4 3.8 3.6 2.8 3.9
Labour (fairly strong) 16.8 22.6 19.1 17.9 13.4 13.7
Labour (not very strong) 18.4 23.3 30.6 28.5 28.3 25.9
Other parties (including Lib. Dems.) 13.8 14.4 15.7 22.4 24.6 21.7
Conservative (not very strong) 26.1 22.1 19.3 17.1 18.9 21.8
Conservative (fairly strong) 16.8 10.3 9.5 8.4 10.2 11.0
Conservative (very strong) 3.6 1.9 2.1 2.0 1.8 2.0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Note: Tabulation based on the question: “Would you call yourself a very strong
supporter of (named party), fairly strong or not very strong?” and “Which Party
do you regard yourself as being closer to than others?”
Source: BHPS and Understanding Society.
I make use of both the market value of the house reported by each household in
the BHPS, and market data from the Land Registry. Self-reported data have the
drawback that they may contain measurement error because households misreport
the price of their house; they simply do not know accurately what it is worth, or
the data is contaminated by the value of renovation work.15 Figure 4.2 compares
15Data are available in the BHPS about additions and improvements to housing that are financed
through an additional mortgage or loan, and so to the extent possible I remove this from the data.
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Table 4.4: Strength of Political support for Conservatives and Labour, by
Home Ownership Status
Home Owners
Strength of party support (%) 1992 1995 1998 2002 2006 2011
Labour (very strong support) 3.1 4.6 2.9 3.2 2.4 3.4
Labour (fairly strong) 14.3 19.6 16.7 17.1 12.9 13.0
Labour (not very strong) 15.8 21.8 29.1 27.1 27.0 24.1
Other parties (including Lib. Dems.) 14.1 14.5 15.2 21.8 23.6 21.7
Conservative (not very strong) 29.5 26.0 23.1 19.3 21.0 23.6
Conservative (fairly strong) 19.2 11.5 10.5 9.3 11.2 12.1
Conservative (very strong) 4.0 2.1 2.3 2.2 2.0 2.1
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Renters
Strength of party support (%) 1992 1995 1998 2002 2006 2011
Labour (very strong support) 8.4 7.8 5.9 5.3 4.0 5.8
Labour (fairly strong) 23.5 30.6 24.6 20.5 15.5 16.3
Labour (not very strong) 25.5 27.7 34.5 33.3 33.5 33.5
Other parties (including Lib. Dems.) 13.0 14.3 16.7 24.9 28.6 21.6
Conservative (not very strong) 16.7 11.1 9.9 9.4 11.0 14.4
Conservative (fairly strong) 10.4 7.0 6.9 5.2 6.5 6.7
Conservative (very strong) 2.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 0.9 1.7
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Note: Tabulation based on the question: “Would you call yourself a very strong
supporter of (named party), fairly strong or not very strong?” and “Which Party
do you regard yourself as being closer to than others?”
Source: BHPS and Understanding Society.
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the self-reported data from the BHPS to average repeat sales data from the Land
Registry, demonstrating that there appears to fairly close relationship between the
two series, although, there appears to be an increasing upward bias in individuals’
estimates in the BHPS in the later part of the period.16 I use Land Registry data
on monthly individual house sales covering over 18 million observations, allowing me
to restrict the sample to only those for which there are at least two sales. Repeat
sales data controls for any changes in the composition of the housing stock. Due to
the possible correlation between house prices and local macroeconomic conditions, I
also control for the regional average unemployment rate and real per capita income,
using data from the Labour Force Survey for the period 1991-2011, for the regional
unemployment rate, and the ONS series ‘Gross Disposable Household Income’, as a
measure of regional income fluctuations.
Table 4.5 contains summary statistics of the BHPS data I use, separately for
home owners and renters. The table shows that relatively equal proportions of home
owners exhibit a preference for the Conservative Party (22.3%) and the Labour Party
(27.5%), in contrast to renters, of whom only 11.0% feel close to the Conservative
Party, and 33.1% feel close to the Labour Party. Renters are also less likely to be em-
ployed, or married, are younger, and less educated. The average self-reported house
price among home owners is £186,000, with a standard deviation of £247,600. From
the Land Registry data, the average real house price is £166,100, with a smaller
standard deviation of £77,400. I assign renters a house price based on the average
16The close relationship between the two data series also appears to hold at the local authority
level.
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Figure 4.2: Comparison of BHPS and Land Registry House Price Data
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Source: Authors’ calculations from the BHPS/US and Land Registry data.
163
market house price in the local authority district in which they live, for which the
average is £160,800, with a standard deviation of £84,400. The average house price
shock based on the Land Registry data for homeowners is £3,100, with a standard de-
viation of £182,500. The corresponding shock for renters is £1,800, with a standard
deviation of £34,700. The average shock for homeowners based on the self-reported
data is £2,800, with a standard deviation of £282,100.
House price increases were not just limited to London and the South East, or
to wealthy homeowners. Many historically lower-price cities and many lower-income
people also experienced large wealth increases from the house price boom. Figure 4.3
presents the geography of changes in house prices. In the 2000-2011 BHPS sample,
the average four-year increase that home owners experienced in the lower half of
the income distribution was 13%, and it was 15% among the top half of the income
distribution.
To the extent that individuals’ foresee the future path of the price of their house,
it is more appropriate to consider the portion of house prices that is unanticipated.
I therefore create two house price shock variables based on the residuals of a AR(2)
house price equation. I create one shock using data from the Land Registry, and
another using the self-reported BHPS data. The advantage to using the self-reported
BHPS house price data is that there is a longer time series available with data
available from 1991 to 2011. However, this is arguably more endogenous than the
data from the Land Registry, but this data is only available from 1995. In both cases
four years of data is lost due to the lags used in estimating the AR(2) process. The
shock based on the Land Registry data is my preferred measure due to it being more
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Table 4.5: Summary Statistics for Home Owners and Renters
Home Owners Renters
Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Closer to the Conservative Party 0.233 0.423 0.110 0.312
Closer to the Labour Party 0.275 0.447 0.331 0.471
Closer to the Liberal Democrats 0.080 0.272 0.062 0.242
Voted for the Conservative Party 0.176 0.381 0.077 0.267
Voted for the Labour Party 0.242 0.429 0.264 0.441
Voted for the Liberal Democrats 0.096 0.294 0.065 0.246
Strength of Political Support 3.877 1.450 3.342 1.386
Self-reported house price (£100,000) 1.860 2.476
Average house price (£100,000) 1.661 0.774 1.608 0.844
House price shock (Land Registry) (£100,000) 0.039 1.250 0.012 0.328
Log house price shock 0.099 1.158 0.011 0.166
Real household income (£10,000) 4.296 3.045 2.502 2.004
Log real interest rate expectations (3year MA) 1.801 0.822 1.872 0.788
Age 47.311 17.157 44.597 20.163
Female 0.528 0.499 0.566 0.496
Children 0.551 0.917 0.609 1.035
Married 0.727 0.446 0.491 0.500
Employed 0.563 0.496 0.394 0.489
Degree 0.146 0.353 0.077 0.267
A levels 0.122 0.327 0.111 0.315
GCSE 0.181 0.385 0.170 0.376
Other qualifications 0.358 0.479 0.268 0.443
No qualifications 0.193 0.395 0.373 0.484
Note: For homeowners the number of observations is 157,794, and house prices are self-
reported values. For renters the number of observations is 58,631. The self-reported
house price is from home-owners as reported in the BHPS/Understanding Society.
The average house price is the average for the local authority district (403) from Land
Registry data, and the house price shock is derived from Equation 4.12. Strength of
support represents strength of support for Conservatives relative to Labour: 1 =
Labour (very strong support), 2 = Labour (fairly strong), 3 = Labour (not very
strong), 4 = Other parties (including Liberal Democrats) 5 = Conservative (not very
strong), 6 = Conservative (fairly strong), 7 = Conservative (very strong). All mone-
tary values are in 2011 pounds.
Source: BHPS and Understanding Society.
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Figure 4.3: Percentage Change in Average Real House Prices (1995-2011)
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Source: Authors’ calculations from Land Registry data.
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exogenous than that based on the self-reported data. I therefore approximate house
prices with a second order autoregressive process with year and local authority fixed
effects, as shown in Equation 4.11.
Pijt = α1 + α2Pij,t−1 + α3Pij,t−2 + γi + µt + uijt (4.11)
where i is the local authority, t is time, j is the individual. I estimate this AR(2)
process using both the self-reported data from the BHPS, and the local authority
average data from the land registry. The residuals are taken to represent the unan-
ticipated change in house prices. To create an unanticipated house price shock I use
the cumulative sum of the residuals from Equation 4.11 for the past 3 years. The
house price shock is then defined as:
shockijt = uˆijt + uˆij,t−1 + uˆij,t−2 + uˆij,t−3 (4.12)
where uˆijt is the residual from the AR(2) process in Equation 4.11. This gives
provides indication of the extent to which house prices deviate from the long-run
national trend.
Figure 4.4 shows the regional average of the path of the annual real house price
shock based on the BHPS data, estimated from Equation 4.12, and Figure 4.5 shows
the regional averages using the Land Registry data.
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Figure 4.4: Annual Average Real House Price Shocks by Region
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The figure shows the evolution of the average house price shock estimated from Equation 4.12 for
11 regions, highlighting London, the South West, North East, and Scotland. Source: Authors’
calculations from BHPS data.
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Figure 4.5: Annual Average Real House Price Shocks by Region
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The figure shows the evolution of the average house price shock estimated from Equation 4.12 for
11 regions, highlighting London, the South West, North East, and Scotland. Source: Authors’
calculations from Land Registry data.
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Figure 4.6: Distribution of Average Real House Price Change and Party
Identification
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4.5 Empirical testing
Before turning to the regression analysis I first present some further summary
data. Figure 4.6 shows the distribution of the average real house price change based
on the Land Registry data (for both owners and renters), and the three main politi-
cal parties that individuals most closely associate with - Labour, Liberal Democrats,
and the Conservatives. This cross-sectional data suggests that overall, those that
have experienced a change in house value in the lower deciles have a much stronger
affinity with the Labour Party (approximately 70% in the first decile), in compar-
ison with the Conservative Party (just over 20%). In deciles 6-8, there is a more
equal association between the Labour and Conservative parties, with both receiving
around 40% support. In deciles 9 and 10, there is a stronger identification with the
Conservative Party, almost 50% and 60% support respectively, in comparison with
38% and 23% support for the Labour Party. Figure 4.7 presents a similar graph,
showing the distribution of the house price shock, and shows a similar pattern in
party identification.
Figure 4.8 shows the average size of the house price shock for those who switched
from not voting Labour at time t − 1 to voting Labour at time t, and similarly the
average house price shock for those who switched from not voting Conservative at
time t − 1 to voting Labour at time t. For those who switched to voting Labour,
the shock was negative, and averaged £8,000, in contrast to those who switched
to voting Conservative for which the average shock was approximately £32,000. In
Figure 4.9 I give an indication of the proportion of ‘switchers’, along the distribution
of the house price shock. The figure shows that for those who switched to voting
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Figure 4.7: Distribution of Average House Price Shock and Party
Identification
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Labour at time t, from not voting Labour at time t − 1, approximately 15% of all
Labour switchers experienced a house price shock in the 1st decile, and about 4%
experienced a shock in the 10th decile. Amongst those who switched to voting Con-
servative, approximately 9% switched and had a house price shock in the 10th decile,
while just over 4.5% switched and had a house price shock in the 1st decile.
Figure 4.8: Distribution of Average House Price Shock and Switchers
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The figure shows the average shock (as defined by Equation 4.12) at t − 1 for those who switched
from not voting Labour at t− 1 to voting Labour at t (versus those that did not switch). Similarly,
the right-hand side shows the average shock at t − 1 for those who switched from not voting
Conservative at t− 1 to voting Conservative at t (versus those that did not switch).
173
Figure 4.9: Distribution of Average House Price Shock and Percentage of
Switchers
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The figure shows the percentage of those who switched from not voting Labour at t − 1 to voting
Labour at t, by the distribution of the average house price shock (as defined by Equation 4.12. Sim-
ilarly, the right-hand side shows the percentage of those who switched from not voting Conservative
at t− 1 to voting Conservative at t, by the distribution of the average house price shock.
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In the regression analysis I first explore the relationship between party preference
and a basic set of demographic variables, by estimating linear probability models of
the following form:
Party preference ijt = β0 + β1∆Pijt + γ1Xijt + ρi + ζj + φt + ijt (4.13)
where i indexes the individual, j indexes the local authority, and t indexes the survey
year. I use three alternative measures to capture political support for the right-wing.
The first dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the person said that he
or she were closer to the Conservative Party, and 0 otherwise. The second dependent
variable takes seven values and measures the strength of political support for the
Conservatives relative to Labour; 1 = Labour (very strong support), 2 = Labour
(fairly strong), 3 = Labour (not very strong), 4 = Other parties (including Liberal
Democrats) 5 = Conservative (not very strong), 6 = Conservative (fairly strong), 7 =
Conservative (very strong). The third measure is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
individual responded that they voted for the Conservative Party in the last election.
The variable P is the real house price, and X is the set of observable characteristics
shown in Table 4.5, as well as local authority-by-year average unemployment and log
real per capita income. The ρi are individual fixed effects, the ζj are local authority
fixed effects, φt are year fixed effects, and ijt is an iid error term. The main coefficient
of interest in equation 4.13 is β1, the coefficient on the unanticipated house price
shock, the coefficient shows how the likelihood of voting for a particular political
party or bloc is associated with recent house price changes. Reported standard
errors are clustered at the local authority level, given that house prices exhibit strong
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geographical correlation, such that errors are unlikely to be independent within local
authorities. Clustering at the household level produces similar results. I estimate
the results for all members of a household, and separately for the household reference
person only.
The identification assumption underlying equation 4.13 is that house price changes
are conditionally exogenous to the voting decision. In other words, apart from the
fact that house prices increase household wealth, house price changes and voting
behaviour should be uncorrelated conditional on the observables in the model. A
possible threat to this assumption is a positive correlation between housing prices
and local macroeconomic conditions. If voting for a particular party, or voter turnout
responds positively to macroeconomic variation, this relationship may be picked up,
rather than identifying the effect of housing wealth changes on voting behaviour. To
this end, I control for the regional unemployment rate and real income per capita,
as measures of regional-level macroeconomic conditions. In addition, I also estimate
the model for renters using average house prices in their local authority. Given that
renters experience the same macroeconomic shocks as home owners but without the
corresponding gain in wealth, these estimates give an indication of any bias that
might be driven by unobserved macroeconomic trends.
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4.6 Results
4.6.1 The effect of wealth shocks on political preferences
The results of estimating equation 4.13 are shown in Table 4.6. Each column
of the table presents results from a separate regression, and all estimates include
the full set of control variables shown in Table 4.5 as well as regional macroeconomic
controls.17 Panel A presents the estimates for home owners using the three alternative
dummy variables described above. And the coefficient on the house price shock
enters positively in each case. A £100,000 change in the housing shock leads to a 2.7
percentage point increase in the probability of voting for the Conservatives, based
on the estimates in column (5). The percentage voting for the Conservative party is
23.3%, implying a 11.6% increase in the probability of voting Conservative from a
£100,000 increase in the housing shock. However the average housing shock among
home-owners is £3,900, which these estimates suggest would lead to an increase in the
probability of voting Conservative of 0.45%. In Table C4 I report the corresponding
logit and ordered logit estimates, which also show a positive and significant effect of
house price shocks on preferences for the Conservative Party. In Table 4.7, I present
the corresponding results using the log house price shock. The result in column (5)
suggests that a 10% increase in the housing shock increases the probability of voting
for the Conservative party by 0.047 percentage points.
An underlying assumption of identification of β1 in equation 4.13 is that house-
holds with a higher underlying propensity to vote Conservative, for example, are
17I report the full results for homeowners in Table C2 and for renters in Table C3 in Appendix
A.
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Table 4.6: Linear Probability Model Estimates of the Effect of Housing
Prices on Political Preferences
Feel closest to the Right Strength of support for Right Voted for the Right
All HRP All HRP All HRP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Home owners
House price shock 0.031∗∗∗ 0.025∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.027∗ 0.031∗
(0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.012) (0.015)
Log household income 0.032∗ 0.033∗ 0.032∗ 0.035∗ 0.044∗ 0.048∗
(0.014) (0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.016)
N 33178 18394 19474 10938 21532 12002
Within R2 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06
B. Renters
House price shock 0.007 0.017 0.006 0.017 0.063 0.062
(0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.014) (0.054) (0.073)
Log household income -0.001 -0.010∗ -0.000 -0.010∗ -0.003 -0.020
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.015) (0.017)
N 5857 3952 5857 3952 2797 1939
Within R2 0.00 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.06
Note: Authors’ estimation of equation 4.13. Data on house prices used to derive the house price shock are based on market
values from the Land Registry. Dependent variable in columns (1)-(2) and (5)-(6): Dummy = 1 if feel closer to the right-
wing. Dependent variable in columns (3)-(4): Represents strength of support for Conservatives relative to Labour; 1 =
Labour (very strong support), 2 = Labour (fairly strong), 3 = Labour (not very strong), 4 = Other parties (including Liberal
Democrats) 5 = Conservative (not very strong), 6 = Conservative (fairly strong), 7 = Conservative (very strong). All estimates
include individual, local authority, and year fixed effects, labour force status dummies, occupational dummies (25), educational
attainment dummies, and controls for age, number of children, marital status, regional unemployment rate, regional real income
per capita, interest rate expectations, and current self-reported house values. For the sample in Panel B, housing price measures
are calculated using home owners within each local authority and year as described in the text.
Standard errors clustered at the local authority district level are in parentheses. *p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001.
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Table 4.7: Linear Probability Model Estimates of the Effect of Housing
Prices on Political Preferences
Feel closest to the Right Strength of support for Right Voted for the Right
All HRP All HRP All HRP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Home owners
Log House price shock 0.047∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗ 0.169∗∗ 0.036∗ 0.036
(0.013) (0.016) (0.039) (0.053) (0.017) (0.024)
Log household income 0.292∗ 0.304 0.226 0.604 0.395 0.429
(0.144) (0.199) (0.528) (0.602) (0.231) (0.309)
N 33178 18394 19474 10938 21532 12002
Within R2 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.05
B. Renters
Log House price shock 0.011 0.012 0.009 0.012 -0.114 -0.106
(0.022) (0.034) (0.023) (0.034) (0.113) (0.131)
Log household income -0.000 -0.011 0.000 -0.011 0.003 -0.005
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.015) (0.018)
N 5857 3952 5857 3952 2797 1939
Within R2 0.01 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.09
Note: Authors’ estimation of equation 4.13. Data on house prices used to derive the log house price shock are based on
market values from the Land Registry. Dependent variable in columns (1)-(2) and (5)-(6): Dummy = 1 if feel closer to the
right-wing. Dependent variable in columns (3)-(4): Represents strength of support for Conservatives relative to Labour; 1
= Labour (very strong support), 2 = Labour (fairly strong), 3 = Labour (not very strong), 4 = Other parties (including
Liberal Democrats) 5 = Conservative (not very strong), 6 = Conservative (fairly strong), 7 = Conservative (very strong).
All estimates include individual, local authority, and year fixed effects, labour force status dummies, occupational dummies
(25), educational attainment dummies, and controls for age, number of children, marital status, regional unemployment rate,
regional real income per capita, interest rate expectations, and current self-reported house values. For the sample in Panel B,
housing price measures are calculated using home owners within each local authority and year as described in the text.
Standard errors clustered at the local authority district level are in parentheses. *p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001.
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not sorting into regions in which housing prices are growing the fastest. The local
authority fixed effects control for systematic differences among households across
local authorities within regions in underlying political preferences. The estimates
presented in panel B of Table 4.6 provide a way of testing that the effects I am
estimating are due to wealth shocks, and not a local authority-level shock that is
correlated with house prices and the direction of political preferences. An increase
in house prices may increase rents, but does not provide a wealth increase. Panel B
therefore presents estimates of equation 4.13 using local authority-by-year average
house prices as the measure of housing prices for renters. All of the coefficients are
insignificant, which gives some support to the causal interpretation of the estimates
among home owners presented in panel A.
The estimates in columns (5) and (6) use a slightly different dependent variable,
in this case, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one when an individual
claims to have voted for a particular political party in the previous election. This
restricts the sample to the years in which elections were held in 1992, 1997, 2001,
2005, and 2010. The estimates for both home owners and renters are remarkably
similar to the previous results, which provides reassurance that the question asked
each year about an individuals’ degree of ‘closeness’ to a particular political party
is not divorced from their stated vote in an election year. In Table 4.8 I report the
results for homeowners only where the house price shock is derived based on the
self-reported house values of homeowners recorded in the BHPS. The overall pattern
of the results is similar, in terms of sign, although the magnitude of the coefficients
is smaller in columns (1) - (2), and (4)-(5), but larger when using the strength of
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support for the right in columns (3)-(4).
As an additional robustness check I also estimate the main results using the per-
centage change in house prices over the pervious four years, and these results are
presented in Table C6 and C7 in Appendix C.18 Although the coefficients are posi-
tive the size of the effect is much weaker in Table C6 suggesting that the estimated
shock variable used in the main results is capturing an unanticipated component of
house price change that is arguably more exogenous than the four year change in
actual house prices.
Table 4.8: Linear Probability Model Estimates of the Effect of Housing
Prices on Political Preferences
Feel closest to the Right Strength of support for Right Voted for the Right
All HRP All HRP All HRP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Homeowners
House price shock 0.014∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.018) (0.020) (0.006) (0.007)
Log household income 0.033∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.024∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011)
N 39795 39795 22265 22265 26466 26466
Within R2 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
Note: Authors’ estimation of equation 4.13. Data on house prices used to derive the house price shock are based on self-
reported values from the BHPS. Dependent variable in columns (1)-(2) and (5)-(6): Dummy = 1 if feel closer to the right-
wing. Dependent variable in columns (3)-(4): Represents strength of support for Conservatives relative to Labour; 1 =
Labour (very strong support), 2 = Labour (fairly strong), 3 = Labour (not very strong), 4 = Other parties (including Liberal
Democrats) 5 = Conservative (not very strong), 6 = Conservative (fairly strong), 7 = Conservative (very strong). All estimates
include individual, local authority, and year fixed effects, labour force status dummies, occupational dummies (25), educational
attainment dummies, and controls for age, number of children, marital status, regional unemployment rate, regional real income
per capita, interest rate expectations, and current self-reported house values. Standard errors clustered at the local authority
district level are in parentheses.
*p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001.
18Alternative specifications using 2, 3, 4 and 5 year changes are all broadly similar.
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4.6.2 Wealth shocks and voter turnout
Table 4.9 presents estimates of a variant of equation 4.13, where the dependent
variable is now a dummy variable equal to one if an individual voted in the last
election. The results suggest that an increase in housing wealth has a positive effect
on voter turnout. The final two columns in Table 4.9 suggest that a change in house
prices in the area a renter lives has no effect on voter turnout.
Table 4.9: Linear Probability Model Estimates of the Effect of House
Price Shocks on Voter Turnout
Voter turnout: Owners Voter turnout: Renters
All HRP All HRP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
House price shock 0.015∗ 0.022∗ 0.015 0.022
(0.007) (0.010) (0.015) (0.017)
Log household income 0.011∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.014 0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.015) (0.017)
N 12288 12288 1287 1287
Within R2 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08
Note: Authors’ estimation of equation 4.13. Dependent variable: Dummy = 1 if individual
voted in the election in the previous year. All estimates include individual, local authority,
and year fixed effects, labour force status dummies, occupational dummies (25), educational
attainment dummies, and controls for age, number of children, marital status, regional
unemployment rate, regional real income per capita, interest rate expectations, and current
self-reported house values. For the sample of Renters, housing price measures are calculated
using home owners within each local authority and year as described in the text. Standard
errors clustered at the local authority district level are in parentheses.
*p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001.
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4.6.3 Do wealth shocks affect the financial well-being
of individuals?
The previous sections have established that changing housing wealth has a sig-
nificant, both statistical and material, effect on the political preferences of voters,
and the decision to vote or not. This, and the following sections turn attention
towards trying to understand the mechanisms through which changing household
wealth could lead individuals to change their political preference from left wing to
right ring, or vice versa, in the presence of a shock to housing wealth. There is
significant debate over the extent to which changing housing wealth affects house-
hold decisions such as consumption and savings choices, and it is therefore useful to
consider any evidence that might indicate that individuals do actually feel wealth-
ier from an increase in housing wealth.19 Unfortunately, the BHPS lacks data on
consumption, and has limited data on household savings and investments, however
the following question is asked of survey respondents annually: ‘How well would
you say you yourself are managing financially these days?’ Responses are coded in
five categories, from 1 equal to “Living comfortably”, to 5 equal to “finding it very
difficult”. For simplicity, cardinality is assumed here, and Table 4.10 presents GLS
(with random effects) estimates of the effect of housing price changes on individuals’
current financial situation. Both the two-year and four-year house price change ap-
pear negatively in the estimates for home owners in columns (1)-(4) implying that
19Among others, Mian and Sufi (2011), Campbell and Cocco (2007), Case et al. (2005), and Hurst
and Stafford (2004) in the US, find that housing wealth affects consumption, although Attanasio
et al. (2009) argue that the relationship is incidental. In the UK, Disney et al. (2010) find a small
but significant affect of house price shocks on household consumption.
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a positive house pice shock does improve the financial situation of individuals. The
four-year house price change also enters negatively in column (6) in the estimate
for renters, however it is significantly smaller than that for home owners, and is not
significant when local authority fixed effects are included (column 8).
Table 4.10: Estimates of the Effect of House Price Shocks
on Current Financial Situation
Financial situation: Owners Financial situation: Renters
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All HRP All HRP
House price shock -0.025∗ -0.021∗∗ -0.006 -0.004
(0.010) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005)
Log household income -0.128∗∗∗ -0.166∗∗∗ -0.107∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.013) (0.016) (0.019)
N 46909 25547 11509 7275
Overall R2 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.07
Note: Dependent variable responses are coded: 1 = living comfortably to 5 = finding
it very difficult. All estimates include individual, local authority, and year fixed effects,
labour force status dummies, occupational dummies (25), educational attainment dum-
mies, and controls for age, number of children, marital status, regional unemployment
rate, regional real income per capita, interest rate expectations, and current self-reported
house values. For the sample of Renters, housing price measures are calculated using
home owners within each local authority and year as described in the text.
Standard errors clustered at the local authority district level are in parentheses.
*p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001.
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4.6.4 How do wealth shocks affect attitudes?
In this section I explore whether house Price Shocks have have any influence on a
range of economic, political, and social issues. These issues may feed into the decision
of an individual to change their political preference in the voting booth. A significant
literature examines the formation of beliefs, while a further literature examines links
between beliefs and economic institutions. Di Tella et al. (2007) for example, finds
that squatters in Buenos Aires who get legal title to land are more likely to report
market beliefs than similar squatters who did not receive legal title to land. Alesina
and La Ferrara (2005) examines how individual preferences for redistribution depend
on future income prospects.
A variety of attitudinal questions are asked every second year in the BHPS and
I group these for exploration under the broad headings of economic, political and
social. The results shown in Tables 4.11 - 4.13 all use the Land Registry based house
price shock, and all estimates include local authority fixed effects. All dependent
variable responses are coded from 1 = strongly agree to 5 = strongly disagree.
Table 4.11 presents the results for homeowners in panel A, and renters in panel
B. In column (1), the question asks whether “ordinary people share in the nations
wealth.” The four-year house price change enters negatively suggesting that home
owners who experience an increase in house prices are more likely to agree with
this proposition. However, interacting the house price change with the left-wing
dummy variable suggests that those who identify with the left are less likely to agree
with the proposition. This proposition, along with that in column (3), “private
enterprise solves economic problems,” can both be considered right-wing views, and
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a positive shock to housing wealth enters negatively for those with right-wing views
and, positively for those who feel closer to the left. In contrast agreement with the
remaining questions in columns (2), and (4) - (7), can all be interpreted as being
left-wing views. House prices enter positively in the “One law for the rich, and one
for the poor” equation (column 2), although it is negative for those who identify
more closely with the left, implying that a positive house price shock to those who
are closer to the left leads them to hold more left-wing views. The results in columns
(4)-(6) can be interpreted in a similar fashion. The only question for which changing
house prices has no significant effect on is the proposition that there “should be a
maximum limit on income,” in column (7). Turning in panel B in Table 4.11, it
is notable that changing house prices appear to have, in most cases, the opposite
sign on individuals’ economic attitudes to that for homeowners, however, none of
the estimates for renters are statistically significant.
The effect of changes in housing prices on three questions about politics are
shown in Table 4.12. The three questions are, “Government reflects people’s wishes,”
People can’t influence government policy,” and “Government puts nation’s interests
first.” These are more difficult to fit within the traditional left-right spectrum, and I
therefore have no priors on how a change in house prices might affect these attitudes.
However, as the estimates in Table 4.12 show, house prices do not have any effect
on any of these questions for either home owners or renters. These results also act
as a placebo test, showing that the housing price shocks I estimate are not simply
correlated with any question one could ask.
Finally, I turn to the effect that changes in housing wealth have on a range of so-
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cial attitudes. The literature on “economic voting” emphasises the role of economic
conditions on voting behaviour, but political preferences are undoubtedly influenced
by opinions on a range of social issues as well. Table 4.13 presents estimates for
homeowners in panel A, and renters in panel B. In column (1), the question asks
whether “the husband should earn while the wife stays at home,” again the response
for each question is on a five-point scale, where 1 = strongly agree. The four-year
house price change enters negatively suggesting that home owners who experience
an increase in house prices are more likely to agree with this proposition. However
the interaction term suggests that those who identify with the left are less likely to
agree with this proposition. In column (3), “employers should help with childcare,”
is arguably a more left-wing view, and a positive house price shock suggests that this
view is more likely to be disagreed with, unless you identify more closely with the
left, in which case the opposite holds. The remaining questions are arguably more
contentious, with respect to where they lie on a traditional left-right spectrum. In the
results for the questions “children need father as much as mother” (column 2), and
“single parents are as good as couples” (4), the four-year house price change enters
negatively and positively, respectively, suggesting that those who identify with the
right are more likely to agree with the first statement, and disagree with the second.
There is no evidence of any effect on house prices in the final two questions presented
in columns (5) and (6). As with the results in the previous two tables, there is no
evidence of any effect of changing housing wealth on the attitudes of renters to the
various, economic, social and political questions considered.
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Table 4.11: Estimates of the Effect of House Price Shocks on Attitudes to
Economic Issues
Voter attitudes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ordinary people share One law for rich Private enterprise Public services should
nations wealth & one for poor solves econ. problems be state owned
A. House owners
House price shock -0.019∗ 0.026∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Close to left 0.080∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗ -0.241∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Close to left * house price shock 0.014 -0.015 0.023∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.005)
Log household income -0.031∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
N 22239 22345 21674 21843
Overall R2 0.05 0.08 0.12 0.07
B. Renters
House price shock -0.005 0.003 0.004 0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Close to left -0.045 0.072 0.149∗∗ -0.163∗∗
(0.058) (0.054) (0.046) (0.061)
Close to left * house price shock 0.002 -0.011 -0.008 0.017
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011)
Log household income -0.006 0.001 -0.005 -0.004
(0.022) (0.018) (0.020) (0.021)
N 4084 4104 3832 3909
Overall R2 0.13 0.18 0.13 0.12
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Table 4.11: Estimates of the Effect of Housing Shocks
on Attitudes to Economic Issues Continued
Voter attitudes
(5) (6) (7)
Govt. obligation Strong trade unions Should be max.
to provide jobs protect employees limit on income
A. House owners
House price shock 0.025∗∗∗ 0.010 0.019∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
Close to left -0.150∗∗∗ -0.285∗∗∗ -0.176∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.023) (0.017)
Close to left * house price shock -0.019∗∗ -0.005 -0.008
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Log household income 0.056∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
N 22295 22209 22826
Overall R2 0.13 0.13 0.11
B. Renters
House price shock 0.003 -0.002 0.006
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Close to left -0.028 -0.196∗∗∗ -0.150∗∗
(0.052) (0.055) (0.052)
Close to left * house price shock 0.000 -0.002 0.013
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Log household income 0.052∗ 0.020 0.041
(0.024) (0.022) (0.022)
N 4101 4073 4526
Overall R2 0.18 0.16 0.15
Note: Dependent variable responses are coded: 1 = strongly agree to 5 = strongly disagree. All estimates include
individual, local authority, and year fixed effects, labour force status dummies, occupational dummies (25), educational
attainment dummies, and controls for age, number of children, marital status, regional unemployment rate, regional real
income per capita, interest rate expectations, and current self-reported house values. For the sample of Renters, housing
price measures are calculated using home owners within each local authority and year as described in the text.
Standard errors clustered at the local authority district level are in parentheses. *p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001.
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4.7 Subsample estimates
In this section I consider a range of subsamples. I start by re-estimating Equation
4.13 for two subsamples, I split the sample spatially, to see whether or not the effect
of housing shocks is driven primarily by London and the South East; the regions
that have seen the largest growth in house prices over this period. The results in
Table 4.14 indicate that if anything, the effect is stronger in the ‘North’, than in
the ‘South’. To the extent that capital gains from house price appreciation can be
realised through selling and moving house,20 this result might reflect the fact that
the realised capital gain from those living in London and the South East is lower,
because many typically migrate from London to other high-priced areas in the South
East or South West. I also split the sample temporally. It is possible that during
a boom there could be an advantage to the incumbent political party from people
feeling wealthy. Given that the coefficients in Table 4.14 are actually higher for the
period 2008-2011, this does not appear to be the case.
In Tables 4.15 - 4.16, I consider two further breakdowns of the data. I first look
at whether there is a difference in the effect of a housing wealth shock between males
and females. Table 4.15 presents the results, and indicates that the shock has a
significant affect on males, but not females, as does income. This is also consistent
with the results found by Powdthavee and Oswald (2014). In Table 4.16 I split the
sample between those who have a degree and those that do not and the results show
that there is no significant effect of a housing price shock on homeowners who hold
a degree, while the positive effect on a preference for the Conservatives remains for
20Or through equity withdrawal.
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those without a degree.
Table 4.14: Linear Probability Model Estimates of the Effect of House
Price Shocks on Political Preferences - subsamples
Feel closest to the Right Strength of Right-wing support
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
South North 1999-2007 2008-2011 South North 1999-2007 2008-2011
A. House Owners
House price shock 0.025∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.031 0.140∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.017) (0.025) (0.023) (0.017)
Log household income 0.020∗∗ 0.012∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.015 0.031 0.020 0.046
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.019) (0.021) (0.016) (0.029)
N 13990 25576 31485 8081 8159 13549 17790 3918
Within R2 0.11 0.15 0.14 0.17 0.15 0.19 0.17 0.18
B. Renters
House price shock 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.020
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.020)
Log household income 0.009 0.016∗ 0.011 0.021∗ 0.046 0.047 0.037 0.092
(0.011) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.032) (0.029) (0.020) (0.108)
N 3188 4838 6378 1648 1494 2001 2917 581
Within R2 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.19 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.23
Note: Authors’ estimation of equation 4.13. Dependent variable in columns (1)-(4): Dummy = 1 if feel closer to the
left-wing or the right-wing. Dependent variable in columns (5)-(8): Represents strength of support for Conservatives
relative to Labour; 1 = Labour (very strong support), 2 = Labour (fairly strong), 3 = Labour (not very strong), 4 =
Other parties (including Liberal Democrats) 5 = Conservative (not very strong), 6 = Conservative (fairly strong), 7 =
Conservative (very strong). All estimates include individual, local authority, and year fixed effects, labour force status
dummies, occupational dummies (25), educational attainment dummies, and controls for age, number of children, marital
status, regional unemployment rate, regional real income per capita, interest rate expectations, and current self-reported
house values. For the sample in Panel B, housing price measures are calculated using home owners within each local
authority and year as described in the text. South is defined as London, the South East, and the South West. North
refers to the remaining regions (East, East Midlands, West Midlands, Wales, North East, North West, Yorkshire and the
Humber, Wales, and Scotland).
Standard errors clustered at the local authority district level are in parentheses. *p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001.
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Table 4.15: Linear Probability Model Estimates of the Effect of House
Price Shocks on Political Preferences - by Sex
Feel closest to the Right Strength of Right-wing support
Male Female Male Female
All HRP All HRP All HRP All HRP
A. House Owners
House price shock 0.052∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗ 0.012 0.022 0.095∗ 0.071∗ 0.026 0.028
(0.015) (0.019) (0.016) (0.021) (0.037) (0.033) (0.065) (0.074)
Log household income 0.038∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.002 0.001 0.101∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗ -0.032 -0.043
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.030) (0.033) (0.037) (0.069)
N 20174 14213 19613 7726 12614 9088 11344 4376
Within R2 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.22 0.23 0.25 0.23 0.29
B. Renters
House price shock -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.006 -0.013 -0.016
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.013) (0.010) (0.015)
Log household income 0.021∗∗ 0.012 0.004 0.004 0.057 0.039 0.030 0.049
(0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.012) (0.030) (0.035) (0.036) (0.043)
N 3726 2548 3752 2436 1867 1313 1719 1135
Within R2 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11
Note: Authors’ estimation of equation 4.13. Dependent variable in columns (1)-(4): Dummy = 1 if feel closer
to the left-wing or the right-wing. Dependent variable in columns (5)-(8): Represents strength of support for
Conservatives relative to Labour; 1 = Labour (very strong support), 2 = Labour (fairly strong), 3 = Labour
(not very strong), 4 = Other parties (including Liberal Democrats) 5 = Conservative (not very strong), 6 =
Conservative (fairly strong), 7 = Conservative (very strong). All estimates include individual, local authority,
and year fixed effects, labour force status dummies, occupational dummies (25), educational attainment dummies,
and controls for age, number of children, marital status, regional unemployment rate, regional real income per
capita, interest rate expectations, and current self-reported house values. For the sample in Panel B, housing
price measures are calculated using home owners within each local authority and year as described in the text.
Standard errors clustered at the local authority district level are in parentheses. *p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p
<0.001.
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Table 4.16: Linear Probability Model Estimates of the Effect of House
Price Shocks on Political Preferences - by Education
Feel closest to the Right Strength of Right-wing support
Degree No degree Degree No degree
All HRP All HRP All HRP All HRP
A. House Owners
House price shock 0.028 0.036 0.030∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.070 0.109 0.049∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.028) (0.008) (0.009) (0.088) (0.115) (0.015) (0.016)
Log household income 0.039∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.095∗ 0.071 0.026 0.043
(0.009) (0.012) (0.006) (0.007) (0.045) (0.065) (0.024) (0.033)
N 6835 4001 26219 14336 4600 2707 14796 8192
Within R2 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.12
B. Renters
House price shock -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.008 -0.006 -0.004 -0.007
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.015) (0.009) (0.011)
Log household income -0.015 -0.027 0.018∗∗ 0.017 -0.103 -0.138 0.062∗ 0.081∗
(0.015) (0.016) (0.007) (0.009) (0.073) (0.097) (0.028) (0.033)
N 1204 894 6274 4090 768 554 2818 1894
Within R2 0.34 0.29 0.20 0.22 0.50 0.44 0.34 0.37
Note: Authors’ estimation of equation 4.13. Dependent variable in columns (1)-(4): Dummy = 1 if feel closer to the
left-wing or the right-wing. Dependent variable in columns (5)-(8): Represents strength of support for Conservatives
relative to Labour; 1 = Labour (very strong support), 2 = Labour (fairly strong), 3 = Labour (not very strong), 4 =
Other parties (including Liberal Democrats) 5 = Conservative (not very strong), 6 = Conservative (fairly strong),
7 = Conservative (very strong). All estimates include individual, local authority, and year fixed effects, labour
force status dummies, occupational dummies (25), educational attainment dummies, and controls for age, number
of children, marital status, regional unemployment rate, regional real income per capita, interest rate expectations,
and current self-reported house values. For the sample in Panel B, housing price measures are calculated using
home owners within each local authority and year as described in the text. Standard errors clustered at the local
authority district level are in parentheses.
*p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001.
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4.8 Conclusion
This chapter uses housing market variation to estimate the response of political
preferences to changes in housing wealth using individual-level data from the BHPS
for the period 1991-2011. The decisions of democratically elected representatives
have a profound impact on a wide variety of public policies, from the distribution of
income to economic growth, and understanding the influence that the characteristics
of individuals, such as income, class, or wealth, have on the formation of their political
preferences is of central importance in the study of political economy.
This chapter adds to the literature by being the first to examine the role of hous-
ing wealth on the partisan choice of individuals’ and on the decision to vote. I find
that an increase in housing wealth during the period 1991-2011 increases the likeli-
hood of voting for the Conservative Party, although the effects are materially quite
small. I do not find any evidence that housing wealth shocks have any impact on the
voting preferences of renters, or on their perceived financial wellbeing, results that
give credence to the causal interpretation of the results presented. While previous
literature has found some evidence that home owners are more likely to vote than
renters, I go beyond this and find that voting is actually increasing in the value of
housing wealth. Finally, I present evidence to suggest that individual attitudes are
affected by changes in housing wealth, but that these effects are asymmetric, depend-
ing on the individuals’ identification with either the left or right-wing. Increases in
housing wealth appear to lead people to hold more right-wing economic views, ex-
pressing for example, a smaller role for the government and a larger role for markets,
and more conservative views on a range of social issues. However, the opposite holds
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for increases in house prices amongst those who identify with the left. This paper
also adds to the causal evidence on how people form political preferences, which
are generally not well understood. Although the correlation between higher-income
and right-ring voting preferences is widely observed, establishing cause-and-effect is
more difficult. By making use of longitudinal data, and holding constant person fixed
effects, it provides some causal evidence that suggests that people may make deci-
sions in the ballot box that are driven by self-interest rather than because of a more
idealistic view of how society should function and resources should be distributed.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This thesis has examined how economic shocks, specifically exogenous shocks
from immigration and developments in the housing market, affect the price people
pay for housing, whether or not they move, and whether who they vote for in an
election is affected.
Exogenous, unanticipated shocks are rarely observed, and this therefore makes
efforts to identify their effects difficult. In this thesis I make use of two sources of
exogenous shocks, one from a rapid increase in immigration to the UK since the
mid-1990s, and the other from a rapid increase in average house prices, also from
the mid-1990s. Although the rapid increase in immigration to the UK since the mid-
1990s can be viewed as quite a sudden shock to the UK, where immigrants decide
to live in the UK is potentially endogenous to the economic conditions in different
parts of the UK, and this necessitates the use of an instrumental variable to estimate
the causal effect of immigration on housing rents and prices, and on native mobility.
198
In chapter two I considered whether there is any evidence of a causal relationship
between the increase in immigrants and the increase in house prices in the UK since
the mid-1990s. Rising immigration has led to concern that this may put pressure
on the housing market, leading to higher house prices and housing rents. In chapter
three I examined whether the inflow of immigrants into local authorities across the
UK has caused the displacement of natives, or the attraction of natives. Finally, in
chapter four, I examined whether unanticipated housing wealth shocks have had any
affect on the voting behaviour of individuals’ in terms of a greater preference for left
or right parties, and on whether it affects the decision to vote or not.
A significant literature in the economics of migration has explored the effect
that immigrants have on local labour markets and generally economists have found
relatively small, if any, effects of immigration on native wages or employment (see for
example, Card (2001, 2007, 2005), Dustmann et al. (2005), Dustmann et al. (2012),
Manacorda et al. (2012)). Or where significant effects have been found they have
been at the lower end of the wage distribution (Dustmann et al., 2012). Chapter two
argues that the housing market is an important arena in which to examine the effects
of immigration, as an upward-sloping supply curve and new immigrant demand could
be expected to push up house prices and rents in areas where immigrants settle. A
key feature of the housing market that makes it different from the labour market is
the durable nature of the housing stock - it can neither be built or removed quickly
(Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005), therefore, the price response could be expected to be
much greater in the housing market than in the labour market.
The analysis in Chapter two is the first to examine how immigration affects rents
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across local authorities in the UK, and this is important because as immigrants are
overwhelmingly likely to rent on first arrival in the UK, and given a relatively fixed
supply of housing in the rental market in the short term, one might expect to see
some affect on housing rents. I also replicate results on the affect of immigration
on house prices from Sa´ (2014) for the period 2003-2010, and extend this to the
period 1996-2002. To overcome problems of endogeneity and measurement error I
construct an instrumental variable, making use of the historical location patterns of
earlier waves of migrants. I find that immigration has a relatively small impact on
average rents; an immigrant inflow equal to one percent of the local population over
a three-year period increases average rents by 0.14-0.18% over the same three-year
period. I also find statistically significant evidence of a reduction in house prices
of about 1.6% following an increase in the immigrant population over a three-year
period equivalent to 1% of the initial local population.
The evidence presented here does not suggest that immigration pushes up either
house prices or rents to any great extent (and in fact reduces house prices), counter to
views that are sometimes expressed by politicians or other individuals, or discussion
in the media claiming that immigration is responsible for rising house prices. The
period under examination here, from 1996-2010 represents a period of rapid migration
to the UK, hence if any significant upward pressure on housing prices or rents was
to be found, it could be expected to be found here. There is therefore no evidence
provided here that immigration to the UK has an affect on housing markets in the
UK that is detrimental to the UK born population.
The major strength of this work is that I am able to analyse the effect of im-
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migration on housing markets at a local level as opposed to at a national level and
can therefore control for local characteristics, and importantly, native mobility. The
major weaknesses relate to the use of the instrument used in the empirical analysis.
For identification I am assuming that recent economics conditions in local authorities
are uncorrelated with the historical settlement patterns of immigrants. It could be
however, that there are omitted variables that determined the location of immigrants
in 1981 that are correlated with the determinants of contemporary house prices and
rents.
There are a number of ways in which the current research could be extended.
First, it would be useful to consider using alternative rent data, perhaps collected
from commercial letting agencies. Second, it would be interesting to look more
carefully at the sorting of different individuals into different neighbourhoods. Third,
it would be useful to incorporate housing supply constraints in different localities to
see what role these have in determining how demand shocks are transmitted into
changes in price, and how this interacts with native out-migration. Are natives
moving primarily to areas with elastic supply, such that this out-migration has little
material affect on house prices, or are they moving to areas with inelastic supply? The
evidence presented in Chapter three suggests that high-skilled immigrants and high-
skilled natives are attracted to the same areas, therefore these areas could be expected
to exhibit some degree of house price inflation. Fourth, it would be possible to
incorporate a more explicit spatial model to examine how changes in local population
spillover to house prices and rents in neighbouring, or even more distant parts of the
country. Finally, there is relatively little empirical analysis of the the rental market
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in the UK, and it would be useful to consider a more sophisticated model of the
rental market, in particular the interaction of different markets, such as the private
and social markets.
An important assumption underlying the results in chapter two, and many other
studies of the labour market consequences of migration, is that the native population
does not respond to immigrant inflows by moving out of an area that has experienced
a high immigrant inflow. In chapter three I analysed this question in the context
of local areas in the UK. Whether or not natives move in response to immigrant
inflows also has important welfare consequences (negative if they did not otherwise
plan to move), and has implications for the growth and decline of cities and regions,
particularly if immigrants of particular skill types locate in similar areas, for example
high skilled immigrants and high skilled natives in large cities such as London.
Standard labour market theory suggests that an immigrant shock to a local labour
market may set in motion a process of spatial arbitrage, whereby immigrants increase
the local labour supply, lowering wages relative to other markets, and creating an
incentive for natives to move to higher wage areas. Alternatively, an immigrant
inflow may attract natives if the economic return to locating near immigrants is
higher because of externalities or skill complementarities, for example. Using the
spatial correlation approach, and instrumenting for immigrant inflows, I examine the
empirical evidence for displacement or attraction. In aggregate I find strong evidence
in favour of displacement. My estimates suggest that between 70-80 natives move
out in response to 100 immigrants moving in to a local area. This is consistent with
the results in Chapter one where I find that immigrant inflows reduce house prices. If
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there is significant displacement of the native population following immigrant inflows
this could be expected to ameliorate any increase in housing costs. However, I also
find results consistent with a high degree of sorting across space by different skill
types. For example disaggregating by skill (based on position in the distribution of
wages, or age of leaving full-time education), I find a degree of attraction between
high-skilled immigrants and high-skilled natives. My results suggest that an inflow
of 100 high-skilled immigrants attracts almost 90 similarly skilled natives, while an
inflow of 100 low-skilled immigrants displaces 100 high-skilled natives.
The major strength of this work is to consider how immigration affects the native
population at the local labour market level using a comprehensive dataset that covers
the entire country, and the entire immigrant population (and not just subsections of
the immigrant population). The major weakness is, as with chapter two, the use of
instrumental variables and the possible threats to the identifying assumptions dis-
cussed above. The potential complementarity of the skills of natives and immigrants
has received recent attention in the literature, for example by Peri and Sparber (2009)
and Lewis (2011), and this area could be pushed further than in the current analysis
by delving more deeply into different occupations and skills to examine the degree
of complementarity or substitution, than with the broad categories used here. By
revealed preference, it appears that high-skilled natives are attracted to areas with
high-skilled immigrants, analysing the productivity benefits of this at a local level
would be of interest. Part of this would be to analyse the effect of immigration on
native wages and employment at the local area level.
The work presented in this chapter has implications for public policy; for exam-
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ple if there are benefits to the co-location of high-skilled natives and high-skilled
immigrants then government policy could accommodate this by making access to
the UK easier. The analysis presented here also suggests that low-skilled immigrants
crowd out high-skilled natives. Further analysis of the welfare consequences of this
would be of interest, and if this leads to persistent patterns of sorting across space of
high-income and low-income groups this also has implications for government policy
if it results in large differences in poverty, unemployment, education and health for
example.
In chapter four I consider a possible consequence of the rapid increase in house
prices that has occurred across large parts of the UK since the mid-1990s. This
increase in house prices represents a large increase in housing wealth, which to the
extent that it is realisable through for example, equity withdrawal, moving house,
or use as collateral represents a significant increase in wealth for many individuals
and households. The major contribution of this chapter to the literature is being the
first to estimate how wealth, and not just income, might influence peoples’ voting
behaviour and economic and social attitudes. The role of wealth in economic rela-
tions and society generally is coming under increasing scrutiny, particularly wealth
inequality. In a democracy, voting for a particular political party is one of the most
important decisions people can make, and while there is a significant literature on
the effects of campaign financing for example, on electoral outcomes, relatively little
attention has been paid to the role of economic factors in affecting people’s choices
in the ballot box. Among others, both Bartels (2008) and Stiglitz (2012), have
emphasised the links between economic inequality and political inequality.
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The main strength of this work is in using variation in wealth determined by the
housing market to identity how household wealth shocks affect political preferences
and voter turnout. Homeownership rates in the UK are high, and housing wealth
represents the largest share of total household wealth for most people, so this gives
a more comprehensive picture of individual wealth, in comparison to Powdthavee
and Oswald (2014), for example, who use lottery wins that are much smaller in
magnitude and affect far fewer people. The rapid increase in house prices occurred
differentially across space, and the boom was not confined to solely high income
people, as many relatively low-income people who happened to live in high-growth
areas also experienced a significant increase in housing wealth, for this reason I argue
that the changes in the housing market have been largely exogenous to households,
allowing me to overcome the inherent endogeneity between wealth accumulation and
voting decisions. However, the major weakness of this work is the extent to which
the changes in housing wealth I observe are truly exogenous. I generate a shock
variable that is represents the long-run deviation from trend in an attempt to create
a measure that represents unanticipated housing wealth shocks, and I also primarily
use local authority house price data that is more likely to overcome the potential
endogeneity of self-reported house price valuations.
Using data from the British Household Panel Survey and Understanding Society
for the period 1995-2012 and controlling for individual fixed effects, I show that an
increase in the housing wealth of home owners causes a significant increase in the
likelihood of voting for the Conservative Party. I find no evidence of an effect of
housing price growth on the voting intentions of renters. In an attempt to explore
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why increased housing wealth might alter the voting patterns of homeowners I also
present evidence suggesting that growth in housing wealth leads homeowners to hold
more conservative views on a variety of economic and social issues.
The fact that positive shocks to housing wealth lead people to be more likely
to vote conservative and hold more economically and socially conservative views
has consequences for the evolution of wealth inequality in the UK, given that the
election of more right-wing governments could be expected to enact policies that
further benefit those that are already wealthy. However this conclusion needs to be
tempered by the fact that more highly educated people are not more likely to vote
right-wing, so to the extent that overall education levels are increasing, this could act
to moderate the wealth effect. If the fact that people are more likely to hold right-
wing views is seen as a concern, policies that ameliorate house price growth, perhaps
by building more houses, or more equitable taxation of housing and land wealth could
be a solution. A comprehensive capital gains tax that covers all housing, instead of
excluding the family home could be considered, along with a reform of the current
regressive local council tax in favour of a progressive tax based on a percentage of
the value of the land and structures.
There are a number of dimensions along which this work might be extended.
First, an interesting line of inquiry for future research is to see whether any of these
findings hold in other countries, particularly those that have also had a significant
increase in house prices in recent decades such as the United States. Second, it would
be interesting to explore in more detail the symmetry of housing wealth shocks, do
periods of significant falling house prices lead to the opposite of what is presented
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here, in addition to modelling in more detail the difference between anticipated versus
unanticipated housing shocks. Third, it would be useful to see how these results
might affect specific policies, for example national and local regulation of housing
supply; are people who experience a positive shock to their housing wealth more
likely to oppose local housing developments? Related to this, would be to examine
whether increased housing wealth has any influence on any local government decision
making, through influencing individual voting behaviour, or the priorities and voting
behaviour of local councillors. Fourth, it would be interesting to examine how the
behaviour of individual MPs is affected by their housing wealth, for example by
looking at their voting patterns within Parliament. Finally, it might be possible
to look in more depth at the intergenerational consequences of housing wealth and
electoral preferences.
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A.1 Unit root tests
Table A1: Panel Unit Root Tests
LLC and IPS Unit Root Tests
Variable LLC LLC IPS IPS
No Trend Trend No Trend Trend
∆ Log mean house price (repeat sales) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0055 0.0000
∆ Log mean weekly rent (all bedrooms) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
∆ Log mean weekly rent (1+2 bedrooms) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
∆ Log mean weekly rent (3+4 bedrooms) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
∆ UKi / Popi,t−1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
∆ FBi / Popi,t−1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Instrument 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
∆ Log number of dwellings 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
∆ Log unemployment rate 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
∆ Proportion with no qualification 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
∆ Log real gross weekly capital 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
∆ Log user cost of capital 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Note: The figure presented for each unit root test is the p-value for the statistic under
the null hypothesis of a unit root. LLC is the Levin, Lin and Chu test (which assumes
a common unit root process across areas); IPS is the Im, Pesaran and Shin test (which
assumes an individual unit root process across each area). Each statistic tests the first
difference of the variable and includes an individual intercept; results are presented
with and without inclusion of deterministic time trends.
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A.2 Derivation of housing model
Consider an economy with Nt individuals in time t, where N = FB + UK,
the sum of foreign born and UK born individuals.1 Each individual derives utility
from real non housing consumption (cxt) and housing services (θht), where ht is the
individual’s housing stock and θ is the ratio of the individual’s housing services to
housing stock. In each period the individual earns yt; the individuals real wealth, wt,
can be allocated between ht and real financial assets (ft). The prices of the housing
stock and nonhousing consumption are PHt and PCt, respectively; their ratio is
denoted gt = PHt/PCt, and g˙t is the expected rate of change of g between t and
t+ 1. The real after-tax return on ft is rt; the real return on ht equals the real rate
of capital gain (g˙t) less stamp duty (τt), less council tax (υt), less depreciation (κt)
and less the foregone rate of earnings (or the after-tax cost of borrowing), rt, on the
real housing capital (gtht). Thus the intertemporal constraint for the state variable,
wt, is given by (B.1):
wt+1 = (1 + rt)(wt + yt − cxt) + (g˙t − rt − τt − υt − κt)gtht. (A.1)
In each period the individual has a constant relative risk-aversion utility function that
is separable in nonhousing consumption and housing services; thus the individuals
value function in t (with ρ being the discount factor) is given by
Vt = {[(cx1−δt + (θht1−δ)/(1− δ)] + ρVt+1(wt+1)} (A.2)
Taking the ratio of the first order conditions for (B.2) with respect to cxt and ht,
respectively, yields the optimum ratio of housing stock to consumption for the indi-
vidual:
ht
cxt
= θ(1−δ)/δUC−1/δt g
−1/δ
t , (A.3)
where UCt ≡ (rt+τt+υt+κt− g˙t)/(1+rt) is the real user cost of capital for housing.
Aggregating (B.3) over all N individuals and solving for gt, I obtain:
gt = θ
1−δ
(
Nt
Ht
δ)
CXδt UC
−1
t . (A.4)
Expressing gt as PHt/PCt, adding local authority subscripts to relevant variables
and taking logs yields equation (B.5) for the equilibrium house price in the main
body of the article (Equation 3.1):
1This section follows Grimes and Aitken (2010).
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(
PHit
PCt
)
= (1− δ) ln θ − δ ln
(
Hit
Nit
)
+ δ lnCXit − lnUCit. (A.5)
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A.3 Levels vs differences for house price regres-
sions
Table A2: Change in Foreign Born Population and House Prices (OLS)
Levels First differences
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FB/Popt−1 -0.981∗∗∗ -0.282∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.074)
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 -0.317∗∗∗ -0.317∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.070)
LA fixed effects No Yes No Yes
N 1359 1359 1359 1359
adj. R2 0.38 0.98 0.79 0.79
Local Authorities 170 170 170 170
Note: All estimates includes year fixed effects. ∆ Indicates the first difference.
Standard errors clustered at the local authority district level are in parentheses.
*p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001.
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B.1 Ordered probit estimates
Table B1: Ordered Probit Estimates of the Effect of Individual
Characteristics on Wage Quartile
UK born Foreign born
(1) (2)
Age 0.036∗ 0.067∗
(0.014) (0.034)
Age-squared /100 -0.099∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗
(0.017) (0.044)
Female 0.482∗∗∗ 0.349∗
(0.017) (0.160)
Single, never married -0.112 0.033
(0.068) (0.275)
Married, living with husband/wife -0.116 0.016
(0.065) (0.265)
Married, separated from husband/wife -0.041 0.021
(0.081) (0.312)
Divorced -0.036 0.070
(0.068) (0.281)
Degree or equivalent 0.582∗∗∗ 1.114∗
(0.129) (0.441)
Higher education 0.852∗∗∗ 1.427∗∗
(0.129) (0.440)
GCE A Level or equiv 0.951∗∗∗ 1.420∗∗
(0.127) (0.441)
GCSE grades A-C or equiv 1.046∗∗∗ 1.585∗∗∗
(0.126) (0.446)
Other qualifications 1.095∗∗∗ 1.157∗∗
(0.126) (0.444)
No qualifications 1.008∗∗∗ 1.466∗∗∗
(0.123) (0.441)
Higher managerial and professional -0.658∗∗∗ -1.261∗∗∗
(0.099) (0.211)
Lower managerial and professional -0.167 -0.556∗∗
(0.093) (0.204)
Intermediate occupations 0.265∗∗ -0.091
(0.094) (0.228)
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Table B1: Ordered Probit Estimates Continued
UK born Foreign born
(1) (2)
Small employers and own account workers -6.273∗∗∗ -6.362∗∗∗
(0.097) (0.234)
Lower supervisory and technical 0.428∗∗∗ -0.085
(0.094) (0.217)
Semi-routine occupations 0.646∗∗∗ 0.219
(0.097) (0.223)
Routine occupations 0.685∗∗∗ 0.219
(0.098) (0.218)
Years of experience -0.035∗∗∗ -0.036∗
(0.008) (0.017)
Years of experience squared /100 0.146∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.039)
Employed 0.696∗∗∗ 0.671∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.044)
Unemployed -0.043∗∗∗ -0.074
(0.019) (0.323)
Years in the UK 0.006
(0.009)
Years in the UK squared /100 -0.029
(0.016)
N 31276 2992
Log-likelihood -25235.57 -1863.61
Note: Ordered probit estimates of the effect of native (column 1) and im-
migrant (column 2) characteristics on wage quartiles. The estimates for
immigrants also includes interactions between region of birth and age, sex,
and years in the UK. Local authority fixed effects are also included.
Standard errors clustered at the local authority district level are in paren-
theses. *p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001.
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B.2 Summary statistics: Unnormalised data
Table B2: Summary Statistics: Unnormalised Data
Total Population Working Age
Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Aggregate population
∆ UK 9,332 33,886 5,777 21,964
∆ FB 2,252 5,825 1,906 4,900
∆ Local demand shock -0.003 0.036 -0.003 0.036
∆ Log real house price 0.011 0.071 0.011 0.071
∆ Log housing stock 0.037 1.442 0.037 1.442
Occupation groups
∆ UK (professional) 742 4,699 560 4,506
∆ UK (intermediate) 34 3,680 -47 3,568
∆ UK (routine) -274 3,524 -381 3,390
∆ FB (professional) 397 2,079 372 2,045
∆ FB (intermediate) 194 1,319 191 1,319
∆ FB (routine) 354 1,914 351 1,879
Education groups
∆ UK (highest) 430 3,344 351 3,285
∆ UK 4,473 11,328 4,213 11,196
∆ UK (lowest) 2,557 13,421 1,677 12,813
∆ FB (highest) 619 2,304 597 2,288
∆ FB 1,054 3,158 1,022 3,126
∆ FB (lowest) 294 2,055 251 2,011
Skill (wage) groups
∆ UK (4th quartile) 1,483 6,271 1,469 6,247
∆ UK (3rd quartile) 1,454 5,911 1,434 5,884
∆ UK (2nd quartile) 1,420 5,859 1,391 5,816
∆ UK (1st quartile) 1,814 3,639 1,772 3,572
∆ FB (4th quartile) 282 1,407 279 1,404
∆ FB (3rd quartile) 218 1,216 217 1,203
∆ FB (2nd quartile) 224 1,232 221 1,226
∆ FB (1st quartile) 350 1,199 348 1,204
Note: Cells for skill groups (occupation, education-experience, and
wage) all refer to working age population only (aged 16-65).
Source: Authors’ calculations from the Annual Population Survey.
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B.3 25 largest local authorities in 2003
Table B3: 25 Largest Local Authorities in 2003
Local authority Population (2003) UK born (2003) Foreign born (2003) % Foreign born Share of UK immigrant
pop in 2003
Birmingham 959,611 810,038 149,573 0.156 0.029
Leeds 719,811 653,312 66,499 0.092 0.013
Glasgow 560,004 517,592 42,412 0.076 0.008
Sheffield 502,878 468,433 34,445 0.068 0.007
Bradford 469,851 404,309 65,542 0.139 0.013
Buckinghamshire 466,341 424,542 41,799 0.090 0.008
Edinburgh 445,180 405,833 39,347 0.088 0.008
Liverpool 427,931 409,109 18,822 0.044 0.004
Manchester 423,682 349,805 73,877 0.174 0.015
Bristol 387,000 358,389 28,611 0.074 0.006
Croydon 329,525 256,334 73,191 0.222 0.014
Barnet 321,375 217,357 104,018 0.324 0.020
Coventry 292,708 249,753 42,955 0.147 0.008
Ealing 288,161 173,268 114,893 0.399 0.023
Bromley 286,809 258,361 28,448 0.099 0.006
Leicester 276,928 207,953 68,975 0.249 0.014
Nottingham 270,932 238,817 32,115 0.119 0.006
Lambeth 266,551 167,334 99,217 0.372 0.020
Enfield 264,221 195,594 68,627 0.260 0.013
Wandsworth 260,327 179,414 80,913 0.311 0.016
Brent 256,944 137,621 119,323 0.464 0.023
Southwark 250,314 169,705 80,609 0.322 0.016
Lewisham 248,507 183,519 64,988 0.262 0.013
Kingston upon Hull 245,302 236,246 9,056 0.037 0.002
Newham 243,494 141,599 101,895 0.418 0.020
Note: Data are for the largest 25 local authorities in 2003.
Source: Authors’ calculations from Annual Population Survey.
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B.4 Fastest growing local authorities, 2003-2012
Table B4: Fastest growing Local Authorities, 2003-2012
Local authority % Change Population UK born Foreign born % Foreign born Share of UK immigrant
Population (2012) (2012) (2012) pop in 2012
Manchester 22.2 470,780 368,850 101,930 0.213 0.016
Westminster 20.7 243,113 118,628 124,484 0.511 0.020
Tower Hamlets 19.5 225,903 129,636 96,267 0.424 0.015
Reading 18.7 145,609 112,066 33,542 0.226 0.005
Camden 17.3 219,596 129,160 90,436 0.410 0.014
Newcastle upon Tyne 16.8 277,868 245,593 32,275 0.115 0.005
Bristol 16.6 419,185 375,071 44,114 0.103 0.007
Cardiff 16.2 324,327 291,092 33,234 0.101 0.005
Milton Keynes 16.1 230,200 194,938 35,262 0.151 0.005
Slough 16.0 126,244 82,852 43,392 0.339 0.007
Southwark 15.7 269,903 177,420 92,483 0.341 0.015
Luton 15.4 191,681 142,418 49,264 0.255 0.008
Nottingham 15.2 291,586 243,338 48,248 0.162 0.007
Redbridge 14.8 257,028 174,220 82,808 0.319 0.013
York 14.5 193,136 183,232 9,904 0.050 0.002
Barking and Dagenham 14.3 174,066 131,203 42,862 0.243 0.007
North Somerset 14.3 200,034 189,152 10,883 0.054 0.002
Windsor and Maidenhead 13.7 139,021 117,733 21,288 0.152 0.003
Southampton 13.7 228,816 197,435 31,380 0.134 0.005
Note: Data are for the top 10% fastest growing local authorities.
Source: Authors’ calculations from Annual Population Survey.
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B.5 Sample weights
The LFS assigns weights to each individual in the survey, and these weights rep-
resent the number of people in the total population that have similar characteristics
to the individual that is actually surveyed. According to Office for National Statis-
tics (2011) the weighting serves two main purposes; it ensures that cases that have a
lower probability of selection get a higher weight, and it also ensures compensation
for differential non-response amongst sub-groups in the population.
The weights are calibrated so that, for example, the weights of all 25-year old
males in an LFS dataset equal the total number of 25-year old males in the UK at
that time. The weights are calibrated primarily to recent census data, augmented
by other sources such as the NHS Central Register for internal migration, the In-
ternational Passenger for international migration flows and the registration data for
births and deaths. Three different calibration groups or partitions are used, and
within each partition the weights sum to the population Office for National Statis-
tics (2011). The first partition is local authority districts, of which there are 433.
Partition 2 consists of 44 calibration groups; 12 age groups, for 2 sexes, and two
countries (Northern Ireland and Great Britain). And the third partition consists of
612 calibration categories, being age-bands (17) within regions (18) and sexes.
ONS uses the sample weights when reporting data on immigration from the LFS
in official publications and Nicholas Palmer at ONS also recommends that they
be used for area analysis at local authority level. Given that country of birth is
just one of many individual characteristics which are not taken into account in the
weighting (only age, sex, local authority and region), then unless the overall age,
sex and location distribution of immigrants is radically different to the UK born
distribution of age, sex and location, then the weights are as appropriate to use for
immigrants versus natives as any other possible division of the population on any
other particular characteristic. If there was a sudden influx of immigrants to an area
that had previously had few immigrants and the age and sex of these immigrants
was vastly different from the local native population, the weights would be less
appropriate, however, the age, sex and location of immigrants are already factored
into the total population used to calibrate the weights given that immigrants are
recorded in the census and factored into the annual population estimates.
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B.6 Unweighted results
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Table B5: Estimates of the Effect of Immigrant Inflows on
Net Native Outflows - Unweighted Data
Total Population Working Age Population
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. OLS
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 0.018 0.541 -0.523 0.148
(0.731) (0.554) (0.529) (0.435)
∆ Local demand shock 3.651 3.821
(2.690) (2.562)
∆ Log real house price 6.255∗∗∗ 6.522∗∗∗
(1.567) (1.524)
∆ Log housing stock 2.275 2.370
(1.240) (1.245)
adj. R2 0.64 0.70 0.64 0.69
B. IV
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 -0.213∗∗∗ -0.218∗∗ -0.169∗∗∗ -0.147∗
(0.063) (0.071) (0.046) (0.080)
∆ Local demand shock -1.843 -1.656
(1.306) (1.136)
∆ Log real house price -1.780 -1.408
(1.243) (0.995)
∆ Log housing stock -0.433 -0.304
(0.638) (0.561)
First stage coeff. 0.535 0.558 0.672 0.518
(0.199) (0.207) (0.239) (0.250)
F-stat 7.42 7.21 7.79 7.93
N 1800 1800 1800 1800
Local Authorities 200 200 200 200
Note: Authors’ estimation of Equation 3.1. All estimates includes year and
local authority fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the local authority
district level are in parentheses. *p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001.
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Table B6: Estimates of the Effect of Immigrant Inflows on
Net Native Outflows (Pooled Occupation Groups) - Unweighted Data
Total Population Working Age
(1) (2)
A. OLS
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 0.541∗∗∗ 0.474∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.060)
adj. R2 0.12 0.10
B. IV
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 -0.648 -0.585
(0.564) (0.575)
First stage coeff. 0.402 0.398
(0.151) (0.164)
F-stat 7.03 5.88
Occupation fixed effects Yes Yes
N 5400 5400
Local Authorities 200 200
Note: Authors’ estimation of Equation 3.4. All estimates in-
cludes year and local authority fixed effects. Standard errors
clustered at the local authority district level are in parentheses.
*p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001.
Table B7: Estimates of the Effect of Immigrant Inflows on
Net Native Outflows (Pooled Education Groups) - Unweighted Data
Total Population Working Age
(1) (2)
A. OLS
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 -0.385 -0.420
(0.551) (0.557)
adj. R2 0.53 0.53
B. IV
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 -0.672∗∗∗ -0.679∗∗∗
(0.144) (0.146)
First stage coeff. 0.589 0.581
(0.082) (0.081)
F-stat 51.35 51.72
Education fixed effects Yes Yes
N 5400 5400
Local Authorities 200 200
Note: Authors’ estimation of Equation 3.4. All estimates in-
cludes year and local authority fixed effects. Standard errors
clustered at the local authority district level are in parentheses.
*p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001.
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Table B8: Estimates of the Effect of Immigrant Inflows on
Net Native Outflows (Pooled Skill Groups) - Unweighted Data
Total Population Working Age
(1) (2)
A. OLS
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 0.411∗∗∗ 0.402∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.099)
adj. R2 0.52 0.52
B. IV
(∆ FB)/Popt−1 -0.569 -0.718
(0.903) (0.915)
First stage coeff. 0.137 0.114
(0.010) (0.087)
F-stat 15.70 14.73
Skill fixed effects Yes Yes
N 7200 7200
Local Authorities 200 200
Note: Authors’ estimation of Equation 3.4. All estimates
includes year and local authority fixed effects.
Standard errors clustered at the local authority district
level are in parentheses. *p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p
<0.001.
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Appendices for Chapter 3
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C.1 Testing interest rate expectations and house
prices
Table C1: Linear Probability Model Estimates of the Effect of Housing
Prices on Political Preferences
Strength of Right-wing support
(1) (2) (3) (4)
House price shock 0.036∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Log household income 0.032∗ 0.032∗ 0.033∗ 0.033∗
(0.014) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014)
Log regional GDP 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Log house price 0.017 0.017
(0.028) (0.028)
Interest rate expectations 0.011 0.009
(0.074) (0.074)
N 19474 19474 19474 19474
Within R2 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Note: Authors’ estimation of equation 4.13. Data on house prices used to derive the
house price shock are based on market values from the Land Registry. The depen-
dent variable is defined as: Dummy = 1 if feel closer to the right-wing. Dependent
variable in columns (3)-(4): Represents strength of support for Conservatives relative
to Labour; 1 = Labour (very strong support), 2 = Labour (fairly strong), 3 = Labour
(not very strong), 4 = Other parties (including Liberal Democrats) 5 = Conservative
(not very strong), 6 = Conservative (fairly strong), 7 = Conservative (very strong).
All estimates include individual, local authority, and year fixed effects, labour force
status dummies, occupational dummies (25), educational attainment dummies, and
controls for age, number of children, marital status, regional unemployment rate, re-
gional real income per capita, interest rate expectations, and current self-reported
house values. Standard errors clustered at the local authority district level are in
parentheses.
*p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001.
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C.2 Full results - linear models
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Table C2: Linear Probability Model Estimates of the Effect of Housing
Prices on Political Preferences - Home owners
Feel closest to the Right Strength of support for Right Voted for the Right
All HRP All HRP All HRP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Home owners
House price shock 0.031∗∗∗ 0.025∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.027∗ 0.031∗
(0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.012) (0.015)
Log household income 0.032∗ 0.033∗ 0.032∗ 0.035∗ 0.044∗ 0.048∗
(0.014) (0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.016)
Log regional GDP -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.009) (0.013) (0.002) (0.003)
Log house price -0.004 -0.008 0.017 0.041 -0.035∗∗ -0.040∗
(0.009) (0.012) (0.028) (0.036) (0.013) (0.017)
Interest rate expectations 0.015 0.022 0.011 0.106 0.005 0.030
(0.027) (0.037) (0.074) (0.098) (0.030) (0.038)
Regional unemployment rate 0.001 0.002 0.007 0.012 0.002 0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.008) (0.002) (0.003)
Age 0.011 0.012 0.028 0.019 -0.004 0.007
(0.007) (0.010) (0.022) (0.033) (0.011) (0.014)
Age-squared 0.000 0.000 -0.000∗∗ -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Children 0.007 0.013∗∗ 0.016 0.035∗ -0.001 0.008
(0.004) (0.005) (0.013) (0.017) (0.005) (0.006)
Married 0.019∗ 0.021 0.048 -0.011 -0.014 -0.038∗
(0.008) (0.013) (0.033) (0.049) (0.012) (0.017)
Degree -0.014 -0.014 0.020 0.095 0.029 0.012
(0.027) (0.040) (0.088) (0.123) (0.053) (0.089)
A levels -0.001 -0.022 0.081 0.056 0.032 0.011
(0.019) (0.029) (0.066) (0.091) (0.038) (0.077)
GCSEs 0.005 -0.005 0.074 -0.012 0.026 0.008
(0.018) (0.029) (0.059) (0.088) (0.038) (0.072)
Other qual. 0.003 0.006 0.068 0.021 0.033 0.033
(0.016) (0.027) (0.054) (0.077) (0.036) (0.073)
Employed 0.001 -0.002 -0.000 -0.099 -0.020 0.015
(0.016) (0.022) (0.068) (0.085) (0.023) (0.029)
Self-employed -0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.093 -0.018 0.004
(0.019) (0.024) (0.074) (0.090) (0.023) (0.031)
Unemployed -0.028 -0.021 -0.121 -0.321 -0.073 -0.002
(0.037) (0.052) (0.162) (0.188) (0.059) (0.085)
Retired 0.023 0.051 0.083 -0.091 -0.060 0.003
(0.030) (0.032) (0.105) (0.118) (0.033) (0.029)
Family care -0.011 -0.058 0.060 -0.132 -0.036 0.037
(0.022) (0.032) (0.079) (0.123) (0.027) (0.040)
N 33178 18394 19474 10938 21532 12002
Within R2 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06
Note: Authors’ estimation of equation 4.13. Dependent variable in columns (1)-(2) and (5)-(6):
Dummy = 1 if feel closer to the right-wing. Dependent variable in columns (3)-(4): Represents
strength of support for Conservatives relative to Labour/; 1 = Labour (very strong support), 2 =
Labour (fairly strong), 3 = Labour (not very strong), 4 = Other parties (including Liberal Democrats)
5 = Conservative (not very strong), 6 = Conservative (fairly strong), 7 = Conservative (very strong).
All estimates include individual, local authority, and year fixed effects, and occupational dummies
(25). Standard errors clustered at the local authority district level are in parentheses.
*p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001.
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Table C3: Linear Probability Model Estimates of the Effect of Housing
Prices on Political Preferences - Renters
Feel closest to the Right Strength of support for Right Voted for the Right
All HRP All HRP All HRP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Renters
House price shock 0.007 0.017 0.006 0.017 0.063 0.062
(0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.014) (0.054) (0.073)
Log household income -0.001 -0.010∗ -0.000 -0.010∗ -0.003 -0.020
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.015) (0.017)
Interest rate expectations -0.018 -0.016 -0.006 -0.016 -0.117 -0.038
(0.054) (0.081) (0.063) (0.081) (0.238) (0.293)
Regional unemployment rate -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 0.004 0.007
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.019) (0.022)
Log regional GDP -0.224 -0.419 -0.248 -0.419 -0.058 0.111
(0.270) (0.403) (0.294) (0.403) (1.348) (1.705)
Age 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.144 0.099
(0.013) (0.018) (0.013) (0.018) (0.080) (0.108)
Age-squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Children 0.009 -0.002 0.013 -0.002 0.001 -0.008
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.035) (0.042)
Married 0.005 0.020 0.005 0.020 0.049 0.053
(0.015) (0.019) (0.015) (0.019) (0.061) (0.063)
Degree -0.049 -0.077 -0.080 -0.077 -0.095 0.201
(0.035) (0.055) (0.043) (0.055) (0.287) (0.345)
A levels -0.005 -0.017 0.001 -0.017 -0.205 -0.048
(0.027) (0.038) (0.027) (0.038) (0.133) (0.135)
GCSEs 0.007 -0.018 -0.000 -0.018 -0.194 -0.043
(0.023) (0.029) (0.023) (0.029) (0.123) (0.122)
Other qual. -0.004 -0.014 -0.001 -0.014 -0.171 -0.096
(0.021) (0.026) (0.022) (0.026) (0.128) (0.098)
Employed -0.019 -0.029 -0.014 -0.029 -0.001 0.048
(0.012) (0.019) (0.012) (0.019) (0.154) (0.200)
Self-employed -0.030 -0.058 -0.033 -0.058 -0.054 -0.084
(0.020) (0.032) (0.021) (0.032) (0.188) (0.253)
Unemployed -0.025 -0.019 -0.044 -0.019 0.232 0.268
(0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.189) (0.238)
Retired -0.064∗ -0.102∗∗ -0.065∗ -0.102∗∗ -0.026 -0.298
(0.025) (0.038) (0.026) (0.038) (0.272) (0.450)
Family care -0.025 -0.043 -0.022 -0.043 0.096 0.335
(0.013) (0.023) (0.014) (0.023) (0.195) (0.242)
N 5857 3952 5857 3952 2797 1939
Within R2 0.00 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.06
Note: Authors’ estimation of equation 4.13. Dependent variable in columns (1)-(2) and (5)-(6):
Dummy = 1 if feel closer to the right-wing. Dependent variable in columns (3)-(4): Represents strength
of support for Conservatives relative to Labour; 1 = Labour (very strong support), 2 = Labour (fairly
strong), 3 = Labour (not very strong), 4 = Other parties (including Liberal Democrats) 5 = Conserva-
tive (not very strong), 6 = Conservative (fairly strong), 7 = Conservative (very strong). All estimates
include individual, local authority, and year fixed effects, and occupational dummies (25). The house
price shock measure is calculated using home owners within each local authority and year as described
in the text. Standard errors clustered at the local authority district level are in parentheses.
*p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001.
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C.3 Logit models
Table C4: Logit Estimates of the Effect of Housing Prices on Political
Preferences
Feel closest to the Right Voted for the Right Strength of Right support
All HRP All HRP All HRP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Home owners
House price shock 0.034∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) (0.033) (0.032)
Log household income 0.018∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.013∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.028 0.041
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.027) (0.040)
N 37945 21025 24646 13711 22364 12571
B. Renters
House price shock -0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.009 -0.001 -0.007
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.012) (0.015)
Log household income 0.015 0.011 0.007 0.015 0.057 0.083
(0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.044) (0.053)
N 5490 3293 2845 1717 3593 2454
Note: Authors’ estimation of equation 4.13. Marginal effects reported in columns (1)-(4). Odds ratios for ordered logits
reported in columns (5)-(6). Dependent variable in columns (1)-(2) and (5)-(6): Dummy = 1 if feel closer to the right-wing.
Dependent variable in columns (3)-(4): Represents strength of support for Conservatives relative to Labour; 1 = Labour
(very strong support), 2 = Labour (fairly strong), 3 = Labour (not very strong), 4 = Other parties (including Liberal
Democrats) 5 = Conservative (not very strong), 6 = Conservative (fairly strong), 7 = Conservative (very strong). All
estimates include individual, local authority, and year fixed effects, labour force status dummies, occupational dummies
(25), educational attainment dummies, and controls for age, number of children, marital status, regional unemployment
rate, regional real income per capita, interest rate expectations, and current self-reported house values. For the sample in
Panel B, housing price measures are calculated using home owners within each local authority and year as described in
the text. Standard errors clustered at the local authority district level are in parentheses.
*p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001.
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Table C5: Logit Estimates of the Effect of Housing Prices on Political
Preferences
Feel closest to the Right Voted for the Right Strength of Right support
All HRP All HRP All HRP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Home owners
Log House price shock 0.112∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.616∗∗∗ 0.640∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.016) (0.017) (0.064) (0.069)
Log household income 0.016∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.009 0.016∗ 0.014 0.019
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.028) (0.041)
N 37945 21025 24646 13711 22364 12571
B. Renters
Log House price shock -0.001 -0.003 0.008 0.031 0.053 0.015
(0.010) (0.012) (0.018) (0.024) (0.067) (0.082)
Log household income 0.017 0.013 0.008 0.016 0.073 0.098
(0.009) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.047) (0.057)
N 5490 3293 2845 1717 3593 2454
Note: Authors’ estimation of equation 4.13. Marginal effects reported in columns (1)-(4). Odds ratios for ordered logits
reported in columns (5)-(6). Dependent variable in columns (1)-(2) and (5)-(6): Dummy = 1 if feel closer to the right-wing.
Dependent variable in columns (3)-(4): Represents strength of support for Conservatives relative to Labour; 1 = Labour
(very strong support), 2 = Labour (fairly strong), 3 = Labour (not very strong), 4 = Other parties (including Liberal
Democrats) 5 = Conservative (not very strong), 6 = Conservative (fairly strong), 7 = Conservative (very strong). All
estimates include individual, local authority, and year fixed effects, labour force status dummies, occupational dummies
(25), educational attainment dummies, and controls for age, number of children, marital status, regional unemployment
rate, regional real income per capita, interest rate expectations, and current self-reported house values. For the sample in
Panel B, housing price measures are calculated using home owners within each local authority and year as described in
the text. Standard errors clustered at the local authority district level are in parentheses.
*p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001.
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C.4 Alternative models: Four year change in house
prices
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Table C6: Linear Probability Model Estimates of the Effect of Housing
Prices on Political Preferences
Feel closest to the Right Voted for the Right Strength of Right support
All HRP All HRP All HRP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Home owners
4-year House price change 0.011∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.011 0.008∗∗ 0.007∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003)
Log household income 0.284∗ 0.344 0.395 0.069 0.222 0.358
(0.140) (0.177) (0.464) (0.535) (0.209) (0.262)
Log regional GDP 0.005∗ 0.007∗ 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.006∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.008) (0.012) (0.002) (0.003)
Log house price 0.011 0.005 0.053∗ 0.040 -0.019 -0.025∗
(0.007) (0.009) (0.022) (0.026) (0.010) (0.011)
Interest rate expectations 0.026 0.019 0.027 0.086 0.004 0.009
(0.023) (0.034) (0.069) (0.086) (0.029) (0.036)
Regional unemployment rate 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.011 0.001 0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.008) (0.002) (0.003)
Age 0.002 0.000 0.013 -0.001 -0.001 -0.005
(0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.011) (0.003) (0.004)
Age-squared 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Children 0.000 0.002 0.006 0.012 -0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.004) (0.011) (0.014) (0.004) (0.005)
Married 0.015∗ 0.014 0.004 -0.045 -0.009 -0.020
(0.007) (0.009) (0.025) (0.035) (0.011) (0.014)
Degree 0.012 0.025 0.011 0.072 -0.025 -0.037
(0.014) (0.019) (0.054) (0.069) (0.025) (0.036)
A levels 0.024 0.030 0.143∗∗ 0.189∗∗ 0.035 0.044
(0.013) (0.018) (0.049) (0.062) (0.025) (0.038)
GCSEs 0.029∗ 0.037∗ 0.133∗∗ 0.108 0.033 0.015
(0.012) (0.016) (0.044) (0.061) (0.024) (0.034)
Other qual. 0.030∗∗ 0.044∗∗ 0.131∗∗ 0.146∗∗ 0.042 0.037
(0.012) (0.015) (0.041) (0.056) (0.022) (0.034)
Employed -0.000 -0.019 0.023 -0.103 -0.009 0.011
(0.016) (0.025) (0.060) (0.078) (0.019) (0.028)
Self-employed 0.015 0.006 0.085 -0.033 0.008 0.024
(0.018) (0.028) (0.066) (0.082) (0.020) (0.030)
Unemployed -0.007 -0.041 -0.109 -0.417∗ -0.039 0.010
(0.031) (0.047) (0.139) (0.181) (0.045) (0.070)
Retired 0.049 0.051 0.022 -0.214∗ -0.029 0.010
(0.033) (0.037) (0.086) (0.107) (0.028) (0.030)
Family care -0.016 -0.045 0.058 -0.133 -0.028 0.012
(0.021) (0.034) (0.072) (0.113) (0.023) (0.034)
N 36102 19688 21431 11893 23782 13080
Within R2 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06
Note: Authors’ estimation of equation 4.13. Dependent variable in columns (1)-(2) and (5)-(6):
Dummy = 1 if feel closer to the right-wing. Dependent variable in columns (3)-(4): Represents
strength of support for Conservatives relative to Labour/; 1 = Labour (very strong support), 2
= Labour (fairly strong), 3 = Labour (not very strong), 4 = Other parties (including Liberal
Democrats) 5 = Conservative (not very strong), 6 = Conservative (fairly strong), 7 = Conserva-
tive (very strong). All estimates include individual, local authority, and year fixed effects, and
occupational dummies (25). Standard errors clustered at the local authority district level are in
parentheses.
*p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001.
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Table C7: Linear Probability Model Estimates of the Effect of Housing
Prices on Political Preferences
Feel closest to the Right Voted for the Right Strength of Right support
All HRP All HRP All HRP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Home owners
Log 4-year House price change 0.035∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.008) (0.017) (0.023) (0.008) (0.010)
Log household income 0.320∗ 0.376∗ 0.433 0.094 0.246 0.374
(0.147) (0.182) (0.469) (0.538) (0.214) (0.266)
Log regional GDP 0.005∗ 0.007∗ 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.006∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.008) (0.012) (0.002) (0.003)
Log house price 0.016∗ 0.009 0.061∗∗ 0.044 -0.014 -0.021
(0.007) (0.009) (0.023) (0.025) (0.010) (0.011)
Interest rate expectations 0.025 0.018 0.024 0.080 0.002 0.007
(0.023) (0.034) (0.069) (0.086) (0.029) (0.036)
Regional unemployment rate 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.011 0.001 0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.008) (0.002) (0.003)
Age 0.001 -0.001 0.010 -0.004 -0.003 -0.007
(0.002) (0.003) (0.008) (0.011) (0.003) (0.004)
Age-squared 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Children 0.000 0.002 0.005 0.011 -0.003 0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.011) (0.014) (0.004) (0.006)
Married 0.016∗ 0.014 0.007 -0.044 -0.008 -0.020
(0.006) (0.009) (0.025) (0.034) (0.011) (0.014)
Degree 0.009 0.021 0.001 0.062 -0.030 -0.043
(0.014) (0.019) (0.055) (0.069) (0.025) (0.036)
A levels 0.022 0.028 0.138∗∗ 0.182∗∗ 0.032 0.041
(0.013) (0.018) (0.049) (0.062) (0.025) (0.038)
GCSEs 0.028∗ 0.035∗ 0.129∗∗ 0.104 0.030 0.012
(0.012) (0.016) (0.044) (0.061) (0.024) (0.034)
Other qual. 0.028∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.127∗∗ 0.141∗ 0.039 0.033
(0.012) (0.015) (0.041) (0.056) (0.022) (0.034)
Employed 0.001 -0.019 0.027 -0.102 -0.008 0.011
(0.016) (0.025) (0.060) (0.078) (0.019) (0.028)
Self-employed 0.016 0.007 0.088 -0.033 0.009 0.024
(0.018) (0.028) (0.066) (0.082) (0.020) (0.030)
Unemployed -0.006 -0.039 -0.107 -0.416∗ -0.039 0.010
(0.031) (0.047) (0.139) (0.182) (0.045) (0.070)
Retired 0.051 0.053 0.028 -0.210 -0.028 0.011
(0.033) (0.037) (0.087) (0.108) (0.028) (0.030)
Family care -0.015 -0.046 0.062 -0.132 -0.027 0.009
(0.021) (0.034) (0.073) (0.113) (0.023) (0.034)
N 36102 19688 21431 11893 23782 13080
Within R2 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06
Note: Authors’ estimation of equation 4.13. Dependent variable in columns (1)-(2) and (5)-(6):
Dummy = 1 if feel closer to the right-wing. Dependent variable in columns (3)-(4): Represents
strength of support for Conservatives relative to Labour/; 1 = Labour (very strong support), 2 =
Labour (fairly strong), 3 = Labour (not very strong), 4 = Other parties (including Liberal Democrats)
5 = Conservative (not very strong), 6 = Conservative (fairly strong), 7 = Conservative (very strong).
All estimates include individual, local authority, and year fixed effects, and occupational dummies
(25). Standard errors clustered at the local authority district level are in parentheses.
*p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001.
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